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Interference control is the ability to select relevant information while filtering out 
irrelevant distracting information.  Theories of interference control differ regarding 
whether a single system of control acts upon multiple representations, or whether 
dissociable forms of control exist.  Moreover, it is unclear whether control relies 
on the facilitation of relevant information, inhibition of irrelevant information, or 
both.  Here, we combine cognitive psychology, functional neuromaging, and 
meta-analytic techniques to examine the neural and psychological mechanisms 
of interference control.  We find common control-related activation in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex across perceptual, memorial, and response 
selection.  However, control networks in more posterior regions of the brain 
differentiate by the kinds of representations that control acts upon.  We suggest 
that the frontal eye fields and superior parietal lobule may be most closely linked 
to selective attention mechanisms that underlie perceptual selection, but that 
these regions may also be recruited to select upon competing memorial and 
response representations.  Interference control processes acting upon competing 
memories preferentially recruit left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, which shows 
enhanced functional connectivity with the medial temporal lobe when selection 
 ix
demands are increased.  Finally, response selection processes may engage the 
premotor cortex, and all forms of selection may be dissociable from inhibition 
processes that act just before motor execution.  We demonstrate that at least in 
the perceptual domain, control processes act by a combination of facilitation of 
relevant information and inhibition of irrelevant information, and that inhibition can 
affect processing at least several seconds into the future.  The role of inhibition in 
memory remains less clear.  Our results suggest that common goal-related 
information stored in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex biases processing in 
dissociable posterior networks responsible for different kinds of information.  
Hence, both common and dissociable neural and psychological mechanisms 






Consider the following situations:   
• Faced with interesting scenery and several other motorists, a driver 
determines where to deploy her attention. 
• Having scheduled multiple lunch arrangements, a student attempts to 
recall whether they are having lunch with a friend today or the next day. 
• A diner chooses an entrée from a list of many delectable items. 
 
All of these situations require selection.  Oftentimes, selection proceeds 
automatically and we hardly notice it.  What makes these cases interesting is that 
selection is effortful due to the presence of salient competing information.  In 
these situations, control is required to select relevant information amongst 
irrelevant competitors.  How is such control achieved?  This is a question that 
has been of interest since the inception of experimental psychology. 
 
The study of cognitive control has largely centered around tasks that require 
effortful discipline over automatic behaviors.  Consider the classic Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935).  In this task, subjects are presented with colored words.  Subjects
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 are instructed to refrain from their automatic tendency to read the words, and 
instead name the color that the words are printed in.  In conditions where the 
word and the color match (e.g. the word “red” printed in red), there is little control 
needed since there is no conflict present.  However, when the word and the color 
mismatch (e.g. the word “red” printed in green), control must be called upon in 
order to make the appropriate response in the face of conflicting color and word 
representations.  Careful dissection of this task reveals that there are multiple 
routes towards successful performance.  For one, attentional processes may be 
drawn upon to emphasize the color aspect of the input and/or attenuate the word 
input.  Alternatively, both inputs may be perceived, yet control may allow only the 
color input to elicit its semantic representation.  In the case that both the color 
and word activate their semantic representations, one might excite only the 
stimulus-response mapping for the color representation and/or suppress the 
stimulus-response mapping of the word.  Finally, if the wrong response has been 
selected, this response may be withdrawn in favor of the correct response.  
Hence, even in this simple task, appropriate control can be achieved in several 
ways. 
 
What the opening examples and the Stroop task illustrate is that effortful 
selection can occur on several levels of representation.  These levels range from 
sensory inputs, to memories, to motor outputs.  Clearly there are varied forms of 
information to be selected.  What is unclear is whether the act of selecting among 
different sorts of information varies, as well, or whether a single governing 
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system of control is responsible for selecting amongst information of all kinds.  In 
other words, is there a single control process or might control processes be 
distinguished in some meaningful way?  Of further interest are the computational 
mechanisms by which control is achieved.  For instance, is it the case that 
effortful selection proceeds via highlighting relevant information, attenuating 
irrelevant information, or both?  Answers to these questions are central to our 
understanding of cognition. 
 
Here, we will use the term “interference control” or “interference-resolution” to 
describe selection in the face of competing information.  Historically, the term 
“inhibition” has been used in a synonymous way.  However, this term 
presupposes the mechanism by which control is achieved: namely, the down-
regulation of competing information.  Although this account has intuitive appeal, 
empirical support for inhibition acting at a cognitive level is scarce (see MacLeod 
et al., 2003 for a review).  Hence, recognizing that the mechanisms of control 
remain largely unclear, we restrict our use of term “inhibition” to cases where 
there is good reason to suspect that inhibition is truly at work, and use theory 
neutral terms otherwise.  
 
1.1  Theories of Interference Control 
Popular accounts of interference control are mixed regarding whether 
interference control is subserved by a single process, or a collection of 
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processes.  In addition to variations in process distinctions, these accounts vary 
in the mechanisms underlying interference control. 
 
1.1.1 Unitary Theories 
 
1.1.1.1 Hasher, Zacks, and May, 1999 – Inhibition: Access, Deletion, and 
Restraint 
Hasher, Zacks, and May (1999) hypothesized that inhibition is the critical 
component to interference control.  These authors reasoned that inhibition 
performed three functions in the service of goal-directed behaviors.  First, 
inhibition serves to prevent irrelevant information from capturing attention 
(access).  Second, inhibition removes irrelevant information from mind (deletion).  
Third, inhibition prevents habitual responses from being produced, allowing less 
prepotent responses to be made (restraint).  Hasher, Zacks, and May (1999) 
argued that the access and deletion functions of inhibition preserve the contents 
of memory so that only goal-relevant information is maintained.  Deficits in either 
of these functions increase “mental clutter”, producing problems during retrieval.  
The authors applied this reasoning to memory declines in old age explaining that 
inhibitory declines with age produce more information to sift through in working 
memory leading to less efficient retrieval operations. 
 
1.1.1.2 Kane et al., 2001 – Controlled Attention 
 5
Similar to Hasher, Zacks, and May (1999), Kane and colleagues (2001) theorized 
that interference control depends upon a single process.  However, rather than 
highlighting inhibition as the mechanism that enables interference control, these 
authors argued that differences in interference control result from differences in 
controlled attention.  By the controlled attention account, irrelevant information is 
shielded from memory by focusing attention on goal-relevant information.  
Outside of focal attention, irrelevant information fades away.  Hence, this account 
does not endorse active inhibition as the mechanism underlying interference 
control, but rather excitation of relevant information.  Irrelevant information need 
not be inhibited per se, rather it needs to not be maintained.  These authors 
further speculated that if inhibition exists, it is the result of active maintenance 
that blocks distracting information.  Therefore, inhibition may be a by-product of 
directing attention towards relevant information, rather than an active process 
focused upon suppressing irrelevant information. 
 
1.1.1.3 MacLeod et al., 2003 – Episodic Retrieval 
Both the inhibition and controlled attention accounts of interference control 
highlight the need to maintain goal-relevant information.  Failures to maintain 
relevant information or filter out irrelevant information cause performance 
decrements observed in interference tasks.  By contrast, MacLeod and 
colleagues (2003) focused on retrieval as the locus of performance decrements 
in interference tasks.  These authors argued that interference tasks elicit 
automatic retrievals of conflicting information since multiple sources of 
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information compete for representation.  The resolution of this retrieval-related 
conflict is a demanding operation, which causes decreases in performance.  
Furthermore, these authors favored an inhibition-free interpretation of 
interference control, pointing out that choosing among competing alternatives 
does not necessitate inhibiting one of them. 
 
1.1.1.4 Braver, et al., 2007 – Proactive versus Reactive Control 
The episodic retrieval account of interference control is clearly at odds with the 
inhibition account in that the episodic retrieval account sees no role for inhibition.  
At first blush, the episodic retrieval account may also seem incompatible with the 
controlled attention view since the controlled attention view highlights 
maintenance operations as the heart of interference control, whereas the 
episodic retrieval account focuses on retrieval.  Work by Braver and colleagues 
(2007) demonstrates that these two accounts need not be mutually exclusive, 
however.  By Braver et al. (2007), interference control can either be realized 
proactively, as in the careful maintenance of goals or goal-relevant information in 
the face of distraction.  Alternatively, interference control can proceed reactively.  
In this case, a target stimulus is allowed to retrieve associated details, both 
relevant and irrelevant.  After these details have been retrieved, control 
processes may select the appropriate information.  Hence, this reactive form of 
control may have its locus at retrieval.  Braver et al. (2007) showed that subjects 
differ in the degree to which they favor a proactive or reactive strategy, and that 
these differences were related to differences in fluid intelligence.  However, both 
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strategies recruited similar neural correlates, suggesting that the same control 
processes operated for both proactive and reactive control, but at different points 
in time.  Hence, it is possible that both the controlled attention view and episodic 
retrieval account are correct, and variations in task and subject strategy may 
favor one or the other at a given time. 
 
1.1.1.5 Neural Instantiation of Single Process Theories – Biased 
Competition Models 
If a single form of interference control acts upon multiple representations (e.g. 
percepts, memories, responses), how might control be instantiated in the brain?  
Several accounts have posited that a similar network of top-down control 
produces biasing signals that resolve competition at various levels of processing 
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 
2001).  Top-down control is thought to originate from prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and modulate neural activity in representational 
cortex such as visual cortex for percepts, temporal cortex for memories, and 
motor cortex for responses.  These control signals may act to highlight relevant 
information (Kastner et al., 1999; Egner and Hirsch, 2005), similar to the 
controlled attention account, or dampen irrelevant information (Tootell et al., 
1998; Muller and Ebeling, 2008), similar to the inhibition account.  Moreover, 
control can act at different points in time.  Top-down biasing of visual cortex has 
been demonstrated during prepatory periods as subjects await a stimulus at a 
particular location (Kastner et al., 1999), supporting a proactive form of control.  
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Additionally, control signals from PFC are ramped up following high conflict 
situations (Kerns et al., 2004), reflecting a reactive form of control. 
 
1.1.2 Multi-process Theories 
Although parsimonious in their explanation of interference control, unitary 
theories face several challenges.  For starters, measures of interference control 
often show near-zero correlations with one another (Kramer et al., 1994; Shilling 
et al., 2002).  Such poor consistency among interference measures casts doubt 
on the claim that they tap the same fundamental ability.  In addition, some patient 
populations demonstrate difficulties with some tasks involving interference 
control, but not others, suggesting a deficit in a specific form of interference 
control (e.g. Nigg, 2000; 2001).  As a result, some theorists have suggested that 
interference control processes form a family of functions. 
 
1.1.2.1 Nigg, 2000 – Interference Control, Cognitive Inhibition, and 
Behavioral Inhibition 
Nigg (2000) hypothesized a taxonomy of interference control processes similar to 
the inhibition account of Hasher, May, and Zacks (1999).  He distinguished four 
types of effortful control: 1) interference control prevents interference due to 
resource or stimulus competition; 2) cognitive inhibition suppresses unwanted 
thoughts to protect working memory; 3) behavioral inhibition suppresses 
inappropriate responses; and 4) oculomotor inhibition provides control over 
reflexive saccades.  Nigg’s interference control is similar to access in the Hasher, 
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Zacks, and May (1999) framework: cognitive inhibition is similar to deletion, and 
behavioral inhibition and oculomotor control map onto the restraint function.  Like 
Hasher, Zacks, and May (1999), Nigg (2000) endorsed the position that control is 
achieved via inhibition.  However, whereas Hasher, Zacks, and May (1999) 
spoke of inhibition as a single process that performs multiple functions, Nigg 
(2000) admitted uncertainty regarding whether each function was performed by a 
separable system.  In his framework, Nigg (2000) hypothesized partially 
overlapping, but partially distinct neural correlates for each process and 
recognized that much work was needed to investigate these speculations. 
 
Other authors have proposed taxonomies of interference control processes, but 
each of these map more or less onto the same framework proposed by Nigg 
(2000) (e.g. Dempster, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995).  Hence, several researchers 
have converged on the idea that interference control processes may be parsed 
by stages of processing.  Therefore, the critical test to determine between unitary 
and multi-process theories may be to examine whether there are distinguishable 
interference control processes related to encoding perceptual material, 
maintaining information in memory, selecting among responses, and executing 
responses.  There has been little work addressed at examining these 
distinctions, and as a result, multi-process theories of interference control rely 
largely upon conceptual distinctions rather than empirical support (Friedman and 
Miyake, 2004).  Hence, there is a need for careful examination of distinctions 
among interference control processes. 
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1.2 Present Work 
In the following chapters, I present 6 studies aimed at enhancing our 
understanding of interference control.  Chapter 2 describes a meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging work that serves to summarize the extant neuroimaging data on 
interference control, as way as lay the groundwork for further studies.  Chapter 3 
focuses on a specific form of interference: interference from previously relevant, 
but no longer relevant memories (proactive interference).  There we use event-
related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural 
correlates of proactive interference and the mechanisms that are involved in its 
resolution.  Chapter 4 describes the use of additive factors logic in a behavioral 
study to distinguish control processes related to proactive interference from those 
related to responses.  Chapters 5 and 7 contrast the neural correlates of 
proactive interference-resolution with those involving selective attention to inputs.  
Chapter 5 examines these processes during retrieval, whereas Chapter 7 
investigates their operation during encoding and maintenance.  Chapter 6 
examines control over attention more closely, testing whether control processes 
of selective attention use an inhibitory mechanism. 
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Chapter 2 
Interference-Resolution: Insights from a Meta-Analysis 
of Neuroimaging Tasks 
 
The need to select information among competing alternatives is ubiquitous. 
Oftentimes, successful cognition depends upon the ability to focus resources on 
goal-relevant information while filtering out or inhibiting irrelevant information. 
How selective attention operates, and whether and how irrelevant information is 
inhibited or otherwise filtered out has been a major focus of research since the 
inception of experimental psychology. For the past 15 years, cognitive 
neuroscientists have used neuroimaging to uncover the brain mechanisms 
underlying processes responsible for handling irrelevant information. Much of this 
research has used variants of classic cognitive interference-resolution tasks, 
each different in its superficial characteristics but sharing the common 
requirement to resolve conflict. What have we learned from this large corpus of 
data? 
  
Examining the multitude of studies focusing on interference-resolution tells an 
extremely varied story. Figure 1a shows a plot of the peaks of activation of forty-
seven studies which purport to examine interference-resolution (see the studies 
listed in Table 2.1). Ostensibly, there appears to be little consistency in these 
data. Several factors may be contributing to the massive inter-study variance.
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First, Figure 2.1a includes activations from different tasks, subjects, equipment, 
scanning parameters, and statistical analyses. If we constrain our focus to just 
one task, however, the activations do not appear to be much more consistent. 
Figure 2.1b shows the activations arising just from the Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935), and these do not appear any more orderly. Indeed, the variability among 
the reported peaks across all interference-resolution tasks corroborates 
behavioral findings that correlations in performance among different interference-
resolution tasks are low (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994; 
Shilling, Chetwynd, & Rabbitt, 2002). Indeed, even simple changes in task 
parameters appear to produce very different results (e.g. de Zubicaray, Andrew, 
Zelaya, Williams, & Dumanoir, 2000; MacLeod, 1991). It seems clear that 
understanding interference-resolution will take deeper analytic methods that 
interrogate possible strategic and mechanistic differences. Some researchers 
have attempted to examine the neural signatures of various interference-
resolution tasks within the same subjects to uncover whether any consistency 
can be found (Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss, Thomas, & Posner, 2003; Liu, 
Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2004; Peterson et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2005). 
These efforts have revealed that activations in different tasks overlap in a 
number of regions, but that there are also regions unique to one task or another. 







Figure 2.1.  Peak Plot. A) Peaks from the 47 studies included in the meta-
analysis plotted in a single brain. B) Peaks from the studies using the Stroop 
task.1 
 
At this point, there have been a sufficient number of studies of interference-
resolution to begin to answer these questions. Here, we attempt to sift through 
the inter-study variance in the interference-resolution literature and pick out the 
consistencies among studies and tasks. In addition to trying to uncover the 
neural basis of interference-resolution, we shall also consider why variations in 
                                                 
1 It is clear from this figure that certain peaks seem to lie outside of the canonical brain 
(avg152T1.img; SPM, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).  In order to plot all of the reported peaks into a single brain, 
coordinates that were reported in Talairach space were converted to MNI space (http://www.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/).  It is possible that either there are some imperfections with the 
transformation tool or that some authors incorrectly reported that their coordinates were in 
Talairach space when they were actually in MNI space, causing the transformation to move these 
peaks outside of the canonical brain. 
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tasks and task parameters may lead to separable patterns of neural activation. 
Although the meta-analytic methods used here preclude us from drawing strong 
conclusions about interference-resolution (because they rely on reported peak 
coordinates from previous studies), they allow us to begin to form hypotheses 
that further investigations can either confirm or deny (e.g. Fox, Laird, & 
Lancaster, 2005).  
 
2.1 Methods  
2.1.1 Study Selection  
For our analyses we included 6 tasks that have been prominent in the 
interference-resolution literature: the go/no-go task, flanker task, Stroop task, 
stimulus-response compatibility task, Simon task, and stop-signal task (all 
described below). Studies were included only if they reported peaks of activation 
in standardized coordinate space (Talairach or MNI). Notably absent are tasks 
that examine the resolution of proactive interference (e.g. Jonides, Smith, 
Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998) since a review of these data has 
already been published (Jonides & Nee, 2006). Furthermore, we do not include 
the anti-saccade task in this mix because models of this task are already at the 
single-unit level, and our coarse techniques of analysis would be unable to inform 
this literature further (Munoz & Everling, 2004). We included neuroimaging 
studies that used either PET or fMRI between 1990 and 2005 that examined 
normal, healthy, young adults.2 Although we recognize that there may be 
                                                 
2 Several studies included also looked at patient, younger, or older populations.  Data included in 
our analyses consisted only of those data extracted from normal, healthy young adults. 
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differences between blocked and event-related designs in terms of neural 
activations, there were insufficient studies to examine each separately. 
Therefore, we have combined both types of designs in our analyses. Forty-seven 
studies met our criteria and are listed in Table 2.1. When possible, we restricted 
our analyses to correct trials only. 
 
2.1.2 Tasks  
Go/No-Go. In the go/no-go (GNG) task, subjects are required to respond to one 
stimulus (the letter “Y” for example), but withhold a response to another stimulus 
(“X”). Responses are labeled “go” trials, while trials on which a response is to be 
withheld are called “no-go” trials. It has been argued that as the number of “go” 
trials preceding a “no-go” trial increases, a greater prepotent tendency to respond 
is formed (de Zubicaray et al., 2000; Durston, Thomas, Worden, Yang, & Casey, 
2002; Durston et al., 2002; Rubia et al., 2001). This prepotent response must be 
resolved in order to perform properly on “no-go” trials. Our analyses included 
contrasts of no-go versus go responses. 
  
Flanker. The flanker task requires a subject to attend to a centrally fixated 
stimulus while ignoring flanking stimuli (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In a 
paradigmatic case, the central stimulus can be a letter (“H”, for example), which 
subjects learn to associate with a given response (say, a left keypress). Flanking 
stimuli can be of 3 types. First, the flankers can be identical to the imperative 
stimulus. In this case, both the relevant and irrelevant stimuli are consistent 
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(HHH). We will refer to this trial-type as “identical.” Flankers can also be different 
from the central stimulus (“S”, for instance), but participants are instructed to map 
these stimuli onto the same (say, left) response as the target stimulus (SHS). 
This trial-type is called “congruent.” Finally, stimuli can differ not only in form from 
the relevant stimulus, but also in response pairing (“G” mapped onto a right 
keypress). This is what we call an “incongruent” trial (GHG). Thus, on identical 
trials, no conflict is present. On congruent trials, there is stimulus conflict but not 
response conflict, and on incongruent trials there is stimulus as well as response 
conflict (Kornblum, Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999; van Veen, Cohen, 
Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001; Zhang, Zhang, & Kornblum, 1999). Our 
analyses included both contrasts of incongruent versus congruent responses and 
incongruent versus identical responses. There were insufficient studies to tease 
these two contrasts apart.  Additionally, there was an insufficient use of neutral 
conditions (i.e. flanking stimuli that map onto no response), to include as a point 
of comparison. 
 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility. In the stimulus-response compatibility 
(SRC) paradigm, a subject is required to switch between two stimulus-response 
mappings. One mapping, referred to as “compatible”, is directly suggested by the 
stimulus. For example, a typical SRC task might employ arrows as stimuli in 
which case a “compatible” mapping might be a left keypress to an arrow pointing 
left and right keypress to an arrow pointing right. An “incompatible” mapping 
would require a left keypress to a rightward pointing arrow and a right keypress 
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to a leftward pointing arrow. Thus, in the “incompatible” condition, a prepotent 
response that is suggested by the stimulus and developed by previous 
“compatible” responses must be overcome. Our analyses included incompatible 
minus compatible contrasts.  
 
Stroop. In the Stroop task, subjects must identify the hue in which a word is 
printed while ignoring the referent of the word. There are three basic types of 
trials in a typical Stroop task: incongruent, congruent, and neutral. On congruent 
trials, both the color of the word and the word’s referent elicit the same response 
(for example, the word “red” printed in red ink). On incongruent trials, the color 
and referent of the word elicit different responses (the word “green” printed in red 
ink). Neutral trials may be of several types, but for all neutral trials the referent of 
the stimulus does not provide a competing response to the hue (for example, a 
series of X’s printed in red, or the word “LOT” printed in red). Our analyses 
included both incongruent minus congruent and incongruent minus neutral 
contrasts.  
 
Simon. The Simon task is similar to the Stroop task, except that the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension is spatial. For example, in a paradigmatic Simon task, a 
relevant stimulus is presented at various spatial locations. The stimulus (say, a 
colored circle) might appear either to the right or left of fixation. The circle is 
mapped onto a left or right response (e.g. red-left, blue-right), and subjects must 
respond to the stimulus while ignoring the potentially distracting spatial 
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placement of the stimulus. It has been found that when the location of the 
stimulus is incompatible with the response it elicits (a red circle presented to the 
right of fixation), reaction times are slower than if the location is compatible with 
the response. This is due to the resolution of interference caused by the 
irrelevant spatial dimension of the stimulus. We included incompatible minus 
compatible contrasts in our analyses. 
 
Stop-signal. The stop-signal task requires a subject to cease executing a 
readied response. In a typical stop-signal task, a subject is required to respond to 
a stimulus, but withhold the response if a tone is heard. Varying the onset of the 
tone relative to the response can affect the error-rates (responses not withheld) 
and thus the demands on conflict-resolution processes. Our analyses include 
stop versus go responses.  
 
2.1.3 Density Analysis  
We used a data-driven approach to discovering which regions of the brain were 
most consistently reported in the corpus of studies. To this end, we employed a 
density analysis technique, which has been successfully used in other meta-
analyses (Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 
2003) and is similar to other voxel-based methods (Fox et al., 2005; Laird et al., 
2005). The density technique is similar to the Activation Likelihood Estimate 
(ALE) method used in some other meta-analyses (Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & 
Zeffiro, 2002), with one distinction. The density technique examines the spatial 
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consistency among reported peaks and locates brain voxels in which the density 
of reported peaks exceeds what would be expected by chance. The ALE method 
assesses the probability that at least one activation peak fell within that voxel by 
assessing the union of probability values across individual peaks. Though the 
methods give very similar results, we test the null hypothesis that the spatial 
distribution of peaks is random, whereas the ALE method tests the null 
hypothesis that no studies activated a particular voxel.  
 
The density analysis was conducted as follows. We first converted all Talairach 
peaks into MNI space in order to have all the data mapped into a common 
stereotactic space (http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/). Next, we plotted all 
of the peaks reported in each study onto a canonical brain (avg152T1.img; SPM, 
Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). 
We included only positive activations since deactivations are inconsistently 
reported and difficult to interpret (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Wager 
et al., 2003). We then calculated a peak density estimate for each of the 2 x 2 x 2 
mm voxels in the brain; this was defined as the number of the n peaks in the 
analysis contained within a sphere of 10 to 20 mm (depending on analysis, 
described below) surrounding that voxel, divided by the volume of the sphere. 
Thus, the units of density reported are peaks per cubic mm of brain tissue. In 
order to determine a density distribution for the null hypothesis, we conducted a 
Monte Carlo simulation with 5000 iterations per analysis, assuming no systematic 
spatial organization of the voxels.  For each iteration, n points corresponding to 
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the n reported peaks were distributed randomly throughout the gray and white 
matter of the brain (excluding ventricles and sinus spaces). White matter was 
included because many reported peaks fall within white matter near white/gray 
matter boundaries.3 The density-estimate map across the brain for the peaks as 
actually reported in the literature was then compared to this null distribution using 
a significance threshold of the 95
th 
percentile of the null distribution (p < 0.05, 
brain-wise, one-tailed). The test statistic is the density of reported peaks in the 
local area around the voxel being tested, and the Monte Carlo simulation 
provides p-values that reflect how (un)likely it is to obtain the observed density if 
peaks were actually randomly (uniformly) distributed throughout the brain. A low 
p-value would indicate that the null-hypothesis uniform distribution of peaks is 
unlikely to result in a cluster as dense as the one observed. If the density-
estimate of a given voxel was significantly greater than what would be expected 
by the simulated null distribution, we took this voxel to be active for that particular 
analysis.4 
 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge that although some reported peaks fall within white matter, or gray 
matter/white matter boundaries, peaks are more likely to fall within gray matter.  Therefore, it may 
not be appropriate to distribute simulated peaks uniformly across gray and white matter.  
However, the assumption of uniform distribution across gray and white matter greatly simplifies 
the analysis.  Some studies do report peaks relatively deep in white matter, whether due to 
spatial imprecision or neuro-vascular translation in the BOLD effect or some other factors.  The 
inclusion of white matter makes the tests here slightly less conservative than they would be if we 
included only some white matter (near gray-matter structures, for example) or only gray matter, 
but the difference is relatively small.  Indeed, analyses that excluded white matter produced very 
similar results (as did simulations that increased the number of Monte Carlo simulations to 
10000).  Therefore, we deem that this method offers a reasonable approximation. 
4 We realize that using peaks ignores the volume and significance level of activation.  
Additionally, our resolution is limited by the density radius and the nonconformity of peaks may 
derive from variations in smoothing function images.  As a result, we merely propose hypotheses 
from our data rather than drawing conclusion.  However, we point out that this technique and 
techniques similar have provided useful results in several published studies (e.g. Phan et al., 
2002; Turkeltaub et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2004; Wager et al., 2003). 
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Active voxels were grouped into contiguous voxels using SPM2's contiguity 
assessment procedures (spm_cluster.m; Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology), i.e., if voxels share at least one vertex, they are considered to be 
part of the same contiguous region. The resulting clusters are reported in Table 
2. Localization of these clusters was performed by first converting the clusters 
back into Talairach space (http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/) and then 
consulting a standard brain atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988).  
We performed a separate density analysis for each interference contrast: go/no-
go, flanker, SRC, and Stroop. Due to the small number of studies that 
investigated the Simon and stop-signal tasks, we were unable to perform a 
density analysis on these tasks. Additionally, we performed a density analysis on 
all of the studies taken together. For the individual studies, a density sphere of 
radius 20-mm was used. We used a larger sphere for these analyses because 
few studies and therefore few coordinates were available for each of these tasks. 
For the analysis that combined all tasks, we used a smaller region of 10-mm 
radius, consistent with the size used in previous such meta-analyses (Wager et 
al., 2003).  
 
2.2 Results  
The density analysis performed on the combination of all the tasks produced 
significant clusters bilaterally in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC) (Figure 2.2). Table 2.2 summarizes the results.  
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2.2.1 Individual Task Analyses  
Density analyses performed on each task individually by and large revealed a 




Figure 2.2. All Tasks Combined.  Results of a peak density analysis performed 
on all of the 47 studies included.  Regions are reported in Table 2.2. 
 
2.2.1.1 Go/No-Go  
 For the go/no-go task, the most prominent cluster was in right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, extending inferiorly into the right inferior frontal gyrus and 
insula. There were also significant clusters in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
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anterior cingulate, and right posterior parietal cortex, but these were smaller in 
extent. There were also small clusters in right occipital cortex.  
 
2.2.1.2 Flanker  
The flanker task produced a significant cluster in right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Another smaller cluster was found in the right insula, but the extent of the 
inferior cluster was not nearly the size of the one found in the go/no-go task.  
 
2.2.1.3 Stimulus-Response Compatibility  
The SRC task produced reliable clusters most prominently in bilateral posterior 
parietal cortex, but primarily right lateralized. Clusters were also found in left 
supplementary motor area and premotor cortex, as well as in the anterior 
cingulate cortex.  
 
2.2.1.4 Stroop  
Clusters from the Stroop task were primarily left lateralized. There was a large 
cluster in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex that extended inferiorly to the insula. 
Additionally, we found a very large cluster in medial frontal cortex including the 
anterior cingulate. To a lesser extent there was also a cluster in left posterior 
parietal cortex. There were also clusters in right dorsolateral prefrontal and 
posterior parietal cortices, but these clusters were much smaller in extent than 
the ones found in the left hemisphere. Finally, there was also a small cluster in 
the thalamus.  
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Figure 2.3. Individual Task Density Analyses. Results of peak density analyses 
performed separately on the go/no-go, flanker, stimulus-response compatibility, 
and Stroop tasks.  Also included are separate density analyses performed on 
studies investigating the incongruent versus neutral Stroop contrast and the 
incongruent versus congruent Stroop contrast. 
 
2.3 Discussion  
Despite the seemingly random scatter of activation pictured in Figure 1, our 
density analysis yielded reliable clusters of activation in many areas that have 
often been implicated in interference-resolution. This network of regions may 
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therefore be involved in interference-resolution in general. However, a look at our 
individual task-analyses reveals that each task reliably activates a subset of 
these regions. Understanding why each task loads differentially on a distinct 
subset of regions may be the key to understanding how the brain resolves 
conflict.  
 
Each task included in this study relies on different methods for inducing cognitive 
conflict. It is likely that these different forms of conflict act upon different neural 
mechanisms. For instance, mechanisms that filter out distracting visual 
information may be useful in the flanker, Stroop, and Simon tasks where conflict 
is produced by competing irrelevant stimuli, but these same mechanisms would 
not be relevant for the go/no-go task, in which there are no visual distractors. 
Therefore, examining the differences in the kinds of conflict each task produces 
and differences in the neural activations that accompany each kind of conflict-





Figure 2.4.  All Tasks Combined Slices.  Slice renderings of the peak density 
analysis performed on all of the 47 studies included. 
 
2.3.1 Go/No-Go and Stop-signal  
It is clear that the go/no-go task induces conflict in mechanisms responsible for 
selecting and executing an appropriate response. As some authors have argued, 
response-selection and response-execution may be distinguishable stages of 
processing (Rubia et al., 2001; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor, 2003). 
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Therefore, when subjects attempt to overcome the prepotent tendency to 
respond in the go/no-go task, they may accomplish this either by biasing decision 
processes towards selecting the appropriate response, or by restraining an 
inappropriate response from being executed and later selecting the appropriate 
response. In the former case, interference-resolution acts upon response-
selection and in the latter, it acts upon response-execution. At which stage 
conflict is resolved is likely influenced by the experimental parameters. For 
instance, as the proportion of “go” to “no-go” trials increases, a greater 
prepotency to respond is formed which may heavily bias response-selection 
processes in favor of responding, therefore making a subject more reliant upon 
mechanisms of restraint acting upon response-execution (de Zubicaray et al., 
2000; Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999). It is likely also that speeded responding 
would produce a similar effect. Although changes in task parameters would be 
interesting to explore, we have an insufficient number of studies exploring the 
go/no-go task to warrant meta-analytic techniques. Therefore, for specifics on 
how the neural mechanisms underlying interference-resolution change as task 
parameters differ, we rely on single studies.  
 
By far the most reliable activation we found in the go/no-go task was in right 
frontal cortex, including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior frontal regions. 
Somewhat speculatively, we can tease apart what parts of this activation may be 
due to response-selection and what may be due to response-execution. One 
approach is to examine what neural changes occur as the go/no-go task 
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becomes more or less difficult. Presumably, by the logic we have presented, 
increased difficulty caused by an increased prepotency to respond requires a 
greater contribution of resolution mechanisms acting upon response-execution. 
Several studies examining this have reported that activation in the right inferior 
frontal gyrus increases with increased task difficulty (Durston et al., 2002; 
Durston et al., 2002; Garavan et al., 1999). Another study which parametrically 
varied the number of no-go trials found that as the number of no-go trials 
increased, reaction times increased and errors decreased, suggesting a shift 
toward more controlled responding (de Zubicaray et al., 2000). This shift in 
response style was accompanied by an increase in right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Taken together, it appears that in the go/no-go task, right inferior frontal 
gyrus activation underlies resolution during response-execution, whereas right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation accompanies more controlled resolution, 
perhaps during the selection of a response. 
 
Although our reasoning is somewhat speculative, it corroborates well the 
literature concerning the stop-signal task. In the stop-signal task, the subject 
must restrain a response when a stop-signal occurs, therefore relying solely upon 
mechanisms that resolve conflict during the execution of a response. Indeed, 
neuroimaging studies that have examined the stop-signal task have implicated 
the right inferior frontal gyrus for this kind of interference-resolution (Rubia et al., 
2001; Rubia et al., 2003). Even stronger evidence for this case is made by lesion 
evidence. It has been found that as the size of a lesion in the right inferior frontal 
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gyrus increases, performance in the stop-signal task gets poorer, therefore 
implicating the right inferior frontal gyrus as a region that is vital to the resolution 
of conflict during response-execution (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & 
Robbins, 2003; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). Although we had an 
insufficient number of stop-signal studies to examine this task separately, the 
combination of neuroimaging and lesion evidence appears to provide strong 
support for the notion that the right inferior frontal gyrus is heavily involved in 
resolving conflict due to response-execution.  
 
2.3.2 Flanker  
Our examination of the flanker task revealed significant clusters in right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and right insula. Notably, these areas overlapped 
with the frontal areas activated by the go/no-go task, suggesting that these 
regions may underlie common mechanisms (Figure 2.5) (Wager et al., 2005). 
What might these mechanisms be? As we described above, the flanker task can 
involve stimulus conflict, when the distractor stimuli and target stimuli do not 
match, and response conflict, when the distractor stimuli are mapped onto a 
different response from the target stimuli. Since the go/no-go task does not 
include stimulus conflict, the overlapping activations most likely result from 
response conflict. However, in our discussion of the go/no-go task, we delineated 
two forms of response conflict: response-selection conflict and response-
execution conflict. Furthermore, we implicated right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
activation with resolution of response-selection conflict and right inferior frontal 
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activation with the resolution of conflict during response-execution. Do these 
implications match up with the flanker data?  
 
Figure 2.5.  GNG, Flanker, SRC Slice Renderings. Slice renderings showing the 
results of the peak density analyses performed on the go/no-go (red), flanker 
(green), and SRC (blue) tasks.  Activation overlap between the go/no-go and 
flanker tasks is depicted in yellow. 
 
The overlap in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex appears to be concordant with 
the idea that right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in interference-
resolution during response-selection. Incongruent flankers bias response-
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selection processes against the appropriate response, therefore requiring 
resolution processes to overcome this bias. Therefore, in both the flanker and 
go/no-go tasks, there is a need to select against a bias toward an inappropriate 
response. However, the low error rates typically found in the flanker task suggest 
that there is little need to restrain a response during response-execution. 
Therefore, the inferior frontal overlap appears to be somewhat puzzling.  
 
Whereas the go/no-go task produced a cluster that incorporated both the right 
inferior frontal gyrus and insula, the inferior frontal cluster in the flanker task was 
found exclusively in the insula. We did not distinguish the right inferior frontal 
gyrus from the insula in our earlier discussion, mainly because the role of the 
insula in cognitive tasks remains unclear. One study that compared the go/no-go, 
flanker, and SRC tasks in the same subjects found common anterior insula 
activation among the tasks, activation which correlated with behavioral 
performance (Wager et al., 2005). These authors argued that since all three 
tasks have resolution processes acting upon response-selection in common, the 
insula is involved somehow in response-selection processes. If this is the case, 
then the common insula activation we find in our meta-analysis is orderly in that it 
may reflect common mechanisms of response-selection in the go/no-go and 
flanker tasks. However, other authors have argued that the anterior insula is 
involved in the restraining of inappropriate responses (Garavan et al., 1999). If 
this is the case, then the insula cluster found here is somewhat problematic.  
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A closer look into our flanker studies reveals that one study used a speeded 
flanker task which produced nearly chance accuracy on incongruent trials 
(Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001). The difficulty of this task may have shifted 
resolution processes to response-execution, consistent with our logic for the 
go/no-go task. Indeed, 11 of the 14 inferior frontal peaks found in our flanker 
analysis were contributed by this study alone. Therefore, if the inferior frontal 
region shared by the go/no-go and flanker tasks really does reflect resolution 
processes acting upon response-execution, then our flanker result appears to be 
compatible with this account. 
 
2.3.3 Stimulus-Response Compatibility  
The SRC task is similar to the go/no-go task in that subjects must overcome a 
prepotent tendency to respond inappropriately in order to perform the task 
correctly. However, the prepotency in the two tasks is somewhat different. In the 
go/no-go task, the prepotent tendency to respond is due to the immediately 
preceding context. In other words, a subject has responded to several “go” trials 
and is therefore likely to respond. In the SRC task, however, the prepotency to 
respond inappropriately is not due to the immediately preceding context, but 
rather due to the subject’s familiarity with the stimulus in general. For example, it 
is more natural, based upon previously learned responses, to respond to a left 
arrow with a left response. However, on incompatible trials, subjects must 
overcome this learned tendency to respond appropriately. Put another way, one 
major difference between the go/no-go and SRC tasks is a difference in time-
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scale: in one, a response has been learned due to an immediately preceding 
context; in the other, a response has been learned over the course of a lifetime. 
As our data illustrate, these differences result in very different neural patterns.  
In contrast to the go/no-go and flanker tasks which produced predominately 
frontal activation, the bulk of the activation in the SRC task was in parietal cortex. 
The largest cluster was in left posterior parietal cortex which included the 
intraparietal sulcus. Additional clusters were found in the anterior cingulate and 
premotor/supplementary motor area.  
 
We can contrast the go/no-go and flanker tasks with the SRC task to help 
understand these differences. Let us begin with what is in common between 
them. Although a study comparing the go/no-go, flanker, and SRC tasks in the 
same subjects found several neural regions in common to both (Wager et al., 
2005), the only overlap we found was between the go/no-go and SRC task in left 
premotor cortex. This region has been implicated in response-selection 
(Iacoboni, Woods, & Mazziotta, 1998), and rTMS performed on this region 
impairs performance on incompatible trials (Praamstra, Kleine, & Schnitzler, 
1999). Therefore, the SRC task may have some component of interference-
resolution during response-selection in common with the go/no-go task.  
What is interesting about the neural pattern of results found for the SRC task is 
that the areas implicated are exactly those regions implicated in a meta-analysis 
of switching-attention (Wager et al., 2004). Indeed, a study that directly 
compared the SRC task with a switching task found close parallels between the 
 34
neural signatures of the two tasks (Sylvester et al., 2003). One possibility is that 
interference-resolution in the SRC task is very similar to switching. On 
incompatible trials, the prepotent response may automatically be elicited and 
subjects may need to switch their response-set to activate the appropriate 
response. An alternative, but similar proposal is that activation for both switching 
and the SRC task indicates the need to select among competing stimulus-
response associations. However, further testing will be needed to verify whether 
the type of resolution involved in the SRC task is truly more akin to switching 
than the resolution involved in the go/no-go and flanker tasks.  
 
2.3.4 Stroop  
Like the flanker task, the Stroop task involves filtering out distracting irrelevant 
information that can compete with the appropriate response. However, unlike the 
flanker task, in which the distractors are adjacent to the imperative stimulus, in 
the Stroop task, the target and distractor are different attributes of the same 
object. Additionally, due to the automatic nature of reading the distracting 
material, an incorrect response is highly prepotent on incongruent trials. 
Therefore, in the Stroop task there appears to be a greater demand for selective 
attention to filter out the distracting information.  
 
In the event that selective attention fails to filter out the irrelevant information 
completely, it is likely that the irrelevant information will bias toward the 
inappropriate response. How interference-resolution proceeds in this case 
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depends on the specifics of the paradigm. It has been argued that the verbal-
response Stroop task is very different from a manual-response Stroop task, due 
to the verbal task having an automatic mapping of stimulus to response, whereas 
the manual case has an arbitrary mapping (MacLeod, 1991). Due to the 
movement involved in verbal responses, neuroimaging has by and large relied on 
manual responses. A manual response version of the Stroop task most likely 
relies upon response-selection because the subject is required to select among 
the arbitrary mappings provided by the experimenter. In this case, as with the 
go/no-go, flanker, and SRC tasks, resolution mechanisms must act upon 
response-selection to favor the correct response in the face of strong 
competition.  
 
Overall, the Stroop task is similar to the other tasks studied here in its reliance on 
interference-resolution acting upon response-selection. However, it differs from 
the other tasks in its greater need for selective attention. Additionally, of the tasks 
studied here, the Stroop task is the most verbal in nature. Beginning with what is 
common, the Stroop task overlaps with the go/no-go and flanker tasks in right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and with the SRC task in left 
premotor/supplementary motor area. Consonant with the idea that the Stroop 
task shares response-selection components with these tasks, all of these regions 
have been implicated in the resolution of interference during response-selection 
(Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002; Durston et al., 2002; 
Iacoboni et al., 1998; Praamstra et al., 1999). Additionally, the Stroop task 
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overlaps both the go/no-go and SRC tasks in the anterior cingulate cortex. This 
region has been the subject of much debate, mostly centered around its function 
as a monitor involved in the resolution of response conflict (e.g. Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Once again, this is compatible with the 
notion that the Stroop task shares response-selection components with the other 
tasks.  
 
Although we failed to find significant overlap, there was a close correspondence 
in left posterior parietal cortex (BA 7) between the Stroop task (-22, -64, 46) and 
the SRC task (-16, -62, 48). Both tasks share the need to overcome an overly 
learned prepotent response: in the SRC task the tendency to respond left to a left 
pointing arrow and in the Stroop task the tendency to read written words. Earlier, 
we speculated that resolution in the SRC task may be similar to switching from 
the prepotent response set to the appropriate response set, or selecting among 
stimulus-response associations. It is worth noting that regions that are highly 
related to switching according to a meta-analysis of switching tasks (premotor 
cortex, intraparietal sulcus, and the anterior cingulate) are present in the Stroop 
analysis as they are in the SRC analysis (Wager et al., 2004). Therefore, the 
Stroop and SRC tasks may share the same sort of switch or stimulus-response 
association-related interference-resolution.  
 
Other authors have also speculated that the Stroop task shares mechanisms with 
switching tasks (Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann, & von Cramon, 2005; Derrfuss, 
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Brass, Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005). These authors propose that both tasks 
share the need for updating task representations. Based upon a meta-analysis of 
Stroop and switching tasks, these authors proposed that a region in left frontal 
cortex termed the inferior frontal junction may mediate this function (Derrfuss et 
al., 2005). In accordance with this claim, we found a large left frontal cluster in 
our Stroop analysis which overlapped with this proposed region. We might also 
expect to find similar activation in the SRC task which would ostensibly require 
the same task-representation updating function. However, we did not find reliable 
clusters in this region in our SRC analyses although it is possible that this result 
is due to insufficient power. Perhaps more puzzling is the finding that a separate 
meta-analysis of 31 switching studies also failed to find reliable clusters in the left 
inferior frontal junction (Wager et al., 2004), although these authors did find a 
large left dorsolateral prefrontal region that was more anterior to the inferior 
frontal junction at a reduced threshold. Further examination is required to provide 
consensus regarding the role of the inferior frontal junction and its relation to the 
Stroop and switching tasks.  
 
In contrast to the other tasks studied here, the Stroop task is highly left 
lateralized, most prominently in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior 
frontal regions. Part of this lateralization may be due to the strongly verbal nature 
of the Stroop task. Indeed, some authors have implicated left inferior frontal 
regions in the resolution of verbal conflict (Jonides & Nee, 2006; Jonides et al., 
1998; Leung, Skudlarski, Gatenby, Peterson, & Gore, 2000). Some of the 
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lateralization may also be due to the greater need for selective attention 
processes involved in filtering out strongly competitive irrelevant information. 
Consonant with this idea, one study examined differences during a preparatory 
period preceding either the Stroop task, or the reverse Stroop task where 
subjects make the easier response of responding to the word rather than the 
color (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). These authors found greater 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation for the Stroop task relative to the 
reverse Stroop task. If we believe that the selective attention demands are 
greater for the more difficult task, then it follows that left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex may be engaged in preparation for high demands on selective attention. 
However, this version of the Stroop task involved switching between Stroop and 
reverse Stroop and produced an abnormally large reverse-Stroop effect, so any 
conclusions must be drawn with caution.  
 
Perhaps better evidence regarding the involvement of left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in selective attention comes from several studies that examined 
differences when competing stimuli are response-eligible versus response-
ineligible (Liu, Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2006; Milham & Banich, 2005; 
Milham, Banich, & Barad, 2003; Milham et al., 2001). In these studies, subjects 
learned a mapping of some colors to response keys. These were response-
eligible colors. Contrasting with these colors were other colors that did not have 
mapped responses. Since these items were not available for response, they 
were response-ineligible. Importantly, when used as distracting words, response-
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eligible words caused both stimulus and response conflict on incongruent trials, 
while response-ineligible words caused only stimulus conflict. Therefore, 
examining neural responses to response-ineligible trials compared to neutral 
trials isolates processes involved in resolving stimulus conflict. Indeed, several 
studies examining this paradigm have found left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
related to resolving stimulus conflict (Liu et al., 2006; Milham & Banich, 2005; 
Milham et al., 2003; Milham et al., 2001). This lends support to the idea that left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in selective attention.  
 
Unlike our other tasks, we included both incongruent versus congruent and 
incongruent versus neutral peaks in our analyses in that there were many studies 
that examined each contrast. Since we had sufficient data, we also explored 
whether the incongruent versus congruent contrast differed from the incongruent 
versus neutral contrast as some authors have reported (Bench et al., 1993; 
Carter, Mintun, & Cohen, 1995; Taylor, Kornblum, Lauber, Minoshima, & 
Koeppe, 1997). Indeed, there were significant differences (Figure 2.3, 2.6). The 
incongruent minus neutral contrast exhibited far greater left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and left posterior parietal activation, whereas the incongruent 
versus congruent contrast revealed larger anterior cingulate activation. What this 
must mean is that congruent trials produce greater activation in left dorsolateral 
prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex than neutral trials and less activation in 
the anterior cingulate than neutral trials.  
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Figure 2.6.  Stroop Slice Renderings. Slice renderings of the two different Stroop 
contrasts including their overlap. 
 
Although we are uncertain what exactly to make of these differences, we can 
provide some speculation. Unlike neutral trials, congruent trials provide a 
competing response-eligible stimulus (Milham et al., 2002). If the strategy of the 
participant is to try hard to ignore the irrelevant word, the fact that the word is part 
of the color set may trigger mechanisms involved in selecting the correct stimulus 
dimension (color). By this account, we would expect increases in the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during congruent trials to filter out potentially 
distracting information. However, since the responses indicated by both the word 
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and color are the same, there is no conflict at the response-selection stage. 
Therefore, the reduction in actual response conflict may decrease demand on the 
anterior cingulate. These speculations are supported by a study that examined 
regions specifically recruited by conflict (incongruent > congruent and neutral 
trials) and those by competition (incongruent and congruent > neutral) (Milham & 
Banich, 2005). In this study, there was greater left dorsolateral prefrontal activity 
associated with competition (although still significant activation to a lesser extent 
in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for conflict), consonant with the idea that left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in both incongruent and congruent trials 
where there is a competing response-eligible word. By contrast, there was 
greater anterior cingulate activity associated with conflict (although a smaller, 
dissociable region of the anterior cingulate produced competition related 
activation). These results corroborate well with our finding of greater left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation for the incongruent minus neutral 
contrast, and greater anterior cingulate activation for the incongruent minus 
congruent contrast.  
 
2.3.5 Putting It Together  
We began by noting a network of regions involved in interference-resolution and 
then we interrogated the individual tasks to attempt to understand the functions 
that the individual pieces within this network are performing. What is revealed by 
piecing together the individual facts is a proposal of separate interference-
resolution mechanisms acting upon different stages of processing. Specifically, 
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from the go/no-go and stop-signal data, it appears as though right inferior frontal 
regions are heavily involved in restraining an inappropriate response during 
response-execution. Commonalities in the go/no-go, flanker, SRC, and Stroop 
tasks implicate right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex in 
interference-resolution during response-selection. For cases such as the Stroop 
and SRC tasks, the intraparietal sulcus and premotor cortex may also be 
involved during response-selection, perhaps as a means of switching from 
inappropriate to appropriate response sets or selecting among competing 
stimulus-response associations. Finally, the Stroop data point to left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex for resolution of stimulus conflict, perhaps via selective attention 
mechanisms, and left inferior frontal regions for resolution of verbal conflict. We 
are quick to note that these are merely hypotheses born out of the meta-analysis 
rather than conclusions. Each of these hypotheses needs further testing.  
 
To bolster these hypotheses, we performed a logistic regression to investigate 
whether resolution of interference at different stages of processing predicted 
activation in a given region. We coded each study by whether the task included 
resolution during response-execution, response-selection, or stimulus encoding 
and examined whether these predictors explained activation in right inferior 
frontal gyrus, left inferior frontal gyrus, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate. Additionally, since we 
hypothesized that resolution of verbal information may involve the left inferior 
frontal gyrus, we performed a separate logistic regression on left inferior frontal 
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gyrus using verbal conflict as a predictor (Jonides & Nee, 2006; Jonides et al., 
1998; Leung et al., 2000; Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides, & Smith, 
2003). The results supported our hypotheses. Stimulus-conflict significantly 
predicted activation in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Wald = 5.58, p = 0.018) 
and left inferior frontal gyrus (Wald = 6.9, p = 0.008). Verbal conflict also 
predicted left inferior frontal gyrus activation (Wald = 6.5, p = 0.01). Finally, 
conflict during response-execution marginally predicted activation in the right 
inferior frontal gyrus (Wald = 3.27, p = 0.07). We note that conflict during 
response-selection did not significantly predict activation in any region, but this is 
most likely due to the fact that all tasks other than the one stop-signal task 
included in our meta-analysis elicit conflict during response-selection, and 
therefore this predictor had insufficient variance to explain activation. 
  
These results are consistent with the idea that different neural regions are 
responsible for the resolution of interference at different stages of processing. 
However, we recognize that there may be other ways to organize interference-
resolution processes as well. Some authors have carefully distinguished several 
different forms of conflict, each of which may require its own dissociable 
resolution mechanisms (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Kornblum et al., 
1999; Zhang et al., 1999). Unfortunately, most neuroimaging studies of 
interference-resolution confound several of these forms of conflict, thereby 
making it difficult to distinguish among them. Further investigation is needed to 
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determine whether interference-resolution mechanisms can be more finely 
dissociated than we suggest here. 
  
Figure 2.7.  Peaks By Task. Peaks from all 47 studies plotted in a canonical 
brain, color coded by task. 
 
2.3.6 Mechanisms of interference-resolution  
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We have implicated several regions as important in the resolution of interference, 
but we have not speculated how this conflict is resolved. Resolution may proceed 
via the facilitation of appropriate information, inhibition of inappropriate 
information, a combination of the two, or some other strategy such as switching 
response sets (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & 
Bibi, 2003). We believe that the extant data cannot yet penetrate this question so 
we remain agnostic as to how interference is resolved.  
 
2.3.7 Relation to Other Work   
Several other meta-analyses have looked for consistencies among neuroimaging 
data (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Johnson et al., 2005; 
Wager et al., 2004; Wager & Smith, 2003). For example, Duncan and Owen 
(2000) demonstrated that regions of frontal cortex including the anterior cingulate 
and dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices were recruited by diverse 
cognitive demands not exclusive to conflict. Their analyses of 19 studies 
produced little if any discernible dissociation among the various tasks studied 
when all peaks were plotted on the same canonical brain. Similar to their 
analysis, combining all of our studies produced the same network of regions. 
However, when each task was interrogated individually, we found dissociations 
within this network. Why did we find dissociations when Duncan and Owen 
(2000) did not?  
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Figure 2.7 shows a plot of all of the peaks included in this study, color coded by 
the particular task contributing the peak. From this figure, it is difficult to discern 
dissociable patterns. Examining the data in this way demonstrates the clear need 
for clustering techniques. It is possible that with the inclusion of more studies and 
a clustering technique, dissociable patterns may emerge from the tasks studied 
by Duncan and Owen (2000).  
 
Other meta-analyses looking at particular tasks have found regions overlapping 
with the regions we find here. As mentioned earlier, a meta-analysis of switching 
tasks produced clusters in parietal and premotor cortex similar to areas we found 
for the SRC and Stroop tasks, indicating that resolution for these tasks may have 
share a commonality with switching (Wager et al., 2004). Furthermore, a meta-
analysis of working memory tasks implicated several frontal and parietal regions 
found here (Wager & Smith, 2003). This corroborates findings linking working 
memory with susceptibility to interference (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 
2001; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Hester, Murphy, & Garavan, 2004; Kane, 
Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Kim, Kim, & Chun, 
2005). Working memory tasks often require not only the active maintenance of 
information, but also the filtering out of distraction, and selecting among 
representations for both maintenance and response processes. Consonant with 
the idea that left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is important for selective attention, 
increasing demand on left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex by imposing a working 
memory load increases interference from irrelevant perceptual material (de 
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Fockert et al., 2001). In addition, increasing demand on right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex by increasing working memory load decreases Go/No-Go 
performance, perhaps due to shared components of response-selection (Hester 
et al., 2004). These results suggest a close tie between working memory and 
interference-resolution.  
 
Finally, “refreshing” or bringing to focus an item in mind recruits bilateral frontal, 
anterior cingulate, and posterior parietal cortex (Johnson et al., 2005). Refreshing 
verbal material preferentially activates left inferior frontal regions whereas no 
other refresh-related region demonstrates a verbal preference (Johnson et al., 
2005). Left inferior frontal gyrus may be important in selecting the appropriate 
verbal material to refresh (Jonides & Nee, 2006; Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, 
Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). This verbal selection role is consonant with our data 
demonstrating that left inferior frontal gyrus is needed for interference-resolution 
of verbal conflict. It is likely that other commonalities between regions found here 
and in refreshing also reflect selection of various sorts of representations. Further 
work is needed to examine the relation between interference-resolution and 
refreshing.  
 
2.4 Conclusions  
Examining the combination of many tasks that involve interference-resolution 
revealed that a network including bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior 
frontal regions, posterior parietal cortex and the anterior cingulate that may 
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underlie the resolution of conflict. We hypothesize that separating functions by 
the stage of processing at which conflict is resolved may provide a useful 
framework for understanding interference-resolution. Although future research 
will be needed to test these hypotheses and further understand how each region 
performs interference-resolution, our data suggest that the right inferior frontal 
gyrus is important during response-execution, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
and anterior cingulate during response-selection, and left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex during stimulus encoding. Additionally, switching-related regions in the 




Study Year Flanker GNG SRC Stroop SS Simon Contrast Peaks 
Adleman 2002    X   I-N 3 
Banich 2000    X   I-N 13 
Banich 2001    X   I-N 9 
Bench 1993    X   I-N 13 
Bunge 2002 X      I-C 10 
Carter 1995    X   I-C 9 
     X   I-N 9 
Casey 2002   X    I-Id 11 
Dassonville 2001   X    I-C 14 
Derbyshire 1998    X   I-C 2 
Durston 2001  X     NoGo-Go 9 
Durston 2002  X     NoGo-Go 7 
Fan 2003 X      I-C 14 
     X   I-C 14 
       X I-C 11 
Garavan 1999  X     NoGo-Go 13 
Garavan 2002  X     NoGo-Go 16 
Hazeltine 2000 X      I-C 4 
Iacoboni 1996   X    I-C 2 
Iacoboni 1998   X    I-C 3 
Kiehl 2000  X     NoGo-Go 8 
Konishi 1998  X     NoGo-Go 10 
Konishi 1999  X     NoGo-Go 2 
Leung 2000    X   I-C 16 
Liddle 2001  X     NoGo-Go 23 
Liu 2004      X I-C 34 
Maclin 2001      X I-C 5 
Menon 2001  X     NoGo-Go 13 
Milham 2001    X   I-N 7 
Milham 2002    X   I-N 22 
     X   I-C 7 
Milham 2003    X   I-N 23 
Milham 2005    X   I-N 37 
     X   I-C 22 
Pardo 1990    X   I-C 13 
Paus 1993   X    I-C 10 
Perlstein 2003  X     NoGo-Go 4 
Peterson 1999    X   I-C 82 
Peterson 2002    X   I-C 14 
       X I-C 14 
Ravnkilde 2002    X   I-C 8 
Rubia 2001  X     NoGo-Go 12 
      X  Stop-Go 6 
Ruff 2001    X   I-N 10 
Schumacher 2002   X    I-C 2 
Sylvester 2003   X    I-C 5 
Tamm 2002  X     NoGo-Go 4 
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Taylor 1994   X    I-C 3 
Taylor 1997    X   I-N 12 
Ullsperger 2001 X      I-Id 34 
van Veen 2001 X      I-C 8 
Wager 2005 X      I-C 9 
   X     NoGo-Go 13 
    X    I-C 12 
Watanabe 2002  X     NoGo-Go 5 
Zysset 2001    X   I-N 9 
     X   I-C 4 
 
Table 2.1. Included Studies. Studies included in our meta-analysis catalogued by 
which tasks they included.  Contrasts that were reported in the study are 
indicated in the table (I-C = incongruent – congruent or incompatible – 
compatible, I-N = incongruent – neutral, I-Id = incongruent – identical).  There 
were a total of 6 flanker studies, contributing 79 peaks, 14 go/no-go studies, 
contributing 139 peaks, 9 SRC studies, contributing 62 peaks, 12 Stroop (I-N) 
studies, contributing 158 peaks, 11 Stroop (I-C) studies, contributing 190 peaks, 
4 Simon studies, contributing 64 peaks, and 1 stop signal study contributing 6 





Task X Y Z Voxels BA Region 
All Tasks 
Combined 2 16 46 552 6/8/32 
medial frontal/anterior 
cingulate 
 42 24 28 115 9/8 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 -40 4 38 76 6 left premotor cortex 
 -36 16 4 48 13/45 left inferior frontal/insula 
 -18 -72 42 43 7/19 left precuneus 
 40 6 38 41 6/9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 44 14 8 21 44/13 right inferior frontal/insula 
 40 -52 42 21 40/7 right inferior parietal lobule 
 -36 -56 44 15 7/39/19 left inferior parietal lobule 
 50 -44 32 9 40 right inferior parietal lobule 
 -40 26 30 7 9 
left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 34 18 4 5 13 right insula 
       
Go/No-Go 42 22 24 1143 9/46/13/45 
right dorsolateral 
prefrontal/inferior frontal 
 -40 32 34 144 9/46 
left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 42 -64 34 116 39/40 right angular gyrus 
 0 8 54 106 6/32 anterior cingulate cortex 
 -36 38 20  67 10 left middle frontal gyrus 
 -2 26 42 20 32/8 left anterior cingulate cortex 
 -44 10 38 12 9 
left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 38 -84 -10  10 19/18 right inferior occipital gyrus 
 32 -76 -10   5 18/19 right middle occipital gyrus 
       
SRC 18 -62 48 216 7 right precuneus 
 -8 8 52 31 6 
left premotor/supplementary 
motor area 
 0 4 36 10 24 anterior cingulate cortex 
 -16 -62 48 9 7 left precuneus 
 10 4 50 9 6 
right premotor/supplementary 
motor area 
 -22 4 52 8 6 left premotor cortex 
 -6 4 40 6 24 left anterior cingulate cortex 
 6 -68 48 5 7 right precuneus 
       
Flanker 40 14 28 117 9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 36 16 20 15 13 right insula 
       
Stroop 0 20 40 1426 6/32/8 
medial frontal/anterior 
cingulate cortex 
 -42 16 28 1385 9/6/46/8/13 left dorsolateral prefrontal 
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cortex/inferior frontal 
 46 -48 38 301 40/39 right inferior parietal lobule 
 -22 -64 46 143 7 left precuneus 
 32 38 22 38 9/10 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 12 -78 10 26 17/18 right cuneate 
 46 16 30 11 9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 0 -26 6 10  thalamus 
 -28 -66 34 7 19 left precuneus 
 44 20 22 5 46/9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 
Table 2.2. Cluster Peaks. Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Voxels is the 
area of the region in voxels.  Only clusters of 5 voxels or more are reported.  BA 
= Brodmann area. 
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Chapter 3 
Neural Mechanisms of Proactive Interference-Resolution 
 
Short-term memory plays an integral role in most forms of intelligent behavior.  
For example, differences in short-term memory capacity are related to 
differences in IQ, reasoning, reading comprehension, and problem-solving 
(Daneman and Carpenter, 1980; Carpenter et al., 1990; Daneman and Merikle, 
1996; Just and Carpenter, 1999; Cowan et al., 2005).  What determines how 
much information we can hold online at a given time?  One powerful factor is the 
ability to mitigate proactive interference originating from previously relevant, but 
no longer relevant information (see, e.g., Keppel and Underwood, 1962; Jonides 
and Nee, 2006).  Due to its central importance in understanding short-term 
memory, the neural mechanisms underlying proactive interference and its 
resolution have been a topic of intense interest (Jonides et al., 1998; D’Esposito 
et al., 1999; Jonides et al., 2000; Mecklinger et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2003; 
Badre and Wagner, 2005; Jonides and Nee, 2006). 
 
The lion’s share of neural work on proactive interference has focused on variants 
of a single paradigm, which we shall refer to as the Recent Probes task (Monsell, 
1978; Jonides and Nee, 2006).  In the Recent Probes task, subjects are given a 
small set of items (the target set) to remember over a short retention-interval, 
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followed by a recognition probe (Sternberg, 1966).  Recognition probes can 
either be members of the target set (positive probes) or not (negative probes).  
Additionally, probes can be members of the target set of the previous trial (recent 
probes) or not (non-recent probes).  Crossing these 2 factors produces four types 
of probes: recent positive, non-recent positive, recent negative, and non-recent 
negative.  What is of interest with this task is that subjects show slowed reaction 
times and increased error rates when rejecting recent negative probes compared 
to non-recent negative probes (Monsell, 1978; McElree and Dosher, 1989).  This 
performance decrement is taken to be a marker of proactive interference.  
Subjects also tend to show faster reaction times and reduced error rates when 
responding to recent positive probes compared to non-recent positive probes 
although this facilitation effect is often far more subtle than the interference effect 
(Jonides and Nee, 2006). 
 
There has been a burgeoning literature of neuroimaging studies examining the 
neural correlates of the resolution of proactive interference in the Recent Probes 
task (Jonides et al., 1998; D’Esposito et al.,1999; Jonides et al., 2000; 
Mecklinger et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2003; Badre and Wagner, 2005; Jonides 
and Nee, 2006;).  These studies have converged on left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (VLPFC) as a region important in the resolution of proactive interference 
(see Jonides and Nee, 2006 for a review).  Complementing these studies, 
neuropsychological work has demonstrated that damage to left VLPFC causes 
vastly increased proactive interference, while relatively sparing other aspects of 
 55
short-term memory performance (Thompson-Schill et al., 2002; Hamilton and 
Martin, 2005).  Additionally, elderly subjects show reduced activation in this 
region relative to younger adults concomitant with an increase in susceptibility to 
proactive interference (Jonides et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002). 
 
Although the role of left VLPFC in resolving proactive interference is well 
established in the Recent Probes task, there has been relatively little work testing 
the generality of this effect.  Some efforts have demonstrated left VLPFC 
involvement in proactive interference-resolution in other tasks (Gray et al., 2003; 
Zhang et al., 2003; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Postle and Brush, 2004).  However, 
when comparing across different groups of subjects and analysis methods, it is 
difficult to draw strong conclusions.  Recognizing this shortcoming, several 
studies have examined interference-resolution using multiple paradigms in the 
same subjects (Peterson et al., 2002; Fan et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2004; Wager et 
al., 2005).  However, all of these studies have focused upon interference caused 
by response conflict or perceptual distraction.  By contrast, no study has 
examined proactive interference-resolution across multiple tasks.  This is an 
important omission since there is evidence that the resolution of proactive 
interference may be uniquely distinct from other forms of interference-resolution 
(Friedman and Miyake, 2004).  Therefore, to provide more generality to the claim 
that left VLPFC plays a critical role in proactive interference, it is important to 
demonstrate that it shows the same pattern of activity within the same set of 
subjects across different tasks. 
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Beyond this, the mechanisms by which left VLPFC participates in the resolution 
of proactive interference are unclear.  Jonides and Nee (2006) reviewed several 
potential models of left VLPFC function in the service of proactive interference-
resolution.  These models postulate contrasting positions regarding whether left 
VLPFC is engaged in response selection, episodic retrieval, or biasing of internal 
representations.  Each account relies on left VLPFC being a node in a functional 
network that overcomes proactive interference.  However, each account varies in 
its prediction about the particular network involved.  Therefore, whether left 
VLPFC is functionally correlated with response-related regions (e.g. the anterior 
cingulate, premotor cortex), memory related regions (e.g. medial temporal lobe), 
or both will inform models of proactive-interference resolution.  To date, no study 
has examined the functional connectivity of left VLPFC in the face of proactive 
interference. 
 
A recent study demonstrated that in the Recent Probes task, the left VLPFC not 
only showed enhanced activation to recent negative probes compared to non-
recent negative probes, but also increased activation to recent positive probes 
compared to non-recent positive probes (Badre and Wagner, 2005).  
Behaviorally, whereas recent negative probes in this study led to interference 
relative to non-recent negative probes, recent positive probes demonstrated 
facilitation relative to non-recent positive probes.  This paradoxical result is 
difficult to reconcile within current models of left VLPFC function that attempt to 
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lodge both interference and facilitation effects in this one region of cortex 
(Jonides and Nee, 2006).  Therefore, it is of interest to explore regions related to 
the facilitation effect associated with recent positive probes. 
 
In addition to left VLPFC, a recent study implicated left anterior prefrontal cortex 
(APFC) in the Recent Probes task (Badre and Wagner, 2005).  The authors 
found that this region had a striking overlap with activations found in episodic 
recollection (Dobbins and Wagner, 2005).  Also, this region was found to 
correlate negatively with susceptibility to proactive interference.  This pattern of 
results led the authors to speculate that APFC plays a role in monitoring retrieved 
information in the service of arriving at a correct decision.  Although one study 
examining the Recent Probes task also demonstrated sub-threshold activation in 
this region (Jonides et al., 1998), there is little other evidence that this region 
plays a role in proactive interference tasks.  Furthermore, although Badre and 
Wagner (2005) speculated that APFC may interact with left VLPFC to enable 
proactive interference-resolution, this possibility has yet to be explored.  
Therefore, the role of left APFC in proactive interference-resolution is a topic 
needing additional research. 
 
The present study sought to examine the neural regions involved in the 
resolution of proactive interference.  Here, we scanned subjects using event-
related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they performed two 
different proactive interference tasks: a Recent Probes task and a Directed-
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Forgetting task.  Our novel approach of examining the resolution of proactive 
interference across multiple tasks in the same subjects allows us to explore 
interference-related regions that are task-independent.  Of particular interest are 
the behaviors of left VLPFC and left APFC across tasks, since these regions 
have been implicated during proactive interference-resolution in the Recent 
Probes task.  A previous study examining directed-forgetting in short-term 
memory with fMRI implicated the left VLPFC for resolving interference from lure 
probes (Zhang et al., 2003).  However, it was unclear that the activations 
overlapped with those found in the Recent Probes task and furthermore, the 
activation from Zhang et al. (2003) appeared to be somewhat weak, perhaps due 
to low power (t(7) = 1.85, p = 0.05, one-tailed).  To address these concerns, we 
used a larger set of subjects to increase power and had subjects perform both 
tasks in alternating scans in order to determine whether there is common left 
VLPFC activation across tasks, as well as to further explore the role of left APFC 
in both tasks.  In addition, we used functional connectivity analyses to examine 
whether left VLPFC and left APFC are functionally related in the face of 
interference and to explore other regions that show functional coupling to resolve 
proactive interference.  This analysis allowed us to provide a critical test of 
models of proactive interference-resolution.  Finally, we examined whether there 
are identifiably unique neural signatures of behavioral facilitation in the Recent 
Probes task, hence providing important data to round out models of proactive 
interference-resolution. 
 59
3.1 Materials and Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-five University of Michigan students (age range 18-24; mean age = 20.2; 
11 male) participated in this study.  All were right-handed and native English 
speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  Subjects were health-
screened and informed consent was obtained from all participants in accordance 
with the University of Michigan Institution Review Board.  Participants received 
$40 in compensation for participation, as well as a bonus based on performance.  
Two subjects failed to maintain attentiveness throughout the study and were 
removed from analyses.  One subject was removed from imaging analyses due 
to movement exceeding 7mm and another was removed due to a signal artifact.  
This resulted in twenty-three subjects for behavioral analyses and twenty-one for 
imaging analyses. 
 
3.1.2 Behavioral Tasks 
Stimuli were presented in black with a white background and were projected onto 
a screen at the head of the scanner.  The screen was made visible to subjects 
via a pair of goggles with a mirror attached.  Stimulus presentation was controlled 
using E-Prime experimental software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) and the 
IFIS 9.0 system with a 10-button response unit (MRI Devices Corp.).  Subjects 
received 6 runs of each task, presented in ABAB order, counterbalanced across 




3.1.2.1 Recent Probes Task 
As displayed in Figure 3.1a, each trial began with a 1s red fixation cue.  
Thereafter, subjects were presented with a display of 6 letters for 2s (target set), 
followed by a 3s retention interval.  After the retention interval, a recognition 
probe was presented for 2s.  Subjects made a left index finger press if the probe 
matched the target set and a right index finger press if it did not.  A 4s inter-trial 
interval (ITI) followed each probe (5s if the next trial fixation cue is included).   
 
Each target set was composed of 3 letters from the previous target set, and 3 
letters that had not been presented in the previous two trials.  This allowed for 
half of the probes to match the target set of the previous trial (recent) and half to 
mismatch the previous target set (non-recent).  25% of the probes were 
members of the current target set, but not the last two target sets (Non-Recent 
Positive probes), 25% of the probes were members of the current target set and 
the last target set (Recent Positive probes), 25% were members of the previous 
target set but not the current target set (Recent Negative probes), and 25% had 
not been presented in the previous 2 trials (Non-Recent Negative probes). 
 
3.1.2.2 Directed-Forgetting Task 
As shown in Figure 3.1b, each trial began with a 1s red fixation cue.  Thereafter, 
subjects were presented with a display of 6 letters for 2s (initial set), followed by 
a 3s retention interval.  After the retention interval, a forget cue appeared for 1s 
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that instructed subjects to remove half of the letters from memory.  The cue 
“TOP” instructed subjects to remove the 3 letters originally presented on the top-
half of the screen and the cue “BOT” instructed subjects to remove the 3 letters 
originally presented on the bottom-half of the screen, leaving subjects with 3 
letters in memory (target set).  After the forget-cue, subjects were presented with 
1s of fixation, followed by a recognition probe presented for 2s.  Subjects made a 
left index-finger press if the probe matched the target set and a right index-finger 
press if it did not.  A 4s inter-trial interval (ITI) followed each probe (5s if the next 
trial fixation cue is included). 
 
Each initial set was chosen randomly from the set of all letters with the restriction 
that no letter had appeared in the previous two initial sets.  50% of the 
recognition probes were members of the target set (Positive probes), 25% were 
letters that subjects were instructed to forget (Forget probes), and 25% were 
letters that had not been presented on the previous 2 trials (Control probes). 
 
3.1.3 Image acquisition and pre-processing 
Images were acquired on a GE Signa 3T scanner equipped with a standard 
quadrature headcoil.  Head movement was minimized using foam padding and a 
cloth restraint strapped across participants’ foreheads.  Experimental tasks were 
presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) and the IFIS 
9.0 system with a 10-button response unit (MRI Devices Corp.). 
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Functional T2* weighted images were acquired using a spiral sequence with 40 
contiguous slices with 3.44 x 3.44 x 3 mm voxels (repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms, 
echo time (TE) = 30, flip angle = 90, and field of view (FOV) = 22).  A T1 
weighted gradient echo (GRE) anatomical overlay was acquired using the same 
FOV and slices as the functional scans (TR = 250, TE = 5.7, and flip angle = 90).  
Additionally, a 106-slice high resolution T1 weighted anatomical image was 
collected using spoiled gradient-recalled acquisition in steady state (SPGR) 
imaging (TR = 10.5, TE = 3.4, flip angle = 25, FOV = 24, 1.5 mm slice thickness). 
 
Each SPGR was corrected for signal inhomogeneity (G. Glover and K. Kristoff, 
http://www-psych.standford.edu/~kalina/SPM99/Tools/vol_homocor.html) and 
skull-stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction Tool (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).  
These images were then normalized to the MNI template (avg152t1.img) using 
SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London).  Functional 
images were corrected for slice time differences using 4-point sinc interpolation 
(Oppenheim et al., 1999) and head movement, using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 
2002).  To reduce the impact of spike artifacts, functional images were 
winsorized on a voxel-by-voxel basis so that no voxel had a signal greater than 
3.5 standard deviations from the mean of the run (Lazar et al., 2001).  Spatial 
normalization transformations and 8 mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian smoothing 
were applied to all functional images prior to analysis using SPM2.  All analyses 
included a temporal high-pass filter (128 s) and each image was scaled to have a 
global mean intensity of 100. 
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3.1.4 Image Analysis 
Whole-brain analyses were conducted using the General Linear Model 
implemented in SPM2.  Eight 2-s finite impulse response (FIR) regressors were 
included for all correct trials, onseting at probe presentation.  To account for 
artifacts produced by head motion, linear, quadratic, differential, and quadratic 
differential motion regressors were calculated from the realignment parameters 
and included in the model (Lund et al., 2005).  Contrast images for each 
participant were subjected to a random-effects group analysis.  One sample t-
tests were performed examining the 4th 2-s time-bin after probe onset since it 
appeared that most voxels peaked at this time. 
 
Interference contrasts for the Recent Probes task (Recent Negative probes – 
Non-Recent Negative probes) and the Directed-Forgetting task (Forget probes – 
Control probes) were thresholded at p < 0.001 uncorrected and restricted to 
regions demonstrating 5 contiguous supra-threshold voxels (Forman et al., 1995; 
Poline et al., 1997).  These contrasts used probes that were matched in 
relevance and correct response, and avoided potential confounding effects of 
relevance and response hand when using Positive probes as matched controls 
for interference.  To assess regions showing sensitivity to proactive interference, 
we performed a conjunction analysis on the interference contrasts of both tasks.  
The interference conjunction was thresholded at p < 0.01 for each task, 
producing a conjoint p < 0.0001 threshold and restricted to 5 contiguous voxels.  
We also assessed sensitivity to recency as the tripartite conjunction of Recent 
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Negative probes – Non-Recent Negative Probes, Recent Positive probes – Non-
Recent Positive probes, and Forget probes – Control probes.  The recency 
conjunction was thresholded at p < 0.1 for each task, once again producing a p < 
0.001 conjoint threshold, restricted to 5 contiguous voxels. 
 
Finally, we examined regions related to behavioral facilitation in the Recent 
Probes task.  To do so, we first identified regions that showed stronger activation 
for positive probes relative to negative probes.  This was done using a 
conjunction analysis searching for regions that showed positive probe > negative 
probe activation in both the Recent Probes task (i.e. (Recent Positive probes + 
Non-Recent Positive probes) > (Recent Negative probes + Non-Recent Negative 
probes) and the Directed-Forgetting task (i.e. (Positive probes > (Forget probes + 
Control probes)).  Each individual analysis was thresholded at p < 0.01, 
producing a conjoint threshold of p < 0.0001.  We used the resulting clusters as 
regions of interest (ROIs).  Within these ROIs, we looked for voxels 
demonstrating greater activation for Recent Positive probes relative to Non-
Recent Positive probes, thresholded at p < 0.01. 
 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Behavioral Results 
 
Reaction times (RT) were calculated for correct trials only.  One-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs were performed by trial-type separately on error rates (ER) 
and RT data for each task. 
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The effect of trial-type in the Recent Probes task was significant in ER (F(1,20) = 
12.059, p < 0.001) and RT (F(1,20) = 11.997, p < 0.001).  A planned t-test 
contrasting Recent Negative with Non-Recent Negative probes revealed a 
significant effect of interference in ER (7.6% vs. 2.6%, t(22) = 4.711, p < 0.001) 
and RT (844.31 ms vs. 747.13 ms, t(22) = 5.241, p < 0.001).  Additionally, 
compared to Non-Recent Positive probes, Recent Positive probes demonstrated 
significant facilitation in ER (7.6% vs. 9.8%, t(22) = 2.062, p = 0.05).  Facilitation 
in RT was in the same direction, but did not reach significance (724.15 ms vs. 
733.46 ms, t(22) = 0.922, p > 0.3). 
 
The effect of trial-type in the Directed-Forgetting task was significant in ER 
(F(1,21) = 17.637, p < 0.001) and RT (F(1,21) = 27.016, p < 0.001).  A planned t-
test comparing Forget and Control probes revealed a significant effect of 
interference in ER (8.0% vs. 3.3%, t(22) = 4.794, p < 0.001) and RT (704.69 ms 
vs. 644.89 ms, t(22) = 4.46, p < 0.001). 
 
Finally, there was a modest correlation between interference in the Recent 
Probes and Directed-Forgetting tasks (r = 0.39, p = 0.06 (p = 0.01 after robust 
regression)).  This correlation was in the same direction in ER, though it failed to 
reach significant (r = 0.30, p > 0.15).  Although these correlations are not reliable 
at traditional thresholds, it must be noted that these are correlations among 
difference scores (an interference trial compared to its control), and correlations 
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between difference scores are, of course, less stable than correlations between 
raw scores.  Thus, we take seriously the trends toward significance in these 
correlations. 
 
3.2.2 Self Report 
14 of the 21 subjects included in the imaging analyses reported that they did not 
notice the sequential ordering manipulation of the Recent Probes task.  Those 
who did report noticing the ordering mentioned that they noted such 
contingencies only rarely.  This is in line with previous reports that subjects are 
largely unaware of the conflict in the Recent Probes task (Bunge et al., 2001). 
 
3.2.3 Imaging Results 
Activation increases associated with proactive interference in the Recent-Probes 
task were assessed by contrasting probe-related activity from Recent Negative 
probes versus Non-Recent Negative probes (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2a).  This 
contrast yielded a large left lateral frontal cluster (MNI coordinate peak 40, -16, 
28) that spanned both dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.  To a 
lesser extent, there were similar activation increases in the right hemisphere.  In 
addition, there were significant activation increases in bilateral anterior prefrontal 
cortex, right premotor cortex, left medial frontal cortex, left intraparietal sulcus, 
and bilateral occipital cortex. 
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Interference related activity in the Directed-Forgetting task as examined by 
contrasting Forget and Control probes, produced very similar frontal activation as 
in the Recent Probes task (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2b).  As in the Recent-Probes 
task, the Directed-Forgetting task produced large clusters in left ventrolateral and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  The ventrolateral activation increases were 
strongly bilateral.  Additionally, there were increases in left premotor and left 
inferior temporal cortex. 
 
The conjunction of these contrasts produced clusters in left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, 
and the cerebellum (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2c).  To ensure that these common 
results were not due to liberal thresholding, we also performed a more strict valid 
conjunction test, thresholding each contrast at p < 0.001 (Nichols et al., 2005).  
This test confirmed common activation in bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, 
stronger on the left, but not the other regions.  Finally, we examined the 
averaged response for the interference contrast in both the Recent Probes and 
Directed-Forgetting tasks in the left ventrolateral prefrontal region found in our 
original conjunction analysis (i.e. region of interest analysis).  Confirming that 
resolving proactive interference in both tasks involves left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex, there were highly significant interference-related activation differences in 
this region for both the Recent Probes (t(20) = 3.83, p < 0.001) and Directed-
Forgetting (t(20) = 4.23, p < 0.001) tasks. 
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A previous study found that recency, as assessed by the conjunction of Recent 
Negative – Non-Recent Negative probes and Recent Positive – Non-Recent 
Positive probes, produced increased activation in left anterior prefrontal and 
bilateral ventrolateral frontal cortices (Badre and Wagner, 2005).  To provide a 
stronger test that these regions are implicated in recency, we examined the 
conjunction of Recent Negative – Non-Recent Negative probes, Recent Positive 
– Non-Recent Positive probes, and Forget – Control probes (Table 3.1, Figure 
3.2d).  This conjunction produced significant clusters in several regions, most 
prominently in left anterior prefrontal cortex (MNI coordinate center -40, 48, 14) 
and left lateral prefrontal cortex spanning both ventrolateral and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (MNI coordinate center -46, 24, 20).  Follow up region of interest 
analyses confirmed that all contrasts demonstrated significant activation 
differences in left anterior prefrontal cortex (Recent Negative – Non-Recent 
Negative, t(20) = 2.65, p < 0.01; Forget – Control, t(20) = 2.19, p < 0.05; Recent 
Positive – Non-Recent Positive, t(20) = 1.86, p < 0.05).  In left lateral prefrontal 
cortex a similar pattern emerged, but the Recent Positive – Non-Recent Positive 
contrast was only marginally significant (Recent Negative – Non-Recent 
Negative, t(20) = 2.01, p < 0.05; Forget – Control, t(20) = 2.36, p < 0.05; Recent 
Positive – Non-Recent Positive, t(20) = 1.58, p < 0.07).  In addition, the 
conjunction analysis revealed significant clusters in right dorsolateral prefrontal 




Figure 3.2. Neural Results. Activation increases from the interference contrasts 
for the (A) Recent Probes (Recent Negative – Non-Recent Negative) and (B) 
Directed-Forgetting (Forget – Control) tasks.  Colors represent t-values.  (C) 
Regions showing activation increases for both interference contrasts (conjoint 
probability, p < 0.0001).  (D) Regions showing sensitivity to recency (Recent 
Negative – Non-Recent Negative, Recent Positive – Non-Recent Positive, Forget 
– Control) (conjoint probability, p < 0.001). 
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Previous work indicated that greater increases in activation in left VLPFC were 
associated with greater behavioral indices of proactive interference, whereas 
greater increases in activation in left APFC were associated with decreased 
behavioral indices of proactive interference (Badre and Wagner, 2005).  To 
provide a stronger test of these claims, we calculated a behavioral index of 
proactive interference for each subject as the mean of the interference effects 
measured in both tasks in reaction time.  We then created mean interference 
contrast images by averaging together the two interference contrasts.  Finally, we 
looked for correlations between behavioral indices of proactive interference and 
neural indices of proactive interference, restricted to voxels found in our 
interference and recency conjunctions. 
 
Two regions emerged from this analysis.  A cluster in left posterior VLPFC (MNI 
center -40 10 30, BA 9/44, 29 voxels) correlated positively with proactive 
interference (r = 0.43, p = 0.05).  Additionally, a cluster in left APFC (MNI center -
40 48 12, BA 10, 17 voxels) correlated negatively with proactive interference (r = 








Figure 3.3. Brain-Behavior Correlations. Correlations between behavioral indices 
of proactive interference in reaction time and neural activation increases.  Left 
VLPFC showed a positive correlation with interference, whereas left APFC 
showed a negative correlation. 
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Since the correlations with behavioral measures of proactive interference 
suggest a functional role for left VLPFC and left APFC in proactive interference 
and/or its resolution, we were interested in exploring whether these regions have 
a functional relationship.  To do so, we used the left VLPFC and left APFC 
clusters found from the correlation analysis as seeds, and performed functional 
connectivity analysis.  Details of the analysis method are described elsewhere 
(Rissman et al., 2004).  Briefly, for each subject, separate beta values were 
estimated via SPM2’s general linear model for the probe of each trial.   For each 
subject, we then separately correlated beta values for Recent Negative probes, 
Non-Recent Negative probes, Forget probes, and Control probes, using the 
aforementioned seed clusters.  The resulting r-maps were transformed into z-
maps, and submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA in SPM2 with separate 
predictors for each condition (i.e. Recent Negative, Non-Recent Negative, 
Forget, Control) crossed with region (i.e. left VLPFC, left APFC), producing a 
total of 8 predictors.5  We then looked for regions showing increased connectivity 
to each seed region during interference trials (Recent Negative and Forget) 
versus non-interference trials (Non-Recent Negative and Control) separately for 
each seed region.  Contrasts were thresholded at p < 0.001, with 5 contiguous 
voxels. 
 
                                                 
5 This model pools error resulting from condition and region.  We also tested a model that 
separately partitioned error from condition and region.  To do so, we created pseudo-first level 
contrasts by using SPM2’s ImCalc function to specify the contrasts of interest (i.e. Interference 
vs. Control separately for each seed region, as well as the condition x region interaction) before 
submitting the data to a second-level group model.  These “contrasts” were then submitted to 
one-sample t-tests at the group level, one for each seed region.  The resulting statistical maps did 
not differ appreciably from the pooled error model, so we discuss the pooled error results due to 
simplicity. 
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Left VLPFC and left APFC were not functionally related in the face of 
interference, even at a more liberal threshold (p < 0.01).  Left VLPFC showed 
greater functional connectivity with left premotor cortex, right medial temporal 
cortex, right anterior cingulate cortex, left inferior temporal pole, right posterior 
cingulate cortex, and left caudate during interference trials.  Left APFC, on the 
other hand, showed greater functional connectivity with left anterior cingulate 
cortex.  To assess whether these patterns of activity were dissociable, we looked 
for voxels that showed significant connectivity with one region at p < 0.001, as 
well as significantly more connectivity with one region than the other at p < 0.01 
(i.e. seed region x interference interaction).  Left premotor cortex and right medial 
temporal cortex showed stronger connectivity with left VLPFC than left APFC in 
the face of interference.  Left anterior cingulate showed the opposite pattern, 
displaying stronger connectivity with left APFC than left VLPFC (see Figure 3.4). 
 
Badre and Wagner (2005) found that although contrasts of both Recent 
Negatives – Non-Recent Negatives and Recent Positives – Non-Recent 
Positives produced reliable activation in left APFC and VLPFC, there was a 
Recency x Probe interaction in left VLPFC, but not left APFC.  This interaction 
was produced by greater activation in left VLPFC for the Recent Negatives – 
Non-Recent Negatives contrast.  To investigate this claim, we assessed the 
same interaction in the left lateral and APFC clusters found in our recency 
conjunction.  Contrary to Badre and Wagner (2005), we did not find a Recency x 
Probe interaction in left lateral prefrontal cortex (F < 1).  Instead, there was a 
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significant main effect of Probe with negative probes producing greater activation 
in left lateral prefrontal cortex than positive probes (F(1,17) = 7.648, p = 0.01).  
Similarly, in left APFC, there was no Recency x Probe interaction (F < 1), but a 
marginally-significant main effect of Probe, once again with negative probes 
producing greater activation (F(1,17) = 3.837, p = 0.06).  Right DLPFC and left 
premotor cortex also produced a similar main effect of Probe, but no region in our 
recency conjunction showed a Recency x Probe interaction. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Functional Interactions. The medial temporal lobe (MTL) showed 
stronger functional connectivity with VLPFC than APFC, whereas the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) showed the opposite pattern. 
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The sensitivity of left VLPFC to recency in general is difficult to reconcile with 
behavioral indications that Recent Negative probes produce interference relative 
to Non-Recent Negative probes whereas Recent Positive probes produce 
facilitation relative to Non-Recent Positive probes.  To investigate whether there 
are distinct markers of facilitation, we looked for regions demonstrating increased 
activation for Recent Positive probes relative to Non-Recent Positive probes, 
restricted to voxels that showed increased activation to positive probes relative to 
negative probes (see Methods).  This analysis produced a single significant 
cluster in the right posterior cingulate gyrus near retrosplenial cortex (MNI peak 4 
-36 34, BA 23, 24 voxels).  Reducing the threshold to p < 0.05 did not produce 
other significant clusters, but did increase the size of the posterior cingulate 
cluster to 106 voxels (see Figure 3.5). 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The present study sought to inform models of proactive interference by 
examining neural regions responsive to proactive interference across two 
separate tasks.  First, we generalized the finding of interference-related activity in 
left VLPFC and left APFC across two different proactive interference tasks in the 
same subjects.  Second, we replicated the finding that left VLPFC correlates 
positively with interference, whereas left APFC correlates negatively.  Third, we 
demonstrated that although both of these regions are associated with proactive 
interference, their patterns of functional connectivity suggest separate roles for 
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each region.  Fourth, we identified the posterior cingulate gyrus as a unique 
source of facilitation in the Recent Probes task. 
 
Figure 3.5. Posterior Cingulate. Posterior cingulate region demonstrating 
increased activation for Recent Positive probes relative to Non-Recent Positive 
probes.  Results shown at p < 0.05 uncorrected for display purposes. 
 
 
3.3.1 Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
Models of proactive interference-resolution differ regarding the role of left VLPFC 
(see Jonides and Nee, 2006 for a review).   One possibility is that proactive 
interference causes conflict in selecting a response and that left VLPFC resolves 
this conflict.  However, this idea cannot be reconciled with increased left VLPFC 
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activation to Recent Positive probes relative to Non-Recent Positive probes, 
where response conflict is absent.  An alternative is that left VLPFC is recruited 
during retrieval, rather than response selection (Badre and Wagner, 2005).  
Models of this sort posit that left VLPFC may be important in selecting relevant 
contextual features in order to identify whether an item is a member of the target 
set or not (Badre and Wager, 2005; Jonides and Nee, 2006).  For example, the 
familiarity of Recent Negative probes may elicit retrieval of the previous trial’s 
context, which must be selected against to respond negatively.  Likewise, Forget 
probes elicit a highly familiar, yet irrelevant context, as do Recent Positive 
probes.  Consonant with the idea that left VLPFC is involved in context-selection, 
we found left VLPFC activation related to recency (Recent Negative > Non-
Recent Negative, Recent Positive > Non-Recent Positive, Forget > Control).  
Additionally, we found that this activity correlated positively with behavioral 
indices of interference.  This pattern suggests that increased conflict may call for 
increased selection demands. 
 
Left VLPFC has also been correlated with increased selection demands in 
semantic retrieval (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Thompson-Schill et al., 1998; 
Persson et al., 2004; Nelson, 2005).  A study examining this process and 
proactive interference-resolution in the same subjects found overlapping 
activations within left VLPFC, suggesting a similar mechanism mediating both 
processes (Nelson, 2005).  These results suggest that left VLPFC may select 
among memorial representations more generally, be they episodic or semantic. 
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We also found that relative to non-interference probes, interference probes 
elicited stronger connectivity between left VLPFC and left premotor and right 
medial temporal cortex.  Premotor cortex has often been implicated in selecting 
among competing responses (Iacoboni et al., 1998; Praamstra et al., 1999; Nee 
et al., 2007) and medial temporal cortex is well-known for its role in memory 
(Scoville and Milner, 1957).  The connectivity with right medial temporal cortex 
may reflect the selection of episodic details, whereas the connectivity with left 
premotor cortex may reflect the use of those details to bias decision processes 
(Jonides and Nee, 2006).  Interestingly, Ranganath et al., (2003) found a similar 
network of right posterior medial temporal cortex, left VLPFC, and left premotor 
cortex involved during encoding of items whose contexts were subsequently 
recollected.  This may mean that the same network of regions that are used to 
establish item-context associations during encoding are elicited during retrieval 
when contextual information is needed to distinguish between relevant and 
irrelevant memories. 
 
In addition to a main effect of Recency, Badre and Wagner (2005) reported a 
Recency x Probe interaction in left VLPFC, with disproportionately greater 
activation on Recent Negative trials than Recent Positive trials.  These authors 
explained that although both Recent Positive and Recent Negative probes 
require increased selection demands relative to Non-Recent probes due to their 
relation to multiple contexts, selection demands may be eased for Recent 
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Positive probes since their context is more prepotent, producing the observed 
interaction.  In contrast to Badre and Wagner (2005), we found a main effect of 
Probe in left VLPFC, with negative probes producing relatively greater activation 
than positive probes.  This discrepancy may be due to differences in task details. 
Whereas Badre and Wagner (2005) used four words per trial, we used six letters 
per trial.  Hence, our task differs in load and stimulus material.  It is possible that 
selection demands increase as stimulus materials become less meaningful (i.e. 
letters are less meaningful than words).  Additionally, increased memory load 
may also increase selection demands.  Consistent with these ideas, a study that 
required subjects to maintain a variable number of letters in short-term memory 
demonstrated that left VLPFC showed a similar main effect of Probe, as well as 
sensitivity to load (Wolf et al., 2006).  Increased selection demands may have a 
smaller impact on positive trials since the appropriate context is more prepotent, 
leading to disproportionate increases in left VLPFC activation on negative trials, 
producing the observed pattern of results (Badre and Wagner, 2005; Jonides and 
Nee, 2006). 
 
In the Recent Probes task, subjects reported being largely unaware of 
manipulations of interference, suggesting that control operations of left VLPFC 
may operate without conscious awareness.  This result is at odds of models of 
control that posit that one hallmark of control is conscious awareness (Shiffrin 
and Schneider, 1977) and suggests that frontal mechanisms need not operate 
with explicit awareness.  Although we did not poll subjects regarding awareness 
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of conflict in the Directed-Forgetting task, it is likely that subjects are cognizant 
that forget probes queried information they were told to discard.  Hence, a careful 
contrast of subjective awareness and control-related activation in the Recent 
Probes and Directed-Forgetting tasks may reveal critical networks needed for 
conscious control versus more automatic control. 
 
Finally, proactive interference is generally thought of as a phenomenon that 
interferes with new learning.  Here, we have examined its effects on rejecting 
information that should have been forgotten.  Although the degree to which 
irrelevant information is forgotten clearly has a bearing on how much irrelevant 
information interferes with new learning, we did not explicitly tested this effect of 
proactive interference here.  However, previous work has demonstrated that non-
specific proactive interference that builds up over the course of an experiment, 
and presumably interferes with learning, is also associated with activation in left 
VLPFC (Postle and Brush, 2004).  Hence, similar mechanisms are likely to 
underlie both phenemona. 
 
3.3.2 Left anterior prefrontal cortex 
It has been hypothesized that in the context of proactive interference-resolution, 
APFC functions to monitor retrieved information in the service of decision 
processes (Badre and Wagner, 2005; Jonides and Nee, 2006).  Extending 
previous work, we found left APFC involvement in recency across both the 
Recent Probes and Directed-Forgetting tasks.  Additionally, activation in this 
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region was associated with decreased interference, substantiating previous 
claims (Badre and Wagner, 2005). 
 
In response to interference, we found increased connectivity between left APFC 
and the anterior cingulate.  The anterior cingulate has also been postulated as a 
region that monitors for conflict, although more focused upon response conflict 
(Botvinick et al., 2001).  Previous work has also shown that APFC and the 
anterior cingulate show correlated patterns of activity (Badre and Wagner, 2004).  
Therefore, APFC may work with the anterior cingulate to bias response 
processes. 
 
Although it appears as though both left VLPFC and left APFC contribute to the 
resolution of proactive interference, we failed to find increased functional 
coupling between these regions during interference trials.  This result suggests 
that these regions may make separable contributions to proactive interference-
resolution.  However, any conclusions drawn from a null result warrant caution.  
Further work will be needed to investigate the relatedness of these two regions in 
the service of resolving proactive interference. 
 
3.3.3 Posterior cingulate gyrus 
Models of left VLPFC function have difficulty reconciling that Recent Negative 
probes produce interference and Recent Positive probes produce facilitation, yet 
both probes produce increased left VLPFC activation relative to Non-Recent 
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probes (Jonides and Nee, 2006).  Although both types of Recent probes may 
elicit selection of contextual details, it is difficult to conceive of how this selection 
produces both interference and facilitation.  Therefore, there must be another 
region of cortex responsible for facilitation. 
 
Our analyses suggest that the posterior cingulate gyrus is involved in the 
facilitation of Recent Positive probes relative to Non-Recent Positive probes.  
Previous work has demonstrated posterior cingulate gyrus involvement in 
episodic retrieval, showing increased activation for hits relative to misses, as well 
as increased activation when retrieving source details (see Wagner et al., 2005 
for a review).  The posterior cingulate region found here is adjacent to 
retrosplenial cortex and the two regions are strongly linked (Kobayashi and 
Amaral, 2003).   Due to their strong connections with prefrontal and MTL regions, 
there has been speculation that the retrosplenial cortex and adjacent posterior 
cingulate may provide an interface between short- and long-term memory 
(Kobayashi and Amaral, 2003).  Recent Positive probes contain both short-term 
information from the current trial, as well as longer-term information from the 
previous trial.  Therefore, the short- and long-term memory interfacing functions 
of retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortex are uniquely suited for Recent 
Positive probes.  Hence, increased activation in this region may demonstrate a 
synchrony of short- and long-term memories that provide for quicker and easier 
responding.  Alternatively, given the association of the posterior cingulate with 
recollective processes (Wagner et al., 2005), activation in this region associated 
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with Recent Positives may reflect additional recollective detail that recalled when 
a Recent Positive is presented, which again may facilitate responding. 
 
As a post-hoc analysis to investigate these claims, we examined functional 
connectivity with the posterior cingulate, contrasting Recent Positive probes and 
Non-Recent Positive probes.  Interestingly, the posterior cingulate demonstrated 
functional connectivity with right premotor cortex (MNI peak 56 4 12, 23 voxels at 
p < 0.005) and right motor cortex (MNI peak 44 -22 38, 68 voxels at p < 0.005) 
when subjects responded to Recent Positive probes compared to Non-Recent 
Positive probes.  Since subjects made affirmative responses with their left hand, 
this pattern suggests a stronger motor biasing for Recent Positives, producing 
the observed behavioral facilitation effects.  This result provides an interesting 
avenue for future research. 
 
That both left VLPFC and the posterior cingulate demonstrate increased 
activation for Recent Positives may explain the fragility of the behavioral 
facilitation effect (Jonides and Nee, 2006).  Whereas the selection processes of 
left VLPFC may slow processing, recollection processes of the posterior 
cingulate may speed processing.  These processes may largely cancel each 
other out, producing smaller and less stable behavioral effects. 
 
3.3.4 Relation to other work 
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Whether the results found here extend to other types of material (e.g. spatial or 
object stimuli) is unclear (see Jonides and Nee, 2006 for a review).  There has 
been some evidence for left VLPFC involvement for non-verbal material in the 
Recent Probes task, but these results have generally been statistically weak 
(Postle et al., 2004; Badre and Wagner, 2005).  Additionally, using a spatial 
analogue of the Directed-Forgetting task, Leung and Zhang (2004) failed to find 
significant increases in left VLPFC for Forget probes relative to Control probes, 
but there was a non-significant trend in left APFC.  Instead, these authors found 
significant differences in the superior parietal lobule and precentral sulcus, 
suggesting that regions involved in resolving proactive interference may vary by 





The work examined here provides important considerations for models of 
proactive interference-resolution.  Left VLPFC and left APFC were involved in 
proactive interference across tasks providing robust evidence that these regions 
are central loci of proactive interference-resolution.  The connectivity of left 
VLPFC with the MTL and premotor cortex suggest that this region is involved in 
selection of episodic details that bias responding.  The connectivity of left APFC 
with the ACC, on the other hand, suggests a role of conflict monitoring.  Finally, 
the posterior cingulate was the unique locus of the facilitation effect produced by 
contrasting Recent Positive probes and Non-Recent Positive probes.  This region 
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may serve as an interface between short- and long-term memory recollection 





 Recent Negative - Non-Recent Negative  
 Peak Voxels T-value BA Region 
Frontal -40  16  28 665 6.49 9/46/44 
left dorsolateral/ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex 
  50  32  34 5 3.32 9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
  36  28   4 10 3.31 47/45/13 
right ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
  32  64  16 32 3.6 10 right anterior prefrontal cortex 
 -42  54  14 26 3.53 10 left anterior prefrontal cortex 
  -6  14  54 24 3.46 8/6 left medial frontal cortex 
  -2   6  62 17 3.58 6 left medial frontal cortex 
  50   2  34 32 3.62 9/6 right premotor cortex 
Parietal -26 -62  52 21 3.45 7 left intraparietal sulcus 
 -26 -66  36 24 3.36 7/19 left occipito-parietal junction 
Occipital -30 -94  14 46 4.37 19 left occipital cortex 
  -2 -86  16 282 4.11 18/17 left occipital cortex 
  14 -78  16 77 3.93 18/31 right occipital cortex 
  44 -78  -2 23 3.69 19 left occipital cortex 
     
 Forget - Control    
 Peak Voxels T-value BA Region 
Frontal -50  10  22 187 4.04 44/9/45/46 
left dorsolateral/ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex 
 -32  24   2 197 4.91 47/13/45 
left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
  38  30   2 261 4.2 47/13 
right ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 -38   0  48 62 3.63 6 left premotor cortex 




(Recent Negative - Non-Recent Negative ∩ Forget - Control) 
 Center Voxels  BA Region 
Frontal 38  28  2 162  47/13/45 
right ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 -32  24  8 39  13/45/47 
left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 -44  8  32 504  9/6/46/44 
left dorsolateral/premotor/ 
ventrolateral cortex 
 0  20  50 22  8 medial frontal cortex 
Other 50 -60 -34 5   Cerebellum 
  
 
Recency Conjunction (Recent Negative - Non-Recent Negative ∩ Forget - 
Control ∩ Recent Positive - Non-Recent Positive) 
 Center Voxels  BA Region 
Frontal -46  24  20 74  45/46 left ventrolateral/dorsolateral 
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prefrontal cortex 
 -40  48  14 90  10/46 left anterior prefrontal cortex 
 40  14  32 7  9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 56  24  38 18  9 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 
 -44  2  40 11  6 left premotor cortex 
 36  2  42 15  6/9 right premotor cortex 
Parietal -32 -46  38 33  40/7 
left intraparietal 
sulcus/superior parietal lobule 
Occipital -2 -78  6 51  17/23/18/30 left occipital cortex 
 
Table 3.1. Neural Activations. 
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Chapter 4 
Overcoming Interference in Memory and Responding 
 
The concepts of inhibition and control over interference have been topics of 
intense interest (for reviews, see Dempster, 1995; MacLeod et al., 2003).  This 
interest stems from the pervasive nature of processes that have inhibitory 
character throughout many cognitive activities.  For example, changes in 
inhibitory functions have been used to explain cognitive development (Diamond 
& Gilbert, 1989; Ridderinkhof et al., 1997), as well as age-related cognitive 
decline (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; McDowd et al., 1995).  Additionally, deficient 
inhibitory processes have been related to many disorders including attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Barkley, 1997; Nigg, 2001), autism (Ciesielski & 
Harris, 1997), schizophrenia (Nestor & O’Donnell, 1998), and obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Enright & Beech, 1993).  Although central to cognition, the 
concepts of inhibition and interference-control remain fuzzy and poorly 
understood. 
 
Recently, there has been a movement to understand how different interference-
resolution processes may interact. One hypothesis is that resolving all forms of 
interference depends on the single unitary process of inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 
1988; Hasher et al., 1999).  For example, Hasher and colleagues (1999) 
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demonstrated similar age-related declines for perceptual selection, memory, and 
response production in the face of interference.  These authors proposed that 
these declines may be explained by general inhibitory deficits.  Other 
researchers have demonstrated that differences in working-memory capacity 
explain variations in several different interference tasks (Heitz and Engle, 2007; 
Kane et al., 2001; Kane and Engle, 2000; Rosen and Engle, 1998).  Kane and 
colleagues (2001) suggested that such differences may reflect differences in 
controlled attention that serves to maintain relevant information amidst 
distraction.  Neuroimaging studies examining multiple interference tasks have 
demonstrated similar frontal and parietal recruitment when subjects resolve 
different forms of interference (Fan et al., 2003; Nee et al, 2007; Wager et al., 
2005).  These studies converge on the idea that inhibition-related functions6 may 
be of one sort, regardless of the form of interference. 
 
By contrast, several recent theorists have proposed that inhibition-related 
functions form a family and cannot be distilled into a single unitary construct 
(Harnishfeger, 1995; Kramer et al., 1994; Nigg, 2000; Shilling et al., 2002).  For 
example, behavioral correlations among interference tasks are generally low, 
often near zero (Fan et al., 2003; Kramer et al., 1994; Shilling et al., 2002; Wager 
et al., 2005).  Moreover, despite common neural recruitment across different 
interference tasks, regions unique to different tasks are evident as well (Nee et 
                                                 
6 We use the term “inhibition-related functions” recognizing that “inhibition” has historically linked to the 
processes of interest here.  However, previous work has demonstrated that using the term “inhibition” can 
often be misleading and unnecessary (MacLeod et al., 2003).  Therefore, rather than saying “inhibitory 
functions” we follow the precedent set by Friedman and Miyake (2004) and use the term “inhibition-related 
functions”. 
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al., 2007; Wager et al., 2005).  So, perhaps there are dissociable forms of 
inhibition-related functions.  However, theories remain in conflict regarding the 
proper taxonomy of inhibition-related functions (Dempster and Corkill, 1999; 
Friedman and Miyake, 2004; Harnishfeger, 1995; Kornblum et al., 1990; Nigg, 
2000). 
 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) performed confirmatory factor analysis to examine 
the relationship among three putative inhibitory functions: prepotent response 
inhibition, resistance to distractor interference, and resistance to proactive 
interference (PI).  These authors concluded that prepotent response inhibition 
and resistance to distractor interference formed a single construct (distractor-
response inhibition), but that this construct was distinct from resistance to PI.  
Using a subset of the tasks studied by Friedman and Miyake (2004), Verbruggen 
and colleagues have examined the relationship between prepotent response 
inhibition and resistance to distractor interference by combining interference 
tasks (Verbruggen et al., 2004; 2005; 2006).  These authors determined that 
prepotent response inhibition, as measured by the stop-signal paradigm (e.g. 
Logan and Cowan, 1984) interacted with several other interference tasks 
including the flanker, Simon, spatial Stroop, color-word Stroop, and global-local 
tasks (Verbruggen et al., 2004; 2005; 2006).  These interactions remained even 
in the absence of response conflict (Verbruggen et al., 2004; 2006).  This pattern 
of results confirms that prepotent response inhibition and resistance to distractor 
interference are closely related. 
 92
 
Although Friedman and Miyake (2004) suggested that distractor-response 
inhibition and resistance to PI are distinct, no study has examined this claim in 
more detail.  Notably, the reliabilities of the measures of PI studied by Friedman 
and Miyake (2004) were very low (0.12 or lower) and substantially lower than the 
reliabilities of the other measures studied (0.59 to 0.87).  Furthermore, due to 
their modeling of resistance to PI as residual variance not captured by pure 
recall, it is possible that much of their construct was due to measurement error, 
rather than actually reflecting the ability to resist PI.  Therefore, the lack of 
relation between distractor-response inhibition and resistance to PI may be due 
to these substantial differences in measuring each function. 
 
In this study, we examined the relationship between PI and prepotent response 
inhibition.  In Experiment 1, we combined a directed-forgetting task that induces 
PI in working-memory, with a stop-signal task that requires prepotent response 
inhibition.  We demonstrate that although both PI and prepotent response 
inhibition show robust behavioral signatures, these processes do not interact, 
suggesting that they are indeed separable inhibitory functions.  In Experiment 2 
we combined a variant of the go/no-go task (Rosvold et al., 1956) with the stop-
signal task to examine whether different measures of prepotent response 
inhibition interact.  In addition, we examined whether inhibition-related functions 
related to different stages of response production interact.  We demonstrate a 
strong interaction between our prepotent response inhibition measures, verifying 
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that response inhibition is a robust construct.  However, conflict during response 
selection did not interact with conflict during response execution.  These results 
lead to a taxonomy of inhibition-related functions that distinguishes resistance to 
PI, prepotent response inhibition, and response selection. 
 
4.1 Experiment 1 
4.1.1 Methods 
 
4.1.1.1 Participants   
Twenty-nine participants (8 male, mean age 20) were recruited from the Ann 
Arbor area and were compensated $10/hour plus a performance bonus.  All 
subjects were right-handed native English speakers who had not completed any 
similar experiments during the past two months. Eight subjects were eliminated 
for failure to follow instructions. 
  
4.1.1.2 Design and Procedure   
As shown in Figure 4.1, each trial began with 1s of fixation, followed by a 
memory set of 4 centrally displayed letters presented for 2s. After a 3s delay, 2 
letters of the memory set were re-presented. Subjects were instructed to remove 
these letters from their memory and to retain the 2 letters that had not been re-
presented.  After a 1s delay, subjects responded to a probe letter affirmatively 
(by pressing 1 on a standard keyboard) if the probe letter was one of the to-be-
remembered letters or negatively (by pressing 0) if it was not. 
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Each memory set was chosen randomly from the set of consonants excluding ‘W’ 
with the restriction that no letter had appeared in the previous two trials.  50% of 
the probes were members of the target set (Positive probes), 25% were letters 
that subjects were instructed to forget and hence had to reject (Forget probes), 
and 25% were letters that had not been presented on the previous 2 trials 
(Control probes).  PI was measured by differences between Forget probes and 
Control probes.  Before the experiment, subjects were given written and oral 
instructions, and were administered 16 practice trials under experimenter 
supervision. The experiment consisted of 4 runs of 60 trials each. 
 
On 20% of all trials, an auditory stop-signal (a ring that was presented for 1 
second or until a response, whichever occurred first) was presented shortly after 
the probe. If a stop-signal was presented, the subject was instructed to refrain 
from responding. Subjects were also instructed not to adopt the strategy of 
simply waiting for stop-signals before deciding whether to respond because this 
would decrease their monetary bonus. Stop-signals were equally distributed 
among all types of probes.  
 
The delay between presentation of the probe and the stop-signal (the stop-signal 
delay) varied in a staircase fashion with the first stop-signal set at 350 ms after 
probe onset (Logan, Cowan, Davis, 1984).  The stop-signal delay was increased 
by 50ms following a correct stop and decreased by 50ms following a failure to 
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withhold a response.  Separate staircase functions were used for each type of 
probe.  We measured stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) by subtracting the final 
stop-signal delay value of a particular type of probe (e.g., Control probes) from 
the mean RT on that same type of trial.  SSRT provides a presumed latency to 
stop.  
 
Figure 4.1. Experiment 1 Task Schematic. Schematic of the 3 trial types within 
experiment 1. Presentation duration is in the upper-right corner of each slide in 
milliseconds. 
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A horse-race model has been proposed to explain stop-signal results (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984). It is assumed that there are two processes whose finishing times 
are independent: a “Go” process and a “Stop” process. If the Go process finishes 
first, the subject will respond, and if the Stop process finishes first, a response 
will be successfully inhibited. The staircase procedure for varying stop-signal 
presentation yields an SSRT value which is the amount of time necessary after 
the stop-signal delay for the Stop process to finish at the same time as the Go 
process.  That is, this is the duration necessary for the subject’s go response and 
stop response to finish at the same time (Logan & Cowan, 1984). This calculation 
is necessary as there is no overt response recorded during a successful stop-
signal trial. 
 
Of interest is whether SSRT varied as a function of probe type (Control, Forget, 
or Positive probe).  If prepotent response inhibition and resistance to PI rely on 
the same processes, we would expect an interaction such that SSRT for Forget 
probes that require proactive interference-resolution to be greater than SSRT for 
Control probes that do not require proactive interference-resolution.  This pattern 
follows the logic of additive factors that posits that two variables that act upon the 





Reaction times (RT) were computed only on correct trials where no stop-signal 
was present (signal-absent). Results are summarized in Table 4.1.  The results 
demonstrate significant effects of PI in RT and error rates (ER), but no interaction 
between resolving PI and prepotent response inhibition.  Separate one-way 
ANOVAs were computed for RT, SSRT, ER for signal-absent trials, and ER for 
signal-present trials, using probe type as a factor. These tests revealed a 
significant effect of probe type in RT [F(2,20)=47.14, MSe=1000.83, p<.001] and 
ER on signal-absent trials [F(2,20)=13.13, MSe=.001, p<.001].  Planned t-tests 
revealed that these differences were due to worse performance on Forget probes 
compared to Control probes (Table 4.1, t(20)=6.257 for RT, t(20)=4.54 for ER).  
These results establish robust effects of PI. 
 
Table 4.1 Experiment 1 - Directed-Forgetting 
Task 
Control Forget Positive Forget vs. Control 
Measure 
Mean Mean Mean t-statistic p-value 
RT 570.77 624.96 530.51 6.257 p < 0.001 
ER 2.8% 6.9% 7.7% 4.54 p < 0.001 
SSRT 249.34 251.15 256.7 0.08607 p > 0.9 
Table 4.1. Experiment 1 Behavioral Results. Mean reaction time, error rate, and 
stop-signal reaction time for 3 conditions and planned t-test results for forget vs. 




SSRT (see Figure 4.2) did not vary as a function of probe type [F(2,20)=.065, 
MSe=4744.92, p>.9].  A planned t-test comparing SSRT to Forget probes and 
SSRT to Control probes revealed no difference (t(20)=0.086, p>0.9).  However, 
there was a significant effect of probe type on ER on signal-present trials 
[F(2,20)=3.526, MSe=.003, p<.039], and this was driven by a slightly higher 
accuracy on Forget probes.  Presumably, this was because the initial stop-signal 
delay was equal across all trials (350 ms), and subjects generally responded 
more slowly to forget probes, giving them more time to refrain from responding at 





















Figure 4.2. Experiment 1 SSRTs. Experiment 1 stop-signal reaction time for 3 






Experiment 1 examined the relationship between resistance to PI and prepotent 
response inhibition by combining a directed-forgetting task with the stop-signal 
task.  Despite a robust effect of PI, we were unable to find an interaction between 
resistance to PI and prepotent response inhibition.  This result supports the idea 
that resistance to PI and prepotent response inhibition are separable inhibition-
related functions (Friedman and Miyake, 2004). 
 
Previous studies that have combined the stop-signal task with a variety of 
interference paradigms have demonstrated interactions with SSRT despite 
smaller interference effects (as small as 13ms) (Kramer et al., 1994; Verbruggen 
et al., 2004; 2005; 2006).  Therefore, it is unlikely that our lack of an interaction is 
due to insufficient effect size.  Even so, we wanted to demonstrate that a 
significant interaction in SSRT would be present if two tasks that tap the same 
inhibition-related function were combined.  Hence, we examined prepotent 
response inhibition in Experiment 2 by combining the stop-signal task with a 
variant of the go/no-go task. 
    
4.2 Experiment 2 
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In addition to the stop-signal task, prepotent response inhibition is often 
measured using the go/no-go task that requires subjects to respond to a stream 
of stimuli but withhold a response to a particular target stimulus (Rosvold et al., 
1956).  In the variant used here, we examined prepotent response inhibition, as 
well as conflict during response selection.  Combining this task with the stop-
signal task affords us the ability to 1) affirm that different measures of prepotent 
response inhibition interact and 2) determine whether interference effects at 
different stages of response production interact.  There is a good deal of 
controversy on this latter issue.  Logan and Irwin (2000) demonstrated that 
prepotent response inhibition interacted with response conflict in a stimulus-
response compatibility (SRC) task, but only for eye movements, not manual 
responses.  Kramer et al., (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al., (1999) demonstrated 
interactions between prepotent response inhibition and conflict in the flanker 
task.  However, Verbruggen and colleagues have argued that this may be due to 
stimulus and not response conflict (Verbruggen et al., 2004; 2006).  In the 
present experiment, we included no stimulus conflict, allowing for a unique 
assessment of response conflict.  Our design thus gives us the ability to 





4.2.1.1 Participants  
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Twenty-one participants (9 male, mean age 22) were recruited from the Ann 
Arbor area and compensated $10/hour plus a performance bonus.  All subjects 
were right-handed native English speakers who had not completed any similar 
experiments during the past two months.  
 
4.2.1.2 Design and Procedure 
As displayed in Figure 4.3, on each trial, subjects saw a prime letter for 0.5s, 
followed by a delay that varied between 0.5s and 1.5s (equally distributed among 
discrete values of .5s, 1s, and 1.5s).  Thereafter, subjects were presented with a 
target letter for 1s. Subjects were instructed to respond via keypress to the 
second letter unless the second letter was an X preceded by an A (AX trials).  
The letters were pseudo-randomized such that 40% of trials were AX trials, 20% 
were A followed by any non-X (AY trials), 20% were non-A followed by X (BX 
trials), and 20% were non-A followed by non-X (BY trials). Non-A and Non-X 
letters were randomly chosen from all consonants except for X and W. This 
version of the AX-CPT paradigm (Barch et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 1996) uses RT 
as the main dependent measure, allowing us to embed stop-signals on critical 
trials of interest.  Similar to Experiment 1, an auditory stop-signal was presented 
on 20% of all trials, equally distributed among all trial-types, indicating that a 
response should be withheld, regardless of prior instructions.  The staircase 
procedure for varying stop-signal delay and the calculation of SSRTs proceeded 
in the same manner as Experiment 1, except that the stop-signal delay was 
initialized to 250ms recognizing that the average responses were faster for this 
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task.  Subjects performed 20 runs of 25 trials each.  Before the experiment, 
subjects were given written and verbal instructions, and had 20 practice trials 


























































Figure 4.3. Experiment 2 Task Schematic. Schematic of the 4 trial types within 
Experiment 2. B denotes non-A first letter, and Y denotes non-X second letter. 
Presentation duration is in the upper-right corner of each slide in milliseconds. 
 
We posited that when an “A” was presented as a prime letter, subjects would 
establish a prepotency to withhold a response.  On AY trials, this prepotency 
would have to be overcome in order to respond correctly.  Hence, responses to 
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AY trials examine the ability to overcome prepotent response inhibition.  Of 
particular interest is SSRT on AY trials, since stop-signal trials require subjects to 
first overcome their initial prepotent response inhibition (i.e. respond to the ‘Y’), 
and then re-establish inhibition of a prepotent response (i.e. withhold a response 
to the stop-signal).  In addition, on BX trials, subjects must respond, despite the 
fact that an “X” often indicates a non-response cue.  Hence, BX trials induce 
conflict while subjects select a response (response selection).  Therefore, it is 
also of interest to examine whether this form of response selection conflict 
interacts with the prepotent response inhibition due to the stop-signal.  
Presumably, response inhibition necessitated by the stop-signal occurs after a 
response has been selected.  This allows us to assess whether conflict during 
response selection interacts with inhibiting response execution. 
4.2.2 Results 
 
RT’s were computed only on correct trials without stop-signals. Results are 
summarized in Table 4.2. Separate one-way ANOVAs were computed for RT, 
SSRT, ER on signal-absent trials, and ER on signal-present trials, with trial-type 
as a factor.  The results demonstrated significant effects of prepotent response 
inhibition and response selection conflict in the AX-CPT task.  However, only 
prepotent response inhibition interacted with SSRT (see Figure 4.4). 
 There was a signficant effect of trial-type on RT [F(2,20)=25.43, MSe=1193.39, 
p<.001] and ER on signal-absent trials [F(3,20)=4.591, MSe=.002, p<.01].  
Planned t-tests demonstrated that subjects were significantly slower on AY trials 
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compared to BY trials (t(20)=7.015, p<0.001) although these trials did not differ in 
ER (t(20)=0.3668, p>0.7).  Additionally, subjects were significantly slower and 
more error prone on BX trials compared to BY trials (t(20)=6.378, p<0.001 for 
RT, t(20)=3.569, p<0.01 for ER).  These results demonstrate the expected 
interference effects in the AX-CPT task. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Experiment 2 - AX-CPT Task 
AX AY BX BY AY vs BY BX vs BY 
Measure 
Mean Mean Mean Mean t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
RT N/A 514.97 487.38 439.82 7.015 p < 0.001 6.378 p < 0.001 
ER 4.9% 3.0% 6.8% 2.8% 0.3668 p > 0.7 3.569 p < 0.005 
SSRT N/A 274.5 199.28 197 3.49 p < 0.005 0.0996 p > 0.9 
Table 4.2. Experiment 2 Behavioral Results. Mean reaction time, error rate, and 
stop-signal reaction time for 4 conditions and planned t-test results for conditions 
AY vs BY and BX vs BY.  
 
There was a significant effect of trial-type on SSRT [F(2,20)=6.718, 
MSe=6081.575, p<.01].  A planned t-test revealed that SSRT on AY trials was 
greater than SSRT on BY trials (t(20)=3.49, p<0.01).  However, SSRT on BX 
trials did not differ from SSRT on BY trials (t(20)=0.0996, p>0.9).  There was a 
significant effect of ER on stop-signal trials [F(3,20)=250.71, MSe=.004, p>.001], 
but this was largely due to subjects rarely failing to withhold a response on AX 
trials, which already called for a non-response.  A separate one-way ANOVA on 
 105
AY, BY, and BX trials did not demonstrate a significant difference on ER on 
signal-present trials [F(2,20)=1.658, MSe=.003, p>.2].   
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 demonstrated a strong interaction between two independent 
measures of prepotent response inhibition.  This result validates that the null 
finding of Experiment 1 was not due to SSRT having insufficient sensitivity to 
yield an interaction.  Moreover, the interaction that we found in Experiment 2 
demonstrates that prepotent response inhibition is a consistent measure across 
different paradigms.  By contrast, compared to BY trials, BX trials demonstrated 
a robust interference effect in RT, but there was no comparable difference in 
SSRT.  It is most likely that the interference effect in RT is due to interference 
during response selection is caused by the relationship between the letter “X” 
and a non-response.  However, overcoming conflict due to response selection 
did not affect SSRT.  This result suggests that the response inhibition 
necessitated by the stop-signal occurs after a response is selected, and that 
response selection and inhibition of response execution do not interact.  
Therefore, control mechanisms of response selection and response execution 
appear to be dissociable. 
4.3 General Discussion 
 
Two experiments investigated whether inhibitory processes of PI, prepotent 
response inhibition, and response selection are dissociable.  Whereas different 
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measures of prepotent response inhibition interacted, prepotent response 
inhibition did not interact with PI or response selection conflict.  These results 




















Figure 4.4. Experiment 2 SSRTs. Experiment 2 stop-signal reaction time for 3 
overt response conditions. Error bars denote one standard error of the mean.   
 
Previous work had suggested dissociable roles of prepotent response inhibition 
and resistance to PI.  Using confirmatory factor analysis, Friedman and Miyake 
(2004) demonstrated that prepotent response inhibition and resistance to PI are 
distinct inhibitory functions.  Using event-related fMRI, Nelson and colleagues 
(2003) examined the neural correlates of PI and response conflict.  These 
authors discovered that whereas the left inferior frontal gyrus was involved in the 
resolution of PI, the anterior cingulate was uniquely involved in response conflict.  
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Hence, using very different methodologies, these studies converge on the idea 
that resistance to PI is distinct from inhibitory processes operating on responses. 
 
Prior studies investigating the relationship of conflict during response selection 
and prepotent response inhibition provided mixed evidence regarding their 
separability.  Using a flanker task, Kramer and colleagues (1994) found that 
SSRTs were slowed in the presence of response competition.  Ridderinkhof and 
colleagues (1999) replicated this result using a different flanker.  However, the 
flanker task combines two forms of conflict: stimulus conflict when the flanker 
stimuli do not match the target stimulus in form, and response conflict when the 
flanker stimuli are associated with a competing response.  Verbruggen and 
colleagues (2004; 2006) separably examined whether stimulus conflict, response 
conflict, or both interacted with SSRT.  In two flanker tasks, these authors found 
that stimulus, but not response, conflict interacted with prepotent response 
inhibition.  Therefore, prepotent response inhibition and resolving distracting 
stimulus conflict may rely on the same inhibition-related functions (Friedman and 
Miyake, 2004; Verbruggen et al., 2004; 2005; 2006).  However, distractor-
response inhibition appears to be distinct from response selection conflict. 
 
Neural work has suggested that prepotent response inhibition and response 
selection conflict may have distinct neural loci.  Rubia and colleagues (2001) 
examined the neural correlates of the go/no-go and stop-signal tasks.  These 
authors found common activation for both tasks in the right inferior frontal gyrus, 
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suggesting that this region may be involved in prepotent response inhibition (see 
Aron et al., 2004 for the relationship between prepotent response inhibition and 
the right inferior frontal gyrus).  However, the go/no-go task showed unique 
recruitment of more dorsal regions of frontal cortex, as well as parietal cortex.  
These authors reasoned that these regions may be involved in response 
selection, a function absent in the stop-signal task.  A meta-analysis of inhibition-
related tasks produced similar results (Nee et al., 2007).  Therefore, the neural 
work provides converging evidence that there are dissociable inhibition-related 
functions of response selection and execution. 
 
The results of the current study have implications that extend beyond cognitive 
psychology. Specifically, depression and anxiety disorders have been linked to 
an inability to suppress unwanted thoughts (Muris et al., 1996; Wegner & 
Zanakos, 1994), and successful suppression of intrusive, unwanted thoughts 
requires resistance to PI. In addition, children with ADHD, but not anxious 
children, show impaired response inhibition (Oosterlaan et al., 1998). Therefore, 
the separability shown in this study can help to orient future research in these 
important fields.   
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Chapter 5 
Dissociable Interference-Control Processes in 
Perception and Memory 
 
Successful cognition depends upon performing goal-directed actions in the face 
of interference.  Most tasks require selective attention to some inputs and filtering 
out of others, and most activities require holding certain relevant thoughts in mind 
while shielding these from potential intrusion by irrelevant thoughts.  Goal-
directed actions therefore require the selection of information and/or the de-
selection of irrelevant information.  Understanding how we are able to perform 
such selection is central to understanding cognition. 
 
For over a century, inhibition has been a popular account of how we are able to 
filter out intrusive information (see Smith, 1992, and MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, 
Wilson, & Bibi, 2003, for reviews).  The idea is that inhibition can attenuate the 
representation of distracting information so that it poses a reduced threat to 
ongoing cognition.  Failures of inhibition have been associated with various 
disorders including schizophrenia (MacQueen, Galway, Goldberg, & Tipper, 
2003), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Nigg, 2001), depression (Joorman, 
2005), and obsessive compulsive disorder (Enright & Beech, 1993).  Moreover, 
improved inhibition has been used to explain cognitive advances during 
 110
development (Diamond & Gilbert, 1989), and declining inhibition has been linked 
to cognitive deficits associated with aging (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  These 
examples demonstrate the central importance of the concept of inhibition in 
accounts of cognitive functioning. 
 
Although central to many cognitive models, inhibition remains a phenomenon 
that is poorly understood.  There is contention regarding whether processes that 
down-regulate distracting information are uniform in character (Hasher and 
Zacks, 1988; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001) or whether there is a 
family of such functions (Harnishfeger, 1995).  Theories that posit multiple 
inhibition-related functions remain conflicted regarding the appropriate taxonomy 
of these functions (Dempster, 1995; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Harnishfeger, 
1995; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990).  Importantly, some theorists doubt 
whether inhibition exists at all and instead posit that performance costs thought 
to be related to inhibition are actually products of conflict-resolution resulting from 
memory retrieval (MacLeod, et al., 2003). 
  
Negative priming (NP) has long been taken as a hallmark of inhibitory function 
(see Fox, 1995; May, Kane, and Hasher, 1995; Tipper, 2001 for reviews).  In a 
typical version of a NP task, subjects are required to attend to a target while 
ignoring an irrelevant distractor.  When the target of the current trial was a 
distractor on a previous trial, subjects generally demonstrate slowed and less 
accurate responding.  Initial accounts posited that distracting items are inhibited 
 111
in order to shield processing from interference (Tipper, 2001).  Then, when an 
inhibited item later becomes a target, additional processes have to be recruited 
to overcome the inhibition, and this leads to slowed and more errorful 
performance.  
 
A contrasting position is that inhibition need not be invoked to explain these 
findings (MacLeod et al., 2003).  Instead, the costs associated with NP are 
claimed to be a result of episodic retrieval processes.  By this position, 
presentation of an item automatically retrieves prior episodes associated with 
that item.  These episodes include attributes such as identity information, 
location, the status of the item (e.g. relevant or irrelevant), as well as responses 
to the item (e.g. “respond” or “do not respond”).  Hence, when a previous 
distractor becomes a target, current goals will clash with some retrieved details 
(e.g. relevance, response).  It is the resolution of this episodic retrieval-related 
conflict that causes the observed reduction in performance by this account. 
 
MacLeod and colleagues (2003) supposed that conflict in episodic retrieval 
underlies performance costs involved not only in NP, but also in Stroop, task-
switching, and directed-forgetting situations.  This model is parsimonious in 
explaining a variety of data, providing a single account for many interference 
effects previously associated with inhibition.  The impact of this model on 
theories of cognitive control, development, aging, and various disorders has 
generated a great deal of debate (see Gorfein & MacLeod, 2007, for a summary 
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of conference proceedings on this matter).  However, there is now accruing 
evidence that response-related processes do, in fact, enlist an inhibitory process 
(see Aron, 2007 for a review).  Moreover, there is some evidence that functions 
that inhibit responses are dissociable from functions that resolve interference in 
memory (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Bissett, Nee, & Jonides, submitted).  
Therefore, although some reputed interference effects may be due to problems in 
episodic retrieval, those that act upon responses may be inhibitory in character.  
Is it possible that other interference effects are also due to inhibitory mechanisms 
that are distinguishable from episodic retrieval? 
 
The present study inquires further about the control of interference to see 
whether it is due to a single process or to multiple processes.  In a single 
experimental paradigm, we combined NP and a directed-forgetting procedure 
that induces proactive interference (PI) in order to examine whether dissociable 
patterns emerge.  The claim has been made that these two interference effects 
may be due to conflict during episodic retrieval (MacLeod et al., 2003; Jonides & 
Nee, 2006; Nee, Jonides, & Berman, in press).  Using event-related functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we looked for common and dissociable 
neural patterns that underlie NP and the resolution of PI.  Interrogation of these 
patterns allowed us to determine whether 1) interference-control processes 
related to distracting information and intruding memories are common or 
dissociable and 2) whether NP is a phenomenon related to inhibition, episodic 






Sixteen right-handed adults (12 female, ages 19-26) participated in this study. 
One subject was removed from imaging analyses due to motion artifacts, leaving 
sixteen subjects for behavioral analyses, and fifteen subjects for imaging 
analyses. 
 
5.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Subjects performed two tasks, presented in Figure 5.1.  Both tasks were 
randomly intermixed. 
 
In the “Ignore” task, each trial began with a 1s red fixation cue.  A 1s Ignore cue 
followed, instructing subjects to ignore words of a particular color (either “Ignore 
Teal” or “Ignore Blue”).  After 1.5s of fixation, 6 words were presented for 3s, 3 in 
blue and 3 in teal.  Displays were arranged such that words of the same color 
appeared either in a “V” or upside-down “V” shape.  Subjects were required to 
commit the 3 words they were not told to ignore to memory, and ignore the other 
3 words.  After a 3s retention interval, subjects received a probe for 1.5s.  Fifty 
percent of the probes were members of the target set (Positive-I probes), 25% 
were words subjects were told to ignore (Ignore probes), and 25% were words 
that had not appeared in the last 2 trials (Control-I probes).  Subjects were told to 
respond affirmatively with a left index press to Positive-I probes, and respond 
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negatively with a right index press to all other probes.  Trials were separated by a 
4s interval.  NP was measured by contrasting Ignore probes with Control-I 
probes.   
 
In the “Forget” task, each trial began with a 1s red fixation cue.  After 2.5s of 
fixation, 6 words were presented for 3s, 3 in blue and 3 in teal.  Subjects were 
required to commit all 6 words to memory.  Displays were arranged such that 
words of the same color appeared in a “V” or upside-down “V” shape.  After a 1s 
retention interval, a forget cue was presented for 1s, instructing subjects to 
remove words of a particular color from memory (e.g. Forget Teal).  After another 
1s retention interval, subjects received a probe for 1.5s.  Fifty percent of the 
probes were members of the target set (Positive-F probes), 25% were words 
subjects were told to forget (Forget probes), and 25% were words that had not 
appeared in the last 2 trials (Control-F probes).  Subjects were told to respond 
affirmatively with a left-index press to Positive-F probes, and respond negatively 
with a right index press to all other probes.  Trials were separated by a 4s 
interval.  PI was measured by contrasting Forget probes with Control-F probes. 
 
Subjects performed 8 runs of 24 trials each, for a total of 96 trials of each task.  
All words were drawn randomly from a list of eighty 4-letter nouns with the 






Figure 5.1. Task Schematics.  On each trial, half of the words were presented in 
teal (gray in the figure) and half in blue (black in the figure).  Both tasks were 
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randomly intermixed.  Hemodynamic effects were assessed at the probe of each 
task. 
 
5.1.3 Image acquisition and pre-processing 
Images were acquired on a GE Signa 3T scanner equipped with a standard 
quadrature headcoil.  Head movement was minimized using foam padding and a 
cloth restraint strapped across participants’ foreheads.  Experimental tasks were 
presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) and the IFIS 
9.0 system with a 10-button response unit (MRI Devices Corp.). 
 
Functional T2* weighted images were acquired using a spiral sequence with 40 
contiguous slices with 3.44 x 3.44 x 3 mm voxels (repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms, 
echo time (TE) = 30, flip angle = 90, and field of view (FOV) = 22).  A T1 
weighted gradient echo (GRE) anatomical overlay was acquired using the same 
FOV and slices as the functional scans (TR = 250, TE = 5.7, and flip angle = 90).  
Additionally, a 106-slice high resolution T1 weighted anatomical image was 
collected using spoiled gradient-recalled acquisition in steady state (SPGR) 
imaging (TR = 10.5, TE = 3.4, flip angle = 25, FOV = 24, 1.5 mm slice thickness). 
 
Each SPGR was corrected for signal inhomogeneity (G. Glover and K. Kristoff, 
http://www-psych.standford.edu/~kalina/SPM99/Tools/vol_homocor.html) and 
skull-stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction Tool (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).  
These images were then normalized to the MNI template (avg152t1.img) using 
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SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London).  Functional 
images were corrected for slice time differences using 4-point sinc interpolation 
(Oppenheim, Schafer, & Buck, 1999) and head movement, using MCFLIRT 
(Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002).  To reduce the impact of spike 
artifacts, functional images were winsorized on a voxel-by-voxel basis so that no 
voxel had a signal greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean of the run 
(Lazar, Eddy, Genovese, & Welling, 2001).  Spatial normalization transformations 
and 8 mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian smoothing were applied to all functional 
images prior to analysis using SPM2.  All analyses included a temporal high-pass 
filter (128 s) and each image was scaled to have a global mean intensity of 100. 
 
5.1.4 Image Analysis 
Whole-brain analyses were conducted using the General Linear Model 
implemented in SPM2.  Probe-locked predictors were convolved with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function, including time and dispersion derivatives.  To 
account for artifacts produced by head motion, linear, quadratic, differential, and 
quadratic differential motion regressors were calculated from the realignment 
parameters and included in the model (Lund, Norgaard, Rostrup, Rowe, & 
Paulson, 2005).  Contrast images for each participant were subjected to a 




To examine neural correlates of NP, we contrasted Ignore probes with Control-I 
probes.  To examine neural correlates of PI-resolution, we contrasted Forget 
probes with Control-F probes.  Both of these contrasts were thresholded at p < 
0.001 uncorrected and restricted to regions demonstrating 5 contiguous supra-
threshold voxels (Forman et al., 1995; Poline, Worsley, Evans, & Friston, 1997). 
 
To assess regions showing dissociable responses to NP versus PI, we examined 
regions showing task (Ignore vs. Forget) x probe (Interference vs. Control) 
interactions.  Interactions were assessed using a separate whole-brain random-
effects analysis.  Interaction regions were defined as regions showing both 
significant interference-related activation increases in one task at p < 0.001 and 
greater interference-related activation increases for one task than the other at p < 
0.01, both restricted to 5 contiguous voxels. 
 
To assess regions showing common responses to NP and PI, we performed a 
conjunction analysis on the contrasts of both tasks.  The conjunction was 
thresholded at p < 0.01 for each task, producing a conjoint p < 0.001 threshold 




5.2.1 Behavioral Results 
Reaction times (RT) were calculated for correct trials only.  Two 2 x 3 repeated-
measures ANOVAs were performed separately on error rates (ER) and RT using 
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task and probe as factors.  We found significant effects of NP and PI in RT.  
Results are summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 – Behavioral Data 
 Ignore Task Forget Task 














ER 1.8 (2.5) 3.3 (5.3) 3.5 (3.4) 9.8 (7.0) 5.2 (6.5) 14.8 (10.9) 
 
Table 5.1. Behavioral Data. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.  RT = 
reaction time, ER = error rate. 
 
There was a main effect of task in ER (F(1,15) = 28.442, p < 0.001) and 
marginally in RT (F(1,15) = 4.19, p < 0.06).  Inspection of the data revealed that 
this was due to worse performance on the Forget task.  There was also a main 
effect of probe in ER (F(2,14) = 5.651, p < 0.05) and RT (F(2,14) = 15.467, p < 
0.001).  There was a significant task x probe interaction in ER (F(2,14) = 7.823, p 
< 0.01) and RT (F(2,14) = 5.48, p < 0.05). 
 
Planned contrasts revealed a significant effect of NP in RT, with slower 
responses to Ignore probes compared to Control-I probes (23.1ms, t(15) = 2.392, 
p < 0.05).  There was no comparable effect in ER (t(15) = -1.112, p > 0.25).  
There was also a significant effect of PI in RT, with slower responses to Forget 
probes compared to Control-F probes (79.5ms, t(15) = 4.545, p < 0.001).  The 
effect in ER was in the same direction, but did not reach significance (4.6%, t(15) 
= 1.808, p < 0.1). 
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Figure 5.2.  Whole-brain results. Activation increases related to negative priming 
(Ignore – Control-I) and proactive interference (Forget – Control-F). 
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5.2.2 Imaging Results 
Activation increases associated with NP were most notable in occipital cortex, in 
the left calcarine sulcus and right lingual gyrus.  There were also significant 
activation increases in right inferior temporal gyrus, right premotor cortex, left 
paracentral gyrus, and the right intraparietal sulcus (Table 5.2, Figure 5.2). 
Table 5.2 - Neural correlates of negative priming and proactive 
interference 
Peak Voxels T-value BA Region 
Ignore > Control-I 
 38  18 -32 7 4.83 38 right inferior temporal gyrus 
  2 -64   0 14 4.79 18 right lingual gyrus 
-10 -84   6 42 4.54 17 left calcarine sulcus 
 36  -4  60 13 4.38 6 right premotor cortex 
 -8 -34  54 15 4.29 5 left paracentral gyrus 
 36 -46  56 8 4.2 7/40 right intraparietal sulcus 
 
Forget > Control-F 
-38  22  40 133 6.16 9/8 left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
-48  18  30  4.05 44/9/46 left inferior/middle frontal gyrus 
  0 -66  42 45 5.01 7 precuneus 
 14 -54  54 59 4.89 7 right precuneus 
 -6 -52  48 21 4.41 7 left precuneus 
 42 -68  50 38 4.4 7 right intraparietal sulcus 
 44 -74  38  4.33 19/39  
 48 -68  42  4.31 7  
  8 -68 -46 6 4.36  right cerebellum 
 30  12  54 26 4.36 6/8 right premotor 
 32  34  46 7 4.16 9/8 right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
 
Table 5.2.  Neural correlates of negative priming and proactive interference. 
Whole-brain results reported at p < 0.001, 5 contiguous voxels.  Peaks are 
reported in MNI space. BA = Brodmann’s area 
 
PI-related activation was most prominent in left lateral prefrontal cortex, largely in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but also reaching ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.  
Additionally, activation increases were found in bilateral precuneus, right 
 122
intraparietal sulcus, right premotor cortex, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and 
right cerebellum (Table 5.2, Figure 5.2). 
 
To examine whether any regions demonstrated unique interference-specific 
activation, we looked for regions demonstrating a task x probe interaction.  
Whereas left occipital cortex demonstrated unique NP-related activation, left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex demonstrated unique PI-related activation (Table 
5.3, Figure 5.3).  Follow up analyses that averaged responses in these regions 
confirmed greater NP-related than PI-related activation in left occipital cortex 
(t(14) = 2.88, p < 0.01) and greater PI-related than NP-related activation in left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (t(14) = 3.33, p < 0.01).  Moreover, at a stricter 
whole-brain threshold of p < 0.001, there similar interactions in left occipital 
cortex and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, albeit reduced in extent.  To assess 
whether these dissociable regions were related to performance, we looked for 
brain-behavior correlations in left occipital and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Figure 5.4).  A region in left occipital cortex (MNI center -14 -88 10, BA 17, 17 
voxels) correlated with NP (r = 0.6031, p < 0.05), but not PI (r = -0.0657, p > 0.8).  
By contrast, a region in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (MNI center -42 20 34, 
BA 9/44, 33 voxels) correlated with PI (r = -0.6439, p < 0.01), but not NP (r = -
0.1925, p > 0.4). 
 
Finally, we assessed whether NP and PI produced any common neural 
correlates using a conjunction analysis.  Three regions emerged from this 
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analysis: right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right intraparietal sulcus, and left 
precuneus (Table 5.3, Figure 5.5).  However, none of these regions remained 
using a stricter valid conjunction analysis thresholded at p < 0.001 for each 
contrast (Nichols et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 5.3.  Occipital and PFC Interactions. Occipital cortex demonstrated 
unique negative priming-related activation whereas left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex demonstrated unique proactive interference-related activation. 
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Table 5.3 - Common and distinct regions of interference-control 
Center Voxels BA Region 
Ignore – Control-I > Forget – Control-F 
-10 -86 6 16 17 left calcarine sulcus 
 
Forget – Control-F > Ignore – Control-I 
-40 26 38 40 9 left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
46 -70 40 26 39 right intraparietal sulcus 
2 -64 44 9 7 right precuneus 
14 -54 52 36     
32 36 44 6 9/8 right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
30 10 54 17 6/8 right premotor 
4 -66 -48 6   right cerebellum 
    
Ignore – Control-I ∩ Forget – Control-F 
32 32 42 9 9/8 right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
38 -50 50 26 40 right intraparietal sulcus 
-8 -54 50 7 7 left precuneus 
 




Theories of interference-control disagree about whether NP and PI involve a 
single process acting during episodic retrieval (MacLeod et al., 2003) or distinct 
forms of control (e.g. Friedman & Miyake, 2004).  We found dissociable neural 
recruitment for the two effects, with occipital cortex demonstrating unique 
involvement in NP and left lateral prefrontal cortex demonstrating unique 
activation related to PI.  These results support the notion that NP and PI involve 
at least partially distinct control mechanisms.  Using confirmatory factor analysis 
in a correlational study, Friedman & Miyake (2004) proposed that resistance to 
distractor interference and resistance to PI were distinguishable factors.  
However, ours is the first study that combined both forms of interference-control 
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into a single experimental paradigm.  Our results, together with those of 
Friedman & Miyake (2004), provide strong support for the position that 
interference-control processes for filtering perceptual material versus memories 
are distinct. 
 
5.3.1 Accounting for Negative Priming 
Our results showed activation increases in primary visual cortex that were unique 
to NP.  Moreover, this occipital region demonstrated a strong correlation with 
behavioral indices of NP.  Why would primary visual cortex be associated with 
NP?  Of course, one possibility is that the NP trials (Ignore probes) yield longer 
response times and hence more time-on-task.  However, if this portion of cortex 
were simply responding to time on task, it also should yield greater activation on 
the PI trials (Forget probes).  Yet this region demonstrated decreases in the face 
of PI.  So, time-on-task is not the mediating factor.   
 
A second possibility is that the occipital activation increases somehow represent 
difficulty in episodic retrieval.  This seems implausible in that activation of primary 
visual cortex should precede any memory-related processes.  Furthermore, any 
episodic conflict should be present for both the NP conflict and the PI conflict.  
Yet, the occipital activation is present only for NP.  An alternative is that NP and 
PI elicit the retrieval of different episodic details.  For example, subjects may 
retrieve visual details to respond to Ignore probes and phonological details (e.g. 
placement in rehearsal loop) to respond to Forget probes, causing the observed 
 126
occipital/left frontal dissociation.  However, both Ignore and Forget items are 
distinguishable from relevant material by both color and phonology.  Hence, this 
account would likely predict a more quantitative distinction between Ignore and 
Forget probes, whereas the observed data indicate a qualitative distinction. 
 
Figure 5.4.  Brain-Behaviora Correlations. Correlations between behavioral 
indices of interference-control and neural activity.  PFC = prefrontal cortex. 
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We believe that the pattern of activations we found for NP is best accounted for 
by an inhibitory mechanism.  Some models of NP have lodged the effect of 
inhibition at the level of semantic representations (e.g. Tipper, 2001).  Our task, 
however, seems better suited to an account where the inhibitory processes occur 
earlier in the processing stream, with the visual representations themselves. The 
task we used requires subjects to filter out 3 distractors, while making saccades 
to encode the 3 relevant items.  The likelihood of encoding the wrong item in this 
situation may therefore recruit early selection processes.  Consequently, the 
actual perceptual representation of the ignored items may be inhibited.  If so, 
then when an ignored item is presented as a probe, visual processes must 
overcome this inhibition in order to encode the item.  Hence, the primary visual 
activation increases seen here may be related to overcoming perceptual 
inhibition. 
 
Notably, research has suggested that whether negative priming involves 
inhibition or episodic retrieval varies as a function of task parameters (Kane et 
al., 1997).  For example, Kane and colleagues (1997) argued that when encoding 
a target is made more difficult via stimulus degradation or brief presentations, 
there is a greater reliance of retrieval processes to aid encoding, thereby shifting 
negative priming from inhibition to episodic retrieval.   Our long presentation 
duration of recognition probes and lack of degradation may therefore have 
favored inhibitory rather than retrieval processes.  Hence, an interesting follow-up 
would be to examine neural correlates of negative priming when recognition 
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probes are more difficult to encode versus when they are easier to encode to see 
if difficult encoding recruits stronger left lateral PFC activation. 
 
5.3.2 Accounting for Proactive Interference 
A growing body of literature has implicated left lateral prefrontal cortex in the 
resolution of PI (see Jonides & Nee, 2006 for a review).  Consistent with this, we 
found unique PI-related activation in lateral prefrontal cortex that correlated with 
performance.  These activation increases were somewhat more dorsal than in 
previous reports (e.g. Nee et al., in press) which may be due to increased 
selection difficulty in the task studied here.  There is evidence that more dorsal 
regions of frontal cortex are recruited as processing demands increase (e.g. 
Postle, Berger, & D’Esposito, 1999). Previous studies of directed forgetting in 
short-term memory have used item- or location-based forget cues (Nee et al., in 
press; Zhang, Leung, & Johnson, 2003; Zhang, Feng, Fox, Gao, & Tan, 2004).  
These cues have had obvious mappings to the items to be maintained and 
discarded, making it relatively easy to distinguish relevant and irrelevant items in 
short-term memory.  However, the color-cue we used here does not have an 
obvious mapping to the items to be maintained and forgotten, thereby making 
selection potentially more difficult.   
 
Is the left lateral frontal area somehow involved in inhibitory processing? 
Although early accounts claimed this (Jonides, Smith, Marshuetz, & Koeppe, 
1998), more recent models have gravitated toward the notion that this region is 
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involved in selection of contextual details during episodic retrieval (Badre & 
Wagner, 2005; Jonides & Nee, 2006; Nee et al., in press).  Nee and colleagues 
(in press) have demonstrated that this region shows increased functional 
connectivity with the medial temporal lobe and premotor cortex in the face of PI, 
suggesting that left lateral prefrontal cortex selects episodic details in order to 
bias decision processes.  Our data suggest that these processes are distinct 
from those related to NP. 
 
5.3.3 Common Activations 
We also found common recruitment of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right 
intraparietal sulcus, and left precuneus for both NP and PI.  A previous study 
examining NP in a Stroop task also found activation increases in right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Egner & Hirsch, 2005).  Since this region has been 
associated with episodic retrieval, these authors took this as evidence supporting 
the episodic retrieval account of NP.  Moreover, the common parietal regions that 
we found activated have also been implicated in the retrieval of specific episodic 
details (see Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 2005 for a review).  These 
results suggest that there are common episodic components to both NP and PI.  
These components may reflect contrasting episodic details when an item is a 
probe (“respond to me”) versus when it is ignored or removed from memory (“do 
not respond to me”).  However, none of these regions demonstrated a significant 
correlation with behavior (p > 0.05) and none of these regions survived a stricter 
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valid conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005), so accepting these regions as 
reflecting common episodic components must be taken with caution. 
 
Figure 5.5.  Common Regions. Regions demonstrating common interference-
related activity for negative priming and proactive interference.  DLPFC = 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPS = intraparietal sulcus. 
 
Egner & Hirsch (2005) also reported NP-related activation in the medial dorsal 
thalamus (MNI peak 10 -20 14, 30 voxels).  Moreover, these authors reported 
that activation in this region correlated negatively with behavioral indices of NP.  
In a post-hoc analysis, we interrogated the medial dorsal thalamus for 
comparable activity.  At a more liberal threshold (p < 0.01), we found a similar 
region for our NP contrast (MNI peak -10 -18 16, 10 voxels) that also 
demonstrated a marginally significant correlation with behavioral indices of NP (r 
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= -0.4831, p = 0.07).  However, this region did not show comparable activation 
related to PI (p > 0.9).  Egner & Hirsch (2005) noted the relation of this region to 
schizophrenia.  Schizophrenics demonstrate reduced NP (MacQueen et al., 
2003) with a concomitant decrease in medial dorsal thalamus volumes (e.g. 
Kemether et al., 2003).  Schizophrenics also show decreased metabolic activity 
in the medial dorsal thalamus (Buchsbaum et al., 1996).  Egner & Hirsch (2005) 
interpreted NP-related activity in the medial dorsal thalamus to indicate that 
episodic retrieval and not inhibition is deficient in schizophrenia.  However, our 
results speak to the contrary in that activation increases in this region were 
uniquely associated with NP, not PI.  Rather, this evidence is more consistent 
with models of schizophrenia that posit deficient inhibition (MacQueen et al., 
2003). 
 
In summary, the data here suggest some dissociable interference-control 
processes related to NP and PI.  This indicates that beyond responding, not all 
interference costs can be cast as problems in episodic retrieval.  Rather, resisting 
perceptual interference and resolving PI appear to be dissociable functions.  
Moreover, our data suggest that there are inhibitory components to NP, acting as 
early as primary visual cortex, and perhaps involving the medial dorsal thalamus 
as well.   However, NP may have some components related to conflict during 
episodic retrieval, as retrieval-related regions are recruited for both NP and PI. 
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Understanding how control is achieved over perceptual and memorial 
representations is central to understanding cognition. Our data highlight the 
importance of distinguishing different forms of interference-control that are 
overcome by different mechanisms.  Beyond this, our data also highlight the 
value of neuroimaging as a way to parse different psychological mechanisms that 
are critical to cognitive processing, something that can be applied to studying 
deficits in cognitive processing as well (e.g. Jonides and Nee, 2005). 
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Chapter 6 
The Spotlight Casts a Shadow: Attentionally-Mediated 
Visual Suppression Produces Object-Specific Inhibition 
 
Searching through a cluttered environment requires an interplay between visual 
and attentional systems.  Many traditional accounts rely on the metaphor of 
attention as a spotlight that highlights certain aspects of the visual scene allowing 
for closer inspection of specific details (Posner and Petersen, 1990).   However, 
recent data suggest that attention does more than simply enhance relevant visual 
information; attentional processes also appear to suppress competing distracting 
information (Muller and Ebeling, 2008; Muller and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Nee and 
Jonides, in press; Tootell et al., 1998). Research has demonstrated that when 
humans focus attention on a location, neural activation corresponding to ignored 
locations is reduced (Muller and Ebeling, 2008; Muller and Kleinschmidt, 2004; 
Tootell et al., 1998), and response time to information at suppressed locations is 
impaired (Muller and Ebeling, 2008).  Although it has been assumed that visual 
suppression is a function of top-down modulation of visual cortex, as yet there 
has been no demonstration of an interplay between frontal/parietal attentional 
regions and visual suppression.  Additionally, it is unclear whether the observed 
suppression effects function only to aid encoding, or whether they may underlie a 
longer lasting phenomenon that safeguards the cognitive system from recurrent 
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distraction.  That is, can these suppressive influences on the visual system 
provide a means to inhibit unwanted, intrusive information? 
 
A rich behavioral tradition has demonstrated that when distracting visual 
information is filtered out, subjects show slowed response latencies when they 
must revisit the previously ignored information (Fox, 1995; May et al., 1995; 
Tipper, 2001).  This effect, commonly referred to as negative priming, has been 
taken as a measure of the cognitive system’s ability to inhibit distracting 
information that may otherwise be deleterious to performance.  Evidence of the 
importance of this ability comes from demonstrations that reduced negative 
priming accompanies clinical disorders such as schizophrenia (MacQueen et al., 
2003), attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (Nigg, 2001) and depression 
(Joorman, 2005).  It is thought that cognitive impairments related to these 
disorders may involve the impairment of the ability to inhibit unwanted perceptual 
distraction (Joorman, 2005; MacQueen et al., 2003; Nigg, 2001).  However, 
alternative accounts that do not rely on inhibition have been proposed, and these 
accounts provide parsimonious explanations of many of the cognitive 
phenomena in question (MacLeod et al., 2003).  Moreover, precise neural and 
psychological accounts of inhibition are lacking and do not specify the 
mechanism by which inhibition might be achieved. 
 
Recently, we demonstrated that when subjects encoded a previously ignored 
word, activation in early visual cortex was increased relative to when subjects 
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encoded a word that had not been recently presented (Nee and Jonides, in 
press).  Moreover, occipital activation was related to behavioral manifestations of 
negative priming.  We speculated that the visual representations of the ignored 
words were inhibited.  Then, when the previously ignored words had to be 
encoded once again, this inhibition had to be overcome, resulting in a need for 
increased visual encoding processes and a commensurate slowing of reaction 
time.  However, our experiment neither demonstrated inhibition nor provided a 
rationale for how inhibition might have occurred.  Here, we demonstrate that 
visual suppression may produce the lasting inhibition that mediates negative 
priming. 
 
Based on previous data, we predicted that if inhibition is at work, then it may be 
observable as a neural suppression of occipital regions involved in representing 
distracting information.  Such visual suppressive effects should be caused by 
top-down influences by frontal and/or parietal regions involved in attentional 
control.  Moreover, if suppression of early visual cortex underlies negative 
priming, then reductions in visual cortical responsiveness should predict the 
magnitude of behavioral costs incurred when revisiting ignored information.  
Here, we examine these predictions.  First, we document regions of attentional 
control.  Next, we look for visual regions that may underlie negative priming.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between attentional control regions and their 
presumed targets in visual cortex. 
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To examine attentional-modulation as subjects filtered out distraction, we used a 
modified item-recognition task similar to our previous design (Nee and Jonides, 
in press) while examining neural activation using event-related functional 
magnetic resonance imaging.  On each trial, subjects received a display and had 
to commit 3 target words to memory (Figure 6.1).  On half of the trials, target 
words were accompanied by distracting words that were presented in a different 
color.  On a quarter of the trials, a string of 4 pound-signs appeared in place of 
distracting words, and on the other quarter of the trials, no distractors were 
presented.  All trial types were randomly intermixed.  Before each display was 
presented, subjects were alerted to the color of the target words so that 
attentional processes could select relevant words among potential distractors.  
To provide a behavioral assay of attentional control, we instructed subjects to 
make a keypress after they had encoded the target words.  We reasoned that 
longer keypress latencies denoted larger demands on attentional control.  To 
ensure that subjects faithfully encoded targets and ignored distractors, subjects 
responded to recognition probes following a variable delay.  These recognition 
probes queried target words (requiring a positive response), words that had not 
appeared (requiring a negative response), and words that were to-be-ignored 
(also requiring a negative response).  Accuracy to these recognition decisions 





Eighteen right-handed adults (8 female; ages 19-25) participated in this study.  
All subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision and had no reported 
illnesses.  Subjects were compensated $20/hr plus a bonus for fast and accurate 
performance.  One run from one subject was excluded from analysis due to her 
difficulty with task instructions. 
 
Figure 6.1.  Task Schematic. A depiction of the task with the duration each event 
described on the right.  The attentional cue denoted the color of the target words.  
Subjects encoded target words while either filtering out distracting pound signs 
(pound-distraction), words (word-distraction), or with no distraction present (no-
distraction).  After a varied retention interval, subjects responded to recognition 
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probes that were encoded, not seen, or ignored.  Ignored probes only followed 
the word-distraction condition, since words were not ignored in other conditions. 
 
6.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Words were drawn from a list of 100 four-letter nouns.  Words were drawn 
randomly for each trial with the exception that words could not have been 
presented in the previous 2 trials in order to control for potential effects of 
proactive interference.  All responses were recorded on a 10-button response 
unit that accompanied the IFIS 9.0 system (MRI Devices Corp., Latham, NY) with 
one button for each finger.  Stimuli were presented via a projector at the back of 
the scanner, reflected off a mirror placed above the head of the subject.  
Experimental tasks were presented using E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). 
 
Each trial began with a red fixation cross presented for 1 second to alert the 
subject that the trial was beginning.  Thereafter, an attention cue (“ATTEND 
BLUE”, “ATTEND TEAL”, “IGNORE BLUE”, or “IGNORE TEAL”) was presented 
for 1.5 seconds that informed the subject of the color of the relevant stimuli.  On 
half of the trials the words printed in blue were made relevant and on the other 
half the words printed in teal were made relevant.  Three-fourths of the cues 
involved “attend” instructions, with the other one-fourth involving “ignore” 
instructions.  We collapsed across different cue instructions and “ignore” 
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instructions were used only to parallel another experiment not reported here.  
“Attend” and “ignore” instructions did not produce appreciably different results. 
 
The attention cue was followed by 0.5 seconds of fixation, followed by the target 
display.  The target display consisted of three words presented in the relevant 
color in a “V” or upside-down “V” shape.  On one-half of the trials, three distractor 
words (word-distraction) were presented in the alternate color (blue if the relevant 
words were teal, teal if the relevant words were blue).  On one-fourth of the trials, 
a string of four pound signs was used in place of distracting words (pound-
distraction) and on the other one-fourth of the trials, no distracting information 
appeared (no-distraction).  All of the stimuli considered together subtended 
approximately 9.7 degrees of visual angle horizontally, and approximately 3.5 
degrees vertically.  Each word or string of pound signs subtended approximately 
2.6 degrees of visual angle horizontally, and 0.88 degrees vertically.  Stimuli 
were separated by 0.88 degrees horizontally, and 1.76 degrees vertically.   
 
Subjects were instructed to read the three relevant words subvocally once and 
make a left thumb press after doing so.  Subjects were told to maintain the 
relevant words in memory.  The target display was presented for 4 seconds, and 
subjects were instructed to stare at the fixation cross and continue to attend to 
relevant words and ignore irrelevant information when they had completed 
encoding the relevant words. 
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A fixation interval of 4 to 6 seconds followed the target display, varied in equal 
steps of 1 second.  Thereafter, a cue (rehearsal cue) appeared instructing 
subjects to rehearse the relevant words once and make a left thumb press after 
doing so.  The cue stated “REMEM BLUE” or “REMEM TEAL” (always the 
relevant color), and was included to parallel another experiment not described 
here.  This cue was followed by a 6 to 8-second fixation interval, varied in equal 
steps of 1 second.  Finally, a recognition probe was presented for 1 second, 
followed by an inter-trial interval of 3 to 5 seconds, varied in equal steps of 1 
second.  Subjects responded with a right index press if the probe matched one of 
the three words held in memory (positive probe), and made a left index press 
otherwise (negative probe).  One-half of the probes were positive probes and 
one-half were negative probes.  Three-quarters of the negative probes were 
words that had not appeared for the last 2 trials (control probes) and one-quarter 
were probes that matched a word that had appeared as a distractor on the target 
display (ignore probes).  The asymmetry of the number of ignore probes is due to 
the fact that ignore probes could only follow the word-distraction condition.  
Within the word-distraction condition, control and ignore probes were equally 
distributed.  All combinations of cue and probe were randomly intermixed. 
 
Subjects performed four runs of 18 trials each, for a total of 72 trials.  Runs were 
interleaved with another task not describe here and the order of runs was 
counterbalanced between subjects.  The day prior to scanning, subjects 
performed two runs of the task with accuracy and latency feedback.  On the day 
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of scanning, subjects performed an additional run of practice also with feedback.  
Feedback was not given during scanning, but average accuracy and reaction 
times were presented during rest breaks between scans so that subjects could 
monitor their performance. 
 
6.1.3 Image Acquisition and Preprocessing 
Images were acquired on a GE Signa 3-T scanner equipped with a standard 
quadrature head coil.  Head movement was minimized using foam padding and a 
cloth restraint strapped across participants’ foreheads. 
 
Functional T2*-weighted images were acquired using a spiral sequence with 40 
contiguous slices with 3.44 × 3.44 × 3 mm voxels (repetition time, or TR = 2,000 
ms; echo time, or TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 90°; field of view, or FOV = 22 mm2). A 
T1-weighted gradient-echo anatomical overlay was acquired using the same 
FOV and slices (TR = 250 ms, TE = 5.7 ms, flip angle = 90°). Additionally, a 124-
slice high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image was collected using spoiled-
gradient-recalled acquisition (SPGR) in steady-state imaging (TR = 9 ms, TE = 
1.8 ms, flip angle = 15°, FOV = 25-26 mm2, slice thickness = 1.2 mm). 
 
Each SPGR anatomical image was corrected for signal inhomogeneity and skull-
stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction Tool (Smith et al., 2004). These images 
were then normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template using 
SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). Functional 
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images were corrected for differences in slice timing using 4-point sinc 
interpolation (Oppenheim et al., 1999) and were corrected for head movement 
using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002). To reduce the impact of spike artifacts, 
we winsorized functional images on a voxel-by-voxel basis so that no voxel had a 
signal greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean of the run (Lazar et al., 
2001).  Spatial normalization transformations and 8-mm full-width/half-maximum 
isotropic Gaussian smoothing were applied to all functional images prior to 
analysis using SPM2. All analyses included a temporal high-pass filter (128 s), 
and each image was scaled to have a global mean intensity of 100. 
 
6.1.4 Image Analysis 
Analyses were conducted using the General Linear Model implemented in SPM2.  
Predictors of interest were locked to the onset of the target display and 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function provided by SPM2.  
Additional predictors were used to model the rehearsal cue and the probe, which 
were not involved in the present analyses.  To account for artifacts produced by 
head motion, we calculated linear, quadratic, differential, and quadratic 
differential motion regressors from the realignment parameters and included 
these regressors in the model (Lund et al., 2005).  Trials in which subjects failed 
to make a keypress to the target set or rehearsal cue and/or trials in which 
subjects responded incorrectly to the recognition probe were excluded (less than 
7% of the trials). 
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Separate regressors were calculated for word-distraction, pound-distraction, and 
no-distraction.  Attentional control was assessed by comparing estimated 
responses to word-distraction versus pound-distraction and no-distraction.  This 
analysis was conducted over the entire collected volume and was thresholded at 
p < 0.001 with a cluster extent of at least 20 suprathreshold voxels (Forman et 
al., 1995; Poline et al., 1997).  Visual suppression was assessed by comparing 
estimated responses when distraction was present (word-distraction and pound-
distraction) compared to no-distraction.  The contrast was informed by 
demonstrations that visual suppression occurs in the presence of distracting 
information, but not at empty ignored locations (Muller and Ebeling, 2008).  This 
analysis was restricted to occipital cortex as a region of interest and thresholded 
at p < 0.01 with a cluster extent of at least 20 suprathreshold voxels.  Occipital 
cortex was identified by anatomical inspection and early visual regions of interest 
in V1 and V2 were verified using a probabilistic atlas (Amunts et al., 2000). 
 
Notably, we did not use separate regressors to model different probe events in 
order to investigate probe-related changes in neural activation.  Of interest would 
be the neural differences in activation between ignore probes and control probes 
to examine neural correlates of negative priming.  However, only 9 ignore probes 
were included per subject and our prior work with a similar paradigm suggested 
that this analysis would have insufficient power to detect the anticipated 
difference (Nee and Jonides, in press).  Hence, considerations of probe-related 
effects rely on our previously published report. 
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Correlations between behavioral effects and neural activation were restricted to 
regions demonstrating significant neural activation in the analysis of interest as 
per the criteria above.  Correlations were computed on a voxel-by-voxel basis 
and contiguous voxels demonstrating correlations significant at p < 0.05 were 
pooled together for subsequent analysis.  Only regions demonstrating a cluster 
extent of 20 or more voxels were examined.  All correlations were confirmed 
using robust regression, a method less sensitive to outliers than ordinary least 
squares approaches. 
 
To examine interactions between visual suppression and attentional control, we 
first extracted the contrast estimates for visual suppression in left early visual 
cortex, restricted to regions demonstrating a significant difference for distraction 
versus no-distraction at p < 0.005.  The resultant region was 40 voxels in size.  
For each subject, we averaged the contrast estimates within the left occipital 
region and used the subject-by-subject variation of this estimate as a predictor.  
Within regions that demonstrated significant activation increases to attentional 
control (as per the criteria above), we looked for regions that correlated inversely 
with visual suppression on a voxel-by-voxel basis.  Regions composed of 20 or 
more contiguous voxels that correlated negatively with visual suppression at p < 




6.2.1 Behavioral Results 
Trials in which subjects failed to make a keypress to the target display or 
rehearsal cue were excluded from behavioral analysis (less than 2% of the trials).  
First, we assessed accuracy to recognition probes.  Accuracy was high overall (> 
95%) and did not differ by probe type (positive, control, ignore; F(2,34) < 1), nor 
did accuracy differ as a function of the type of distraction present (word-
distraction, pound-distraction, no-distraction; F(2,34) < 1).  For all latency data, 
we excluded trials in which subjects responded incorrectly to the recognition 
probe. 
 
To explore behavioral effects of attentional control, we examined the latency with 
which subjects made a keypress after encoding the target set as a function of the 
type of distraction present.  There was a significant effect of type of distraction 
(F(2,34) = 24.17, p < 0.001).  Planned t-tests demonstrated that word-distraction 
produced slower latencies to respond than pound-distraction (1430ms vs. 
1176ms, t(17) = 6.6, p < 0.001) and no-distraction (1430ms vs. 1183ms, t(17) = 
4.68, p < 0.001).  Pound-distraction and no-distraction did not differ (t(17) = 0.22, 
p > 0.8).  These results confirmed that word-distraction called for increased 
attentional control compared to pound-distraction and no-distraction. 
 
Next, we examined reaction times to recognition probes.  Recognition probes 
demonstrated a significant effect of probe type (F(2,34) = 10.59, p < 0.001).  This 
was largely driven by faster responses to positive probes (651ms) compared to 
 146
control probes (704ms) and ignore probes (736ms).  There was no effect of type 
of distraction on reaction time for recognition probes (F(2,34) = 1.91, p > 0.15).  
To assess negative priming, we contrasted reaction times to ignore probes with 
control probes.  This test revealed a significant effect of negative priming (t(17) = 
1.76, p < 0.05, one-tailed, 32ms).  That we did not see a more robust effect is 
likely due to the small number of ignore probes (9 per subject). 
 
6.2.2 Neural Results 
6.2.2.1 Attentional Control 
Previous work has suggested that a network of frontal and parietal regions 
underlies attentional control (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Desimone and 
Duncan, 1995; Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Posner and Peterson, 1990, 
Yantis and Serences, 2003).  We reasoned that attentional control would be 
strongest when subjects filtered out distracting words, and weaker when subjects 
filtered out pound signs or were presented with no distracting information.  To 
identify regions of attentional control, we therefore contrasted neural responses 
when subjects ignored distracting words versus distracting pound signs or no 
distraction.  As predicted, this contrast produced robust activation differences in 
several frontal and parietal regions (see Table 6.1 for complete results).  To 
provide stronger evidence that these regions were involved in attentional control, 
we examined whether activation in these regions was predicted by behavioral 
measures of attentional control.  For each subject, we calculated an index of 
attentional control from his/her encoding keypress latencies.  We contrasted the 
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latency to encode target words among distracting words versus the latency to 
encode target words among distracting pound signs or no distraction.  This 
behavioral measure of attentional control predicted activation in bilateral SPL, left 
inferior parietal lobule, and bilateral precuneus (all r > 0.55, p < 0.05; Figure 6.2; 
Table 6.2).  All of these correlations remained significant after robust regression, 
demonstrating that the correlations were not a result of high-leverage outliers.  
Hence, attentional control processes, as measured by neural activation and its 




Figure 6.2.  Parietal Control Regions. Parietal regions demonstrating significant 
activation increases to heightened demands on attentional control and significant 
correlations with behavior measures of attentional control.  High-control 
corresponds to the word-distraction condition, and low-control is a composite of 
the pound-distraction and no-distraction conditions. 
 
6.2.2.2 Visual Suppression 
Previous research has demonstrated that when attention is drawn to target 
information, activation related to nearby distractors is reduced relative to passive 
viewing (Muller and Ebeling, 2008; Muller and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Nee and 
Jonides, in press; Tootell et al., 1998).  This attentionally-driven reduction 
appears to depend upon the presence of distracting information, since reductions 
are not seen in nearby locations that are empty (Muller and Ebeling, 2008).  We 
hypothesized that suppression of distractors may mediate negative priming.  To 
test this proposal, we looked for regions in occipital cortex that showed reduced 
responsiveness when distractors (words or pound signs) were present versus 
when no distraction was present.  This analysis revealed bilateral reductions in 
occipital cortex, in and inferior to the calcarine sulcus (Figure 6.3a; Table 6.3) 
when distractors were present versus absent.  Comparisons with a probabilistic 
atlas (Amunts et al., 2000) revealed that the peaks of these regions were likely to 
be in V1 (see supporting online material), and that they extended inferiorly into at 
least V2.  The left peak was in the vicinity of the region that we previously 




Figure 6.3.  Occipital Visual Suppression and Inhibition. Occipital regions 
demonstrating visual suppression effects.  A) Reductions in bilateral occipital 
cortex when no distractors were present compared to when distractors were 
present.  B) Renderings of voxels demonstrating correlations between visual 
suppression and negative priming.  C) Scatterplot of the correlation between left 




This result suggests that distractor-related reductions in early visual cortex are 
related to slowed responding when a distractor has to be encoded once again.  
To test this claim, we examined whether subjects who showed greater distractor-
related reductions in visual cortex demonstrated heightened negative priming 
(i.e. more inhibition).  Left occipital cortex reflected this prediction; behavioral 
indices of negative priming showed a significant correlation with activation 
reductions in left occipital cortex (averaged over the 29 most significant voxels: r 
= 0.59, p < 0.01; Figure 6.3b,c).  This correlation remained significant after robust 
regression; it was not due to outliers. Hence, visual suppression predicted the 
amount of negative priming produced 11-15 seconds later.  The combination of 
this result with our previous work strongly suggests that visual representations of 
individual distracting words are inhibited, and the amount of inhibition predicts 
later slowing when these words need to be re-encoded. 
 
6.2.2.3 Parietal-Occipital Interactions 
Research on attentional-modulation of early visual cortex has for the most part 
focused on activations in visual cortex itself.  Although it is assumed that 
variations in visual cortex are a product of top-down attentional signals in 
frontal/parietal regions, little work has demonstrated explicit correlations between 
top-down signals and their occipital influences.  To explore this matter, we 
examined whether the amount of visual suppression observed in occipital cortex 
could be linked to parietal regions that correlated with attentional control.  To this 
end, we looked for parietal regions that showed an inverse relationship with 
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visual suppression in the occipital region described above.  That is, greater 
attentional control should be related to greater visual suppression.  This 
relationship was found in the left SPL (r = -0.54, p < 0.05; Figure 6.4).  Subjects 
who showed greater activation in the left SPL when distraction was present 
showed greater suppression in left occipital cortex.  Although the correlational 
data do not permit causal conclusions, the idea that the SPL provides a top-down 
attentional signal to visual regions is consistent with previous proposals (Corbetta 
and Shulman, 2002; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Kastner and Ungerleider, 
2000; Posner and Peterson, 1990, Yantis and Serences, 2003). 
 
Figure 6.4.  Parietal-Occipital Interactions. Shaded portions denote cortical 
regions showing visual suppression (top left) and attentional control (bottom left).  
The scatterplot (right) demonstrates that left occipital cortex and left superior 
parietal lobule show an inverse relationship; greater control is associated with 




Our results suggest that top-down influences from posterior parietal cortex can 
cause visual suppression of distractors.  Visual suppression appears to produce 
an inhibitory effect on specific object representations (individual words), making it 
difficult to revisit ignored information.  Negative priming was assessed after a 
retention interval of 11-15 seconds, indicating that inhibitory influences on visual 
representations can persist for several seconds.  Such persistent inhibition is 
beneficial because it reduces the impact of recurrent perceptual distraction.  
Deficiencies in this ability may lead to cognitive declines such as those observed 
in clinical populations (Joorman, 2005; MacQueen et al., 2003; Nigg, 2001) and 
the elderly (Hasher et al., 1999). 
 
Interestingly, we observed attentional-modulation in early visual cortex, which 
according to a probabilistic atlas (Amunts et al., 2000), likely corresponded to V1.  
Although initial studies of primates (Moran and Desimone, 1985) and humans 
(Kastner et al., 1999) failed to find modulations of V1, there have been other 
demonstrations that V1 can be modulated in both primates (McAdams and Reid, 
2005; Motter, 1993; Roelfsema et al., 1998) and humans (Martinez et al., 1999; 
Muller and Ebeling, 2008; Muller and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Tootell et al., 1998), 
and attentional-modulation can even occur in earlier visual structures such as the 
lateral geniculate nucleus (O’Connor et al., 2002).  V1 modulations are presumed 
to reflect a feedback influence from top-down regions that exert control sometime 
after initial input, rather than an attentional modulation at the time of initial input 
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(Martinez et al., 1999; Pessoa et al., 2003; but see Kelly et al., 2008 for 
presumably earlier modulation).  Our results suggest that posterior parietal cortex 
may be the source of this feedback signal.  Although the pathway by which 
posterior parietal cortex could exert an influence on V1 is unclear, recent reviews 
suggest that the pathway may involve the superior colliculus and/or the pulvinar 
nucleus of the thalamus (Kastner et al., 2004; Moore, 2006).  Our imaging 
methods were too coarse to map these regions, but closer examination of these 
regions would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
 
When visual suppression has been demonstrated, it has been accompanied by 
enhancements in portions of visual cortex where attention is drawn (Muller and 
Ebeling, 2008; Muller and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Tootell et al., 1998).  For instance, 
Muller and Ebeling (2008) demonstrated that in contrast to visual suppression 
seen in ignored peripheral locations, attention produced enhancements in the 
occipital pole which presumably reflected foveal target processing.  Similar to 
these results, we saw enhancements at occipital polar locations which 
demonstrated patterns opposite to those seen in locations corresponding to the 
periphery (Figure 6.5).  Hence, these results suggest that in the face of 
distraction, attention is enhanced at relevant locations (here, the fovea) and 
dampened at irrelevant locations (here, the periphery).  Although we did not 
perform precise retinotopic mapping, the occipital locations we see here 
correspond well with previously published reports (Muller and Ebeling, 2008; 
Muller and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Tootell et al., 1998). 
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Figure 6.5. Enhancement and Suppression. Regions showing attentional 
enhancement (distraction > no-distraction; hot colors) and suppression (no-
distraction > distraction; cool colors).  Enhancement effects are seen at polar 
regions of occipital cortex that likely correspond to the fovea, whereas 
suppression effects are seen in more anterior portions that likely correspond to 
the periphery. 
 
There has been an increasing interest in frontal influences on selective attention 
with the idea that frontal regions may also be a source of top-down control for 
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visual regions (Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Gazzaley et al., 2007).  Recent work has 
suggested that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) may influence extra-striate 
regions to enhance relevant inputs and/or filter out irrelevant inputs (Desimone 
and Duncan, 1995; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Gazzaley et al., 2007; Kastner and 
Ungerleider, 2000).  Although we did find bilateral recruitment of DLPFC with 
increased attention demands, these regions did not correlate with our behavioral 
assays of attentional control, and these regions were small in extent compared to 
the observed posterior parietal and FEF regions.  It may be that modulations of 
extra-striate cortex may depend upon frontal interactions, whereas modulations 
of striate cortex and earlier stages of visual processing may depend more 
critically upon posterior parietal regions.  This speculation would be testable by 




We have provided evidence that distracting information can be suppressed in 
early visual cortex, and that this suppression can have a lasting inhibitory effect 
on specific object representations.  Early visual suppression appears to be 
modulated by attentional processes lodged in posterior parietal cortex.  Our 
results suggest that attention is not merely a spotlight that enhances relevant 
information, but that this spotlight also casts a shadow to filter out distracting 
information.  This shadow creates an inhibitory effect on specific representations 
that may protect the cognitive system from distraction. 
 156
Table 6.1 - Neural Correlates of Attentional Control 
 
Region X Y Z Voxels T-value BA 
Frontal       
left frontal eye fields -28 4 56 684 8.08 6 
left premotor cortex -42 -4 44  6.65 6 
left premotor cortex -48 0 56  5.52 6 
left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex -46 30 30 60 5.62 9/46 
right frontal eye fields 14 0 68 843 5.28 6 
right premotor cortex 48 4 38  5.2 6/9 
right frontal eye fields 24 -2 52  5.19 6 
anterior cingulate 
cortex/medial prefrontal 
cortex 4 20 44 213 5.16 32/8 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 42 46 26 33 3.96 10 
right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex 34 46 24  3.87 10 
       
Parietal       
right inferior parietal lobule 52 -48 26 147 9.08 40 
right temporo-parietal junction 58 -48 8  3.81 40/22 
left superior parietal lobule -26 -66 56 1085 6.87 7 
left superior parietal lobule -14 -66 54  6.4 7 
left posterior intraparietal 
sulcus -32 -84 26  5.58 7/19 
right superior parietal lobule 22 -66 58 955 4.65 7 
right intraparietal sulcus 34 -52 46  4.6 7/40 
right superior parietal lobule 26 -60 54  4.21 7 
       
Temporal       
right middle temporal gyrus 50 -34 2 85 4.15 22/21 
right middle temporal gyrus 56 -44 2  3.12 22/21 
left middle temporal gyrus -52 -36 0 35 4.82 22 
left superior temporal gyrus -60 -52 4 31 4.19 21/22 
       
Occipital       
right occipital pole 20 -100 -8 72 5.02 17/18 
right occipital pole 28 -98 -14  3.89 18 
left occipital pole -16 -102 -6 96 4.88 17/18 
left occipital pole -20 -96 -12  4.11 18 
       
Other       
right thalamus 6 -8 0 57 4.04  
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right cerebellum 18 -82 -30 43 4.84  
right cerebellum 26 -74 -32  3.71  
putamen 20 -14 -14 56 4.42  
putamen 18 -2 16  4.19  
 
Table 6.1. Neural Correlates of Attentional Control. Regions demonstrating 
increased activation for word-distraction versus pound-distraction and no-
distraction conditions.  Results were thresholded p < 0.001 with 20 or more 
contiguous voxels.  Coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space.  BA = Brodmann Area. 
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Table 6.2 - Neural and Behavioral Correlates of Attentional Control 
 
Region X Y Z Voxels r p 
left superior parietal lobule -28 -66 60 25 0.625 < 0.01 
left inferior parietal lobule 34 -50 48 26 0.64 < 0.01 
right superior parietal lobule 20 -72 52 73 0.569 < 0.05 
right precuneus 8 -64 52 30 0.635 < 0.01 
 
Table 6.2. Neural and Behavioral Correlates of Attentional Control. Regions 
demonstrating significant activation increases to attentional control (word-
distraction > pound-distraction and no-distraction, p < 0.001) and significant 
correlations with behavioral indices measuring attentional control (p < 0.05).  
Coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. 
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Table 6.3 - Neural Correlates of Visual Suppression 
 
Region X Y Z Voxels T-value BA 
right calcarine sulcus/ 
lingual gyrus -4 -92 0 94 3.36 17/18
right lingual gyrus 8 -82 -4 43 3.06 18 
right cuneus 20 -90 24 39 3.66 18/19
left middle occipital gyrus -30 -82 2 28 2.63 18/19
right lingual gyrus 22 -72 -6 23 3.15 18/19
 
Table 6.3. Neural Correlates of Visual Suppression. Regions demonstrating 
significant visual suppression to distractors (no-distraction > distraction).  Results 
are thresholded at p < 0.01 with 20 or more contiguous voxels.  Coordinates are 
reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.  BA = Brodmann Area. 
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Chapter 7 
Common and Distinct Neural Correlates of Perceptual 
and Memorial Selection 
 
In order to function efficiently, the cognitive system must choose to represent 
information that is relevant to current goals. When salient distracting information 
is present, control processes are elicited to select relevant information and/or de-
select irrelevant information. Models of cognitive control posit that regions of 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) play a critical role in 
selecting among competing representations (Deco and Rolls, 2005; Desimone 
and Duncan, 1995; Gazzaley and D’Esposito, 2007; Kastner and Ungerleider, 
2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Fronto-parietal regions are thought to provide 
top-down signals that bias the cognitive system to represent only relevant 
information. Under this framework, fronto-parietal regions are presumed to 
operate upon several levels of representation including percepts, memories, and 
responses. 
 
In particular, several proposals suggest that processes of selective attention and 
working memory are closely linked (Awh and Jonides, 2001; Deco and Rolls, 
2005; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Lavie, 2005; 
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Miller and Cohen, 2001; Gazzeley and D’Esposito, 2007). That is, the same 
prefrontal and parietal regions involved in maintaining an outward focus on 
relevant stimuli may also be recruited to maintain an inward focus on relevant 
thoughts. These ideas are bolstered by demonstrations that maintaining 
information in working memory causes decrements in the ability to filter out 
distracting perceptual information (de Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2005; Lavie et 
al., 2004), consistent with the idea that working memory and selective attention 
draw upon the same resources. Furthering the notion that selective attention and 
working memory are interrelated, subjects who have relatively large working 
memory spans tend to perform better on selective attention tasks than subjects 
with relatively low spans (Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2001).  Research with 
nonhuman primates has shown that both selective attention and working memory 
produce similar modulations of inferior temporal regions thought to maintain 
object representations (Chelazzi et al., 1993; 1998). These modulations are 
presumed to originate from frontal and parietal regions (Fuster et al., 1985). 
Finally, lesions of the PFC cause high distractability, impairing both attention 
(Heilman and Valenstein, 1972; Damasio et al., 1980) and working memory 
(Mishkin, 1957; D’Esposito and Postle, 1999); similarly, lesions of parietal cortex 
cause attentional deficits in processing of external stimuli and internal memories 
(Bisiach and Luzzati, 1978; Bisiach et al., 1979). 
 
Drawing upon hypothesized commonalities, several studies have explored 
overlapping neural correlates of attention and memory within the same subjects 
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(Corbetta et al., 2002; Labar et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et al., 2004; 
Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000). These studies have all documented 
overlapping activations for attention and working memory in the frontal eye fields 
(FEF), premotor cortex, and PPC most often in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and 
superior parietal lobule (SPL). The large amount of overlap suggests that the 
same processes that support attention to the outside world also direct attention 
internally to memorial representations (Lepsien and Nobre, 2006; Nobre et al., 
2004). Notably absent from these studies, however, are overlapping activations 
in more anterior regions of PFC (anterior lateral PFC) presumed to be involved in 
cognitive control, such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in Brodmann 
Areas (BA) 9 and 46, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) in BA 44 and 
45 (Smith and Jonides, 1999). In several of these studies, regions in anterior 
lateral PFC were involved in memory, but not attention (Labar et al., 1999; 
Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000; Nobre et al., 2004; Mayer et al., 2007).  
 
One reason for this dissociation may have to do with demands elicited by the 
attention tasks. In the aforementioned studies, the tasks used to examine 
attention investigated processes involved in either maintaining attention on a 
particular location or searching for a target in a visual array. Such tasks place a 
relatively low demand on selective attention processes that filter out visual 
distraction. By contrast, selective attention tasks that require the filtering of 
distraction are known to robustly recruit regions of anterior lateral PFC (Nee et 
al., 2007b). A similar filtering function has been proposed to protect working 
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memory representations, especially when demands on control are increased 
(Smith and Jonides, 1999; D’Esposito and Postle, 1999; Jonides et al., 2005; 
Ranganath et al., 2006). Therefore, there may be similar anterior lateral PFC 
recruitment when selection processes need to maintain relevant information in 
the face of irrelevant distracting information. 
 
Despite hypothesized similarities, we are unaware of any study that has directly 
compared processes of selective attention and working memory in the same 
subjects. Direct comparisons are critical for understanding the extent to which 
selective attention and working memory are truly similar functions. For instance, 
although it is well-established that there is activation in PFC for both selective 
attention and working memory tasks, it is less well-established that the same 
subregions of the PFC are responsible for the two processes. Investigating this 
matter can provide critical data for understanding the functions of different 
regions of PFC. Similarly, research into PPC has suggested differentiable roles 
for subregions of the PPC in attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Yantis and 
Serences, 2003) and memory (Wagner et al., 2005), and understanding which of 
these subregions contribute commonly or uniquely to attention and memory 
would further our understanding of computations in the PPC. 
 
In addition to investigating neural overlap, it is also critical to relate neural data to 
behavioral measures in order to directly demonstrate relationships between brain 
and behavior. That is, even if a region appears to be involved in both selective 
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attention and working memory, that region may play a very different role in each 
(Rowe et al., 2005). Relating brain data to behavioral data may uncover these 
relationships and further our understanding of the neural regions subserving 
selective attention and working memory. 
 
Here, we compared selection processes operating upon percepts and memories. 
To do so, we adapted an item-recognition paradigm that forced subjects either to 
filter out irrelevant perceptual information or to expel irrelevant memorial 
information from working memory. Perceptual and memorial selection were 
assessed in the same subjects to allow for careful comparisons between these 
processes. If top-down processes of selection are common between perceptual 
and memorial selection, we would expect to see similar recruitment of frontal and 
parietal control regions. However, if distinct selection functions operate in 
perception and memory, we should see regions that are engaged by one form of 
selection but not the other. For all analyses, we examined the relation between 
neural activation and behavioral assays of selection in order to provide strong 
evidence that neural regions were closely related to behavioral phenomena of 
interest. 
 
Subjects alternated between runs of the perceptual selection task and memorial 
selection task (Figure 7.1; also see Nee and Jonides, submitted, for another 
description of the perceptual selection task). In both tasks, subjects committed a 
set of words (target set) to memory and responded to recognition probes that 
 165
queried the target set several seconds later. In the perceptual selection task, 
subjects encoded three relevant words from a visual display while filtering out 
three distracting words (word-distraction), three distracting strings of pound signs 
(pound-distraction), or no distraction (no-distraction). Relevant words were 
printed in one color (blue or teal), with irrelevant words printed in an alternate 
color (blue if the relevant words were teal; teal if the relevant words were blue). A 
cue on each trial alerted subjects which words they would have to encode. 
Subjects were instructed to read the three relevant words subvocally and make a 
keypress after doing so, providing a behavioral measure of the duration and 
difficulty of perceptual selection processes. 
 
In the memorial selection task, subjects saw the same three types of displays, 
except that subjects were instructed to encode and remember all printed words. 
Hence, subjects encoded either six or three words. Several seconds after 
encoding, subjects received a cue that told them to update memory if they had 
encoded six words (update) or subvocally rehearse if they had encoded three 
words (rehearse). Update cues informed subjects to retain three words in 
memory and discard the other three words from memory. Update cues were 
phrased in a manner that instructed subjects either to remember words of a given 
color (e.g. “REMEM TEAL”, remember cue) or to forget words of a given color 
(e.g. “FORGET BLUE”, forget cue). Both remember and forget cues left subjects 
with three words in memory and were functionally equivalent. On update trials, 
subjects were instructed to update memory and then subvocally rehearse the 
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three relevant words once and make a keypress after doing so. On rehearse 
trials, subjects were instructed to rehearse the three words in memory once and 
make a keypress after doing so. Contrasting keypress latencies following update 
and rehearse trials provided a behavioral measure of memorial selection. 
 
Successful selection was examined behaviorally by responses to recognition 
probes (Nee and Jonides, in press). Recognition probes queried relevant words 
(positive probes), words that had not appeared and therefore required a negative 
response (control probes), or words that had been ignored (ignore probes) or 
discarded from memory (forget probes). Both ignore and forget probes 
demanded a negative response. Hence, comparing responses to ignore and 
forget probes with responses to control probes provides a measure of successful 
selection. In previous reports, forget probes have induced slowed and less 
accurate responses compared to control probes, presumably due to effects of 
proactive interference (Zhang et al., 2003; Jonides and Nee, 2006; Nee and 
Jonides, in press). Increased effects of proactive interference are likely to be 
related to poorer memorial selection. Examinations of ignore probes have been 
explored elsewhere (Nee and Jonides, in press; Nee and Jonides, submitted), 
and will not be further examined here. 
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Figure 7.1. Experimental protocol.  In the perceptual selection task (left), 
subjects committed a set of three target words to memory while filtering out 
distracting words (word-distraction), pound signs (pound-distraction), or with no 
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distraction present (no-distraction). In the memorial selection task (right), 
subjects committed all available words to memory and were later told to either 
update memory to reduce their memory load to three (update), or rehearse the 
three words already in memory (rehearse).  At the end of each trial, subjects 
were probed to verify that selection was done appropriately.  Neural activation of 
interest was locked to the onset of the target display for the perceptual selection 
task, and to the onset of the memory cue in the memorial selection task.  Words 
printed in light gray appeared in teal, and words printed in dark gray appeared in 




Eighteen right-handed adults (8 female; ages 19-25) participated in this study. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no reported illnesses. 
Subjects were compensated $20/hr plus a bonus for fast and accurate 
performance. Two runs from one subject were excluded from analysis due to her 
difficulty with task instructions, and one run was excluded from another subject 
due to problems with the visual setup. 
 
7.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Description of materials and the perceptual selection task are provided 
elsewhere (Nee and Jonides, submitted). Words were drawn from a list of 100 
four-letter nouns. Words were drawn randomly for each trial with the exception 
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that words could not have been presented in the previous 2 trials in order to 
control for potential effects of proactive interference. All responses were recorded 
on a 10-button response unit that accompanied the IFIS 9.0 system (MRI 
Devices Corp., Latham, NY) with one button for each finger. Stimuli were 
presented via a projector at the back of the scanner, reflected off a mirror placed 
above the head of the subject. Experimental tasks were presented using E-Prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). 
 
During the perceptual selection task each trial began with a red fixation cross 
presented for 1 second to alert the subject that the trial was beginning. 
Thereafter, an attention cue (“ATTEND BLUE”, “ATTEND TEAL”, “IGNORE 
BLUE”, or “IGNORE TEAL”) was presented for 1.5 seconds that informed the 
subject of the color of the relevant stimuli. On half of the trials the words printed 
in blue were made relevant and on the other half the words printed in teal were 
made relevant. Three-fourths of the cues involved “attend” instructions, with the 
other one-fourth involving “ignore” instructions. We collapsed across different cue 
instructions and “ignore” instructions were used only to parallel the memorial 
selection task. “Attend” and “ignore” instructions did not produce appreciably 
different results. 
 
The attention cue was followed by 0.5 seconds of fixation, followed by the target 
display. The target display consisted of three words presented in the relevant 
color in a “V” or upside-down “V” shape. On one-half of the trials, three distractor 
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words (word-distraction) were presented in the alternate color (blue if the relevant 
words were teal, teal if the relevant words were blue). On one-fourth of the trials, 
a string of four pound signs was used in place of distracting words (pound-
distraction) and on the other one-fourth of the trials, no distracting information 
appeared (no-distraction). All of the stimuli considered together subtended 
approximately 9.7 degrees of visual angle horizontally, and approximately 3.5 
degrees vertically. Each word or string of pound signs subtended approximately 
2.6 degrees of visual angle horizontally, and 0.88 degrees vertically. Stimuli were 
separated by 0.88 degrees horizontally, and 1.76 degrees vertically.  
 
Subjects were instructed to read the three relevant words subvocally once and 
make a left thumb press after doing so. Subjects were told to maintain the 
relevant words in memory. The target display was presented for 4 seconds, and 
subjects were instructed to stare at the fixation cross and to continue to attend to 
relevant words and ignore irrelevant information when they had completed 
encoding the relevant words. 
 
A fixation interval of 4 to 6 seconds followed the target display, varied in equal 
steps of 1 second. Thereafter, a cue (memory cue) appeared instructing subjects 
to rehearse the relevant words once and make a left thumb press after doing so. 
The cue stated “REMEM BLUE” or “REMEM TEAL” (always the relevant color), 
or “REMEM ALL” and paralleled the memorial selection task. All memory cues in 
the perceptual selection task were functionally equivalent in that they all required 
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a simple rehearsal of the three words in memory. The cue was followed by a 6 to 
8-second fixation interval, varied in equal steps of 1 second. Finally, a recognition 
probe was presented for 1 second, followed by an inter-trial interval of 3 to 5 
seconds, varied in equal steps of 1 second. Subjects responded with a right 
index press if the probe matched one of the three words held in memory (positive 
probe), and they made a left index press otherwise (negative probe). One-half of 
the probes were positive probes and one-half were negative probes. Three-
quarters of the negative probes were words that had not appeared for the last 2 
trials (control probes) and one-quarter were probes that matched a word that had 
appeared as a distractor on the target display (ignore probes). The asymmetry of 
the number of ignore probes is due to the fact that ignore probes could only 
follow the word-distraction condition. Within the word-distraction condition, 
control and ignore probes were equally distributed. All combinations of cue and 
probe were randomly intermixed. 
 
The memorial selection task was nearly identical to the perceptual selection task 
and we describe only the differences here. In the memorial selection task, the 
attention cue stated either “ATTEND BLUE”, “ATTEND TEAL”, or “ATTEND 
ALL”. Following “ATTEND BLUE” and “ATTEND TEAL” instructions, three words 
were presented in the relevant color, and the three other positions were either 
unfilled or filled with strings of pound signs so that no competing word stimuli 
were present (initial memory load three). Following “ATTEND ALL” instructions, 
six words were presented, three printed in blue and three printed in teal, and 
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subjects were instructed to encode and remember all six words (initial memory 
load six). After encoding relevant words, subjects made a left thumb press, as in 
the perceptual selection task. 
 
In the memorial selection task, memory cues told subjects to either remember 
words of a relevant color (e.g. “REMEM BLUE”; remember cue) or forget words 
of an irrelevant color (e.g. “FORGET TEAL”; forget cue). The classification of cue 
depended upon the information held in memory. Rehearse cues followed initial 
memory loads of three and always instructed subjects to remember words of the 
relevant color. Subjects were instructed to rehearse the three words in memory 
once and make a left thumb press after doing so. Update cues followed initial 
memory loads of six and instructed subjects to select the three relevant words 
from their memory set, rehearse those three words, and make a left thumb press 
after doing so. Hence, the critical difference between rehearse and update cues 
was the need to perform memorial selection to the latter. Half of the update cues 
instructed subjects to remember words of the relevant color, and the other half 
instructed subjects to forget words of the irrelevant color. Both cues were 
functionally equivalent in that they left subjects with the three relevant words in 
memory. However, we hypothesized that forget cues placed a greater demand 
on memorial selection processes due to the stimulus-memory incompatibility 
inherent in these cues. In other words, forget cues lead subjects to the irrelevant 
information, much as stimulus-response incompatible stimuli lead subjects to an 
inappropriate response. Just as stimulus-response incompatibilities place larger 
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demands on response-selection processes (Fitts and Seeger, 1953), we 
hypothesized that stimulus-memory incompatibilities would place greater 
demands on memorial selection processes. 
 
Subjects alternated between runs of the perceptual selection task and memorial 
selection task, with order counterbalanced between subjects. For each task, 
subjects performed four runs of 18 trials each, for a total of 72 trials. The day 
prior to scanning, subjects performed two runs of each task with accuracy and 
latency feedback. On the day of scanning, subjects performed an additional run 
of practice for each task also with feedback. Feedback was not given during 
scanning, but average accuracy and reaction times were presented during rest 
breaks between scans so that subjects could monitor their performance. 
 
7.1.3 Image Acquisition and Preprocessing 
Images were acquired on a GE Signa 3-T scanner equipped with a standard 
quadrature head coil. Head movement was minimized using foam padding and a 
cloth restraint strapped across participants’ foreheads. 
 
Functional T2*-weighted images were acquired using a spiral sequence with 40 
contiguous slices with 3.44 × 3.44 × 3 mm voxels (repetition time, or TR = 2,000 
ms; echo time, or TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 90°; field of view, or FOV = 22 mm2). A 
T1-weighted gradient-echo anatomical overlay was acquired using the same 
FOV and slices (TR = 250 ms, TE = 5.7 ms, flip angle = 90°). Additionally, a 124-
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slice high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image was collected using spoiled-
gradient-recalled acquisition (SPGR) in steady-state imaging (TR = 9 ms, TE = 
1.8 ms, flip angle = 15°, FOV = 25-26 mm2, slice thickness = 1.2 mm). 
 
Each SPGR anatomical image was corrected for signal inhomogeneity and skull-
stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction Tool (Smith et al., 2004). These images 
were then normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template using 
SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). Functional 
images were corrected for differences in slice timing using 4-point sinc 
interpolation (Oppenheim et al., 1999) and were corrected for head movement 
using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002). To reduce the impact of spike artifacts, 
we winsorized functional images on a voxel-by-voxel basis so that no voxel had a 
signal greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean of the run (Lazar et al., 
2001). Spatial normalization transformations and 8-mm full-width/half-maximum 
isotropic Gaussian smoothing were applied to all functional images prior to 
analysis using SPM2. All analyses included a temporal high-pass filter (128 s), 
and each image was scaled to have a global mean intensity of 100. 
 
7.1.4 Image Analysis 
Analyses were conducted using the General Linear Model implemented in SPM2. 
Predictors of interest were locked to the onsets of the target display and memory 
cue and were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
provided by SPM2. Additional predictors were used to model the probe, which 
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were not involved in the present analyses. To account for artifacts produced by 
head motion, we calculated linear, quadratic, differential, and quadratic 
differential motion regressors from the realignment parameters and included 
these regressors in the model (Lund et al., 2005). Trials in which subjects failed 
to make a keypress to the target set or rehearsal cue and/or trials in which 
subjects responded incorrectly to the recognition probe were excluded (less than 
9% of the trials). 
 
For perceptual selection, separate regressors were calculated for word-
distraction, pound-distraction, and no-distraction. Selection-related activation for 
word-distraction was considered high selection, and pound-distraction and no-
distraction were collapsed into low selection. For memorial selection, separate 
regressors were calculated for update cues (high selection) and rehearse cues 
(low selection). Update cues were also divided into remember cues and forget 
cues for follow-up analyses. 
 
For both perceptual and memorial selection, whole-brain analyses contrasted 
high and low selection and were thresholded at p < 0.001 with a cluster extent of 
at least 20 suprathreshold voxels (Forman et al., 1995; Poline et al., 1997). This 
threshold required a minimum t-statistic of 3.65, which was similar to the 
minimum t-statistic required by a multiple comparisons corrected threshold for 
the perceptual selection contrast (false discovery rate (FDR) minimum t-statistic 
of 3.87 for p < 0.05), and more conservative than the same threshold for the 
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memorial selection contrast (FDR minimum t-statistic of 2.97 for p < 0.05). We 
used an uncorrected threshold to hold the minimum t-statistic constant between 
contrasts. 
 
For the conjunction analysis, perceptual and memorial selection contrasts were 
thresholded at p < 0.01, producing a conjoint threshold of p < 0.0001. Once 
again, we used a minimum cluster extent of 20 voxels. 
 
We identified unique regions by a three-part criterion: 1) Significant activation for 
one contrast at p < 0.001; 2) Significantly more activation for one contrast than 
the other at p < 0.01; 3) No significant activation in the other contrast at p < 0.01. 
Once again, we used a minimum cluster extent of 20 voxels. 
 
The examination of forget versus remember cues was restricted to regions 
significant in the memorial selection contrast at p < 0.01. Within these regions, 
we looked for voxels significantly more active for forget cues versus remember 
cues at p < 0.05, with a minimum cluster extent of 20 voxels. The reduced 
threshold was used due to the reduction in power of considering only half of the 
memorial selection trials. 
 
Correlations between neural activation and behavior were restricted to voxels 
significant by the criterion above for each contrast of interest. Correlations are 
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reported only if they were significant at p < 0.05, and only if they were significant 
after robust regression to reduce the impact of outliers. 
 
7.2 Results 
7.2.1 Behavioral Results 
7.2.1.1 Accuracy Data 
We used a modified item-recognition task (Figure 7.1) to examine processes of 
perceptual and memorial selection. All trials in which subjects failed to make a 
keypress after encoding or after updating memory were excluded from behavioral 
analysis (less than 3% of the trials).  
 
First, we assessed accuracy to recognition probes. Accuracy was high overall (> 
94%), and significantly higher on the perceptual selection task (96.0%) than the 
memorial selection task (92.3%, t(17) = 2.8, p < 0.05). The high accuracies 
demonstrate that subjects performed the tasks appropriately. Follow up tests 
considered each task separately. In the memorial selection task, accuracy 
differed significantly by probe type (positive, control, forget; (F(2,34) = 6.3, p < 
0.01). This was driven largely by reduced accuracy to forget probes (83.3%), 
which was significantly lower than accuracy to control probes (94.7%, t(17) = 2.4, 
p < 0.05) and positive probes (94.5%, t(17) = 2.9, p < 0.05). This is to be 
expected due to the high degree of proactive interference associated with forget 
probes (Jonides and Nee, 2006). There was also a significant effect of initial 
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memory load with higher accuracy to low initial load (96.7%) than high initial load 
(88%, t(17) = 3.6, p < 0.01). Although memory load was equivalent by the time 
subjects made recognition decisions (i.e., a load of three words), these load 
effects on accuracy may reflect differences during retention before the memory 
update, or difficulties with memory updating. No factors had an effect on 
accuracy in the perceptual selection task as previously reported (Nee and 
Jonides, submitted). For all subsequent analyses with latency data, trials in which 
subjects made an incorrect response to the recognition probe were excluded (< 
6% of the trials). 
 
7.2.1.2 Behavioral Measures of Memorial and Perceptual Selection 
After encoding the target set (perceptual selection) or after updating and/or 
rehearsing the contents of working memory (memorial selection), subjects made 
a keypress to denote that selection processes were complete. These keypress 
data were entered into a 2-way ANOVA, with factors of selection demands (high 
or low) and selection type (perceptual or memorial) as factors. There were 
significant main effects of selection demands (F(1,17) = 59.25, p < 0.001) and 
selection type (F(1,17) = 7.19, p < 0.05). However, there was no interaction 
between selection demands and type (F(1,17) < 1). These results indicated that 
high selection demands led to slower keypress latencies than low selection 
demands, and that subjects took longer to perform perceptual selection than 
memorial selection. The lack of interaction between selection demands and type 
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suggests that selection demands were equivalently increased for high versus low 
selection in both perceptual and memorial selection tasks. 
 
Follow up analyses examined keypress latencies for memorial selection alone. A 
planned t-test demonstrated that keypress latencies following update instructions 
were significantly longer than keypress latencies following rehearsal instructions 
(1211 ms vs. 919 ms, mean difference = 292 ms, t(17) = 5.24, p < 0.001). This 
difference provides an assay of the time it takes to perform the memory update 
function. Next, we examined whether updates following forget cues were 
significantly different from updates following remember cues. We predicted that 
forget cues would require increased memorial selection demands because forget 
cues lead the subject toward the irrelevant information, whereas remember cues 
lead the subject toward the relevant information. As such, forget cues have a 
stimulus-memory incompatibility that may mimic stimulus-response 
incompatibility effects (Fitts and Seeger, 1953). In line with this prediction, 
keypress latencies following forget cues were slowed relative to remember cues 
(mean difference = 51 ms, t(17) = 1.81, p < 0.05, one-tailed). These results 
suggest that memorial selection demands were enhanced for forget cues relative 
to remember cues. Behavioral results for perceptual selection are reported 
elsewhere (Nee and Jonides, submitted). Those data indicated that word-
distraction led to slower keypress latencies than pound-distraction and no-
distraction, but that pound-distraction and no-distraction did not differ. 
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7.2.1.3 Recognition Probe Data 
Next, we examined reaction times to recognition probes. Reaction times were 
slower during the memorial selection task (723 ms) compared to the perceptual 
selection task (680 ms, t(17) = 5.4, p < 0.001). Follow up tests considered each 
task separately. In the memorial selection task, there was a significant effect of 
probe type on recognition latency (F(2,34) = 41.3, p < 0.001). This was largely 
driven by increased reaction times to forget probes (852 ms) compared to control 
probes (700 ms, t(17) = 5.9, p < 0.001) and positive probes (661 ms, t(17) = 7.9, 
p < 0.001). Once again, these differences are to be expected due to the high 
degree of proactive interference associated with forget probes (Jonides and Nee, 
2006). There was also a significant effect of initial memory load with slower 
responses following initially high loads (752 ms) than low loads (669 ms, t(17) = 
6.8, p < 0.001). Once again, although load was equivalent across all conditions 
by the time subjects made recognition decisions, increased latencies for initially 
high memory loads may reflect difficulties encountered during earlier processing. 
Latency data to recognition probes in the ignore task are reported elsewhere 
(Nee and Jonides, submitted) and demonstrated slowed latencies to ignore 
probes compared to control probes. 
 
7.2.1.4 Behavioral Summary 
To summarize, we found anticipated behavioral effects of selection demands 
during perceptual and memorial selection. Moreover, selection effects were 
carried out to subsequent memory probes, giving an assay of the success (or 
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lack thereof) of selection. High interference to forget probes demonstrated a 
large degree of proactive interference that carried over to recognition decisions, 
suggesting that memory updating processes failed to completely discard 
irrelevant memorial information (Nee and Jonides, 2006; Nee and Jonides, in 
press). 
 
Figure 7.2. Whole-Brain Neural Results.  Regions active for high versus low 
selection in the perceptual selection task (top), memory selection task (middle), 
and the conjunction of both tasks (bottom). 
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7.2.2 Neural Results 
7.2.2.1 Perceptual Selection 
Regions involved in perceptual selection have been reported previously (Nee and 
Jonides, submitted). Activation increases corresponding to increased demands 
on perceptual selection recruited several frontal regions including bilateral FEF, 
premotor cortex, DLPFC, and the anterior cingulate and surrounding medial 
prefrontal cortex (Figure 7.2). Hence, not only were posterior regions of PFC, 
such as the FEF and premotor cortex, involved in perceptual selection, but also 
more anterior regions in left (BA 9/46) and right DLPFC (BA 10).  In addition, 
activation increases to selective attention demands were found in PPC, mostly in 
bilateral SPL, but also including some portions of the IPS, right inferior parietal 
lobule, and right temporo-parietal junction. 
 
7.2.2.2 Memorial Selection 
Regions involved in memorial selection largely included regions involved in 
perceptual selection, but with notable additions in bilateral IPS and VLPFC 
(Table 7.1; Figure 7.2). VLPFC activation was particularly pronounced in the left 
hemisphere, including all of pars triangularis (BA 45), as well as portions of more 
posterior left inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis, BA 44), and more anterior in 
pars orbitalis (BA 47). There was also extensive recruitment of anterior portions 




Confirming the hypothesis that perceptual and memorial selection are similar 
processes, a conjunction analysis produced largely overlapping activations in 
frontal and parietal regions (Figure 7.2; Table 7.2). Frontal overlap was most 
prominent in posterior regions of PFC including bilateral FEF, premotor cortex, 
and the anterior cingulate and surrounding medial prefrontal cortex.  However, in 
contrast to previous reports (Labar et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et al., 
2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000;), both perceptual and memorial 
selection recruited more anterior regions of PFC in DLPFC.  All of these regions 
remained using a stricter valid conjunction analysis with each contrast 
thresholded at p < 0.001 (Nichols et al., 2005), confirming that commonalities 
were not the result of a liberal threshold.  That regions of DLPFC were common 
to both perceptual and memorial selection is consistent with the idea that similar 
PFC top-down control is exerted across both domains (Deco and Rolls, 2005; 
Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Gazzaley and D’Esposito, 2007; Kastner and 
Ungerleider, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001). 
 
Interestingly, parietal overlap was almost exclusively restricted to the SPL, 
sparing most portions of the IPS. This result is in stark contrast with previous 
reports that attention and memory produce common activations in the IPS (Labar 
et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et al., 2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 
2000). It is unlikely that the lack of common IPS activation is due to lack of power 
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since over 8000 common voxels were uncovered in our conjunction analysis. We 
return to the lack of IPS involvement in the discussion. 
 
Figure 7.3. Selection-specific results.  Regions unique to perceptual selection 
are depicted on the left, and regions unique to memorial selection are depicted 
on the right. 
 
7.2.2.4 Unique Perceptual Selection Regions 
Although there was clearly a good deal of overlap between perceptual and 
memorial selection, we were interested in whether any regions were uniquely 
recruited for perceptual selection. To examine this, we searched for regions that 
demonstrated significant activation for perceptual selection, significantly more 
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activation for perceptual selection than memorial selection, and no significant 
activation for memorial selection (see Image Analysis 7.1.4). 
 
Fronto-parietal regions unique to perceptual selection were found most 
prominently in bilateral SPL, and right FEF (Figure 7.3; Table 7.4). These regions 
were adjacent to regions found in the conjunction analysis and suggest that the 
SPL and FEF, although common to both perceptual and memorial selection, may 
be more strongly related to perceptual selection. Regions unique to perceptual 
selection were also found in the right temporo-parietal junction, which has been 
linked to functions of attentional orienting (Corbetta et al., 2002; Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002).  The bilateral SPL and right temporo-parietal junction remained 
unique to perceptual selection using a stricter interaction threshold of p < 0.001, 
although the FEF did not survive this criterion.  However, a region of interest 
analysis averaged over the FEF region found with the more liberal threshold 
demonstrated significantly greater perceptual selection related activation than 
memorial selection related activation (t(17) = 4.84, p < 0.001). 
 
7.2.2.5 Unique Memorial Selection Regions 
We also assessed regions unique to memorial selection by searching for regions 
that demonstrated significant activation for memorial selection, significantly more 
activation for memorial selection than perceptual selection, and no significant 
activation for perceptual selection. 
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Fronto-parietal regions unique to memorial selection included large portions of 
bilateral VLPFC, most prominently on the left (Figure 7.3; Table 7.4). In the left 
hemisphere, unique activation due to memorial selection was largely localized to 
pars triangularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), but also included 
posterior (BA 44) and anterior (BA 47) portions of the inferior frontal gyrus, and 
spread further anterior into BA 10. Activation increases also stretched dorsally 
into the inferior frontal sulcus and inferior portions of the middle frontal gyrus (BA 
9/46). A similar, but less pronounced pattern was observed in the right 
hemisphere, including BA 45 and 13 ventrally, 9/46 dorsally, and BA 10 in the 
anterior portions of the middle frontal gyrus. Regions of the medial prefrontal 
cortex including the anterior cingulate also showed a preferential pattern for 
memorial selection. 
 
The horizontal portion of bilateral IPS was also uniquely involved in memorial 
selection. These activations spread inferiorly to the most dorsal aspects of the 
inferior parietal lobule. This result is surprising given that the IPS has been found 
to be a region common to both attention and memory in previous reports (Labar 
et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et al., 2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 
2000). Additionally, unique activation due to memorial selection was observed in 
the medial portions of parietal cortex in the precunues.  All frontal and parietal 
memorial selection unique regions but the precuneus remained at a stricter 
interaction threshold of p < 0.001. 
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7.2.2.6 Memorial Selection Specificity 
Our memorial selection contrasts have thus far assessed memory updating 
processes that reduce a memory load of six down to three, compared to simple 
rehearsal of three items. Whereas we are primarily interested in the processes 
that select memorial information, our results may potentially be contaminated by 
differences in load before the memory cue. To address this concern, we 
compared selection-related activation to forget cues contrasted with remember 
cues. In both cases, subjects began with a memory load of six and used 
selection processes to reduce the load down to three. However, our behavioral 
data suggest that selection is more difficult to forget cues. Just as stimulus-
response incompatibility calls for increased processes of response selection 
(Fitts and Seeger, 1953), forget cues may elicit stimulus-memory incompatibilities 
that call for increased memorial selection. Therefore, we hypothesized that 
contrasting forget and remember cues would more clearly isolate memorial 
selection processes. 
 
To investigate memorial selection processes with more specificity, we therefore 
looked for regions that showed increased activation to forget cues compared to 
remember cues, restricted to regions that were reliable in our original memorial 
selection contrast. This analysis produced a very similar network of regions 
including bilateral VLPFC, DLPFC, medial PFC including the anterior cingulate, 
FEF, premotor cortex, and bilateral IPS and SPL. Hence, our memorial selection 
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results are unlikely to be due to memory load, and seem to instead reflect 
memorial selection processes. 
 
To bolster this claim, we looked for regions that correlated with behavioral 
selection latency differences between forget and remember cues, restricting 
ourselves to the regions found active above. Confirming their role in memorial 
selection, left lateral PFC (MNI center -46 20 26; BA 46/9/45; 166 voxels; r = 
0.52, p < 0.05), left IPS (MNI center -34 -64 52; BA 7/40; 164 voxels; r = 0.63, p < 
0.01), and left medial PFC (MNI center -2 30 46; BA 8; 139 voxels; r = 0.64, r < 
0.01) all demonstrated a correlation between neural activation and behavioral 
performance (Figure 7.4). Not only did these regions show greater activation for 
forget cues compared to remember cues, all of these regions also demonstrated 
significantly more activation for remember cues than rehearse cues (all t(17) > 4, 
p < 0.001). Hence, these regions varied parametrically with memorial selection 
demands, rather than being unique to forget cues. 
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Figure 7.4. Memorial Selection-Specific Brain-Behavior Correlations.  Regions 
that were involved in memorial selection, more strongly activated for forget cues 
compared to remember cues, and that correlated with behavioral measures of 
selection latency. PFC = prefrontal cortex; IPS = intraparietal sulcus. 
 
7.2.2.7 Left Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Proactive Interference 
Left VLPFC, particularly in BA 45, has been shown to have a strong engagement 
in the resolution of proactive interference (Badre and Wagner, 2005; D’Esposito 
et al., 1999; Jonides and Nee, 2006; Jonides et al., 1998; Nee and Jonides, in 
press; Nee et al., 2007a; Nelson et al., 2003; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002; 
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Zhang et al., 2003). Such demonstrations have generally relied on item-
recognition tasks that probe highly familiar but irrelevant information. Recent 
hypotheses have theorized that left VLPFC may be involved in selecting among 
memorial representations, placing items into appropriate contexts in order to 
guide recognition performance (Badre and Wagner, 2005; Jonides and Nee, 
2006; Nee et al., 2007a). Braver and colleagues (2007) have suggested that 
these selection operations need not be restricted to recognition decisions, but 
rather, subjects may act in a proactive manner to reduce proactive interference 
by performing appropriate selection during delay intervals before a recognition 
probe. In our task, subjects are required to perform such a selection in that the 
update cue forces subjects to discard irrelevant information and rehearse 
relevant information. Therefore, left VLPFC activation during memorial selection 
may protect the cognitive system from later proactive interference. This would 
suggest that greater selection-related activation during memorial selection may 
lead to reduced proactive interference during probe decisions.  
 
An alternative possibility is that both memory updating and resolving probe-
related proactive interference are the same function, and the degree to which 
subjects have difficulty with one, they are likely to have difficulty with the other. 
That is, in both instances subjects are selecting among memorial 
representations, and difficulty in selection during memory updates should predict 
difficulty in selection when probed with a highly familiar irrelevant item. We have 
shown that left VLPFC activation increases during memorial selection correlate 
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positively with behavioral measures of memorial selection, suggesting that 
greater difficulty with selection is associated with greater left VLPFC activation. If 
left VLPFC reflects general memorial selection demands, we would expect that 
greater selection-related activation may also predict higher proactive interference 
during probe decisions. 
 
To test these alternative predictions, we examined whether activation in left 
VLPFC predicted the amount of proactive interference subjects experienced 
during recognition decisions. Proactive interference was indexed as the reaction 
time difference between decisions to forget probes compared to control probes, 
consistent with previous reports (Jonides and Nee, 2006; Nee and Jonides, in 
press; Zhang et al., 2003). We looked in left VLPFC regions that showed 
significant activation increases to memorial selection demands and examined 
whether any of these regions were correlated with behavioral measures of 
proactive interference at the time of the probe. 
 
Activation during memorial selection in left VLPFC correlated strongly with 
subsequent proactive interference (MNI center -52 22 18, BA 45, 178 voxels, r = 
0.71, p < 0.001; Figure 7.5). The correlation was positive indicating that subjects 
who demonstrated increased activation during memorial selection also 
experienced greater proactive interference to later probes. Hence, this region 
was correlated with increased behavioral measures of memorial selection 
demands during selection, as well as increased behavioral measures of proactive 
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interference several seconds after selection. The combination of these results 
suggests that memory updating and resolving proactive interference recruit 
common mechanisms of memorial selection, and that subjects that show 
difficulty in one process also show difficulty in the other. 
 
Figure 7.5. Left VLPFC and Proactive Interference. Memorial selection-related 
activation in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex predicted the amount of proactive 
interference experienced to forget probes compared to control probes.  Voxel-
wise correlations between activation and behavior are rendered on the left.  
Correlations pooled over all significant voxels are plotted on the right. 
 
7.2.2.8 Common Neural and Behavioral Interactions 
We were interested in whether neural activation in any of the common regions 
uncovered by our conjunction analysis could reveal a demonstrable relation to 
behavior. To explore this issue, we looked for regions where neural indices of 
selection demands correlated with behavioral indices of selection demands for 
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both perceptual and memorial selection. We restricted this search to voxels that 
were significant in our conjunction analysis. 
 
In left premotor cortex, lateral and inferior to the FEF (MNI center -54 6 42, BA 
6/8, 17 voxels; Figure 7.6a), activation increases related to increased selection 
demands were positively correlated with behavioral measures of both memorial 
selection (r = 0.51, p < 0.05) and perceptual selection (r = 0.54, p < 0.05). It is 
unlikely that this region reflected a response to the keypress since selection-
related keypresses were all made with the left thumb. However, responses to 
recognition probes were all made with the right hand. Recognition probes 
appeared several seconds after perceptual and memorial selection occurred. 
Hence, it is possible that commonalities in this region may reflect preparation for 
upcoming recognition decisions. Such preparation may involve the biasing of 
relevant stimulus-response associations under high demand, to prevent potential 




Figure 7.6. Common Brain-Behavior Correlations. Regions significant in the 
conjunction analysis that correlated with behavioral measures of selection 
difficulty for both perceptual and memorial selection.  Selection-related activation 
in the left premotor cortex (A) correlated positively with behavioral measures of 
both perceptual and memorial selection.  Selection-related activation in the right 
superior parietal lobule (B) correlated positively with behavioral measures of 
perceptual selection, but negatively with behavioral measures of memorial 
selection.  SPL = superior parietal lobule. 
7.2.2.9 Individual Differences in Common Control 
A region in the right SPL also demonstrated brain-behavior correlations for both 
kinds of selection (MNI center 24 -72 56, BA 7, 74 voxels; Figure 7.6b). 
Interestingly, correlations in this region were in opposite directions for perceptual 
and memorial selection. Whereas selection-related activation increases were 
positively correlated with behavioral measures of perceptual selection (r = 0.52, p 
< 0.05), the opposite held true for memorial selection (r = -0.58, p < 0.05). That 
is, greater activation increases in this region were related to reduced behavioral 
differences between high and low selection for the memorial selection task. By 
contrast, activation increases in this region during perceptual selection scaled 
with behavioral selection effects for the perceptual selection task. 
 
As depicted in Figure 7.6b, the right SPL region was much more engaged during 
the perceptual selection task than the memorial selection task (t(17) = 7.5, p < 
0.001), suggesting a strong attentional role for this region. Moreover, our 
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previous analysis identified other portions of the SPL to be unique to perceptual 
selection, suggesting that the SPL in general may be more strongly related to 
selective attention than working memory. Therefore, one way to interpret this 
result is that subjects vary in the degree to which they recruit perceptual selection 
resources to perform memorial selection. Some subjects show strong 
commonalities, using attention-related SPL resources to perform memorial 
selection. As the correlation in Figure 7.6b indicates, such recruitment may be 
beneficial in that these subjects demonstrated reduced behavioral differences 
between high and low memorial selections. Other subjects, by contrast, may 
show greater distinctions between perceptual and memorial selection. Such 
subjects would likely show greater use of regions unique for memorial selection, 
such as left VLPFC, when performing memorial selection. 
 
To examine this proposal, we performed a median split on the data, dividing 
subjects into 2 groups: a high SPL group that showed greater activation 
increases in the right SPL for memorial selection, and a low SPL group that 
showed lower activation increases in the right SPL for memorial selection. Next, 
we re-ran whole-brain contrasts for memorial selection for each group separately. 
The results are depicted in Figure 7.7. Not surprisingly, the high SPL group 
demonstrated stronger activation increases in the right SPL. This group also 
showed greater selection-related increases in the bilateral FEF and right 
premotor cortex. These frontal regions overlapped with our conjunction analysis 
and were close to regions that were unique to perceptual selection. Hence, 
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memorial selection in these subjects appeared very similar to perceptual 
selection. By contrast, the low SPL group did not show significant activation 
increases in the right SPL, or FEF. Instead, this group showed much greater 
memorial selection-related activation increases in the left VLPFC, a region that 
we demonstrated to be unique to memorial selection. Finally, the groups 
demonstrated significant differences in behavioral measures of memorial 
selection with the high SPL group showing reduced differences between high 
and low selection compared to the low SPL group (t(16) = 2.5, p < 0.05). 
 
This pattern of results suggests that subjects vary a great deal in the degree to 
which they recruit common neural resources of perceptual and memorial 
selection. Using common neural resources for perceptual and memorial selection 
was associated with better performance (i.e. reduced increases in latency for 
high selection demands), suggesting that it is beneficial to use selective attention 
resources to aid memorial selection. 
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Figure 7.7. Individual Differences in Memorial Selection. Differences in memorial 
selection as a function of right superior parietal lobule recruitment.  Subjects that 
showed large activation increases in the right superior parietal lobule (SPL) for 
memorial selection (high SPL; green) demonstrated enhanced activation in 
perceptual selection-related regions.  Subjects that showed smaller activation 
increases in the right SPL (low SPL; red) demonstrated more robust activation in 
left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, which was unique to memorial selection.  
Behavioral results indicated less selection difficulty for high SPL subjects 
compared to low SPL subjects. 
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7.3 Discussion 
We examined the common and unique neural components of selecting among 
competing percepts and memories. Consistent with models that posit that similar 
selection processes operate on all varieties of information, we found a broad 
network of overlapping activation between perceptual and memorial selection. 
Selection of both sorts was associated with activation increases in bilateral FEF, 
premotor cortex, DLPFC, medial PFC, anterior cingulate cortex, and the SPL. 
However, our results suggest that regions of the FEF and SPL are more strongly 
associated with perceptual selection, while memorial selection was uniquely 
associated with VLPFC, particularly on the left, and bilateral IPS. Moreover, left 
VLPFC activation correlated with behavioral measures of memorial selection 
demands, and activation in this region also predicted behavioral measures of 
proactive interference that appeared several seconds later. Finally, there was a 
considerable amount of individual variability in the degree to which subjects 
recruited the same neural resources for perceptual and memorial selection, and 
those subjects that more closely recruited overlapping resources demonstrated 
better performance. 
 
Common Dorsolateral Prefrontal Recruitment 
In contrast to previous reports (Labar et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et 
al., 2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000), we found common selection-related 
activation increases in bilateral DLPFC. Models of selection posit that this region 
may store goal or template information used to guide selection in more posterior 
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regions of cortex (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; 
Miller and Cohen, 2001). Goal or template information is especially important 
when selection cannot proceed in a purely bottom-up fashion. When competing 
distractors are present, information about current goals must be able to bias 
competition so that only goal-relevant information is processed. Consistent with 
these ideas, in both selective attention (Nee et al., 2007b) and working memory 
(D’Esposito and Postle, 1999; Jonides et al., 2005; Smith and Jonides, 1999; 
Wager et al., 2003), the DLPFC appears to be especially important when 
selection demands are increased by the presence of distracting information. In 
previous reports that have compared attention and memory, competition from 
distracting information has been minimized (Labar et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 
2007; Nobre et al., 2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000), which may account 
for previous failures to find common DLPFC recruitment across attention and 
memory. Here, we were careful to highlight selection processes of both attention 
and memory, rather than examining processes that simply maintain attention or 
hold information online. Hence, our results suggest that the DLPFC is critically 
involved in both attention and memory when selection processes must resolve 
competition from salient distraction. 
 
7.3.1 Common Attentional Circuit 
As in previous reports (Labar et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et al., 2004; 
Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000), we found common involvement of the FEF, 
premotor cortex, and SPL across both perceptual and memorial selection. These 
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regions have been robustly associated with attention (Corbetta et al., 2002; 
Kastner et al., 1999; Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000) and spatial working memory 
(Awh and Jonides, 2001; Awh et al., 1999; Awh et al., 2006). Awh and 
colleagues have suggested that in spatial working memory, this network acts as 
a focus of attention that cycles through spatial locations held in mind. In other 
words, spatial working memory is akin to cycled deployments of covert attention, 
explaining the great deal of overlap between attention and spatial working 
memory. However, our results demonstrate that this network need not be 
restricted to spatial information in that we assessed working memory for verbal 
material. That this network is also engaged in selecting among verbal 
representations suggests that attentional processes need not be spatial in 
manner, but can highlight information that lacks a visuo-spatial component. 
 
Another possibility is that during memorial selection, subjects created a visuo-
spatial representation of the information held in working memory, and used 
attentional processes to select among this information. For example, subjects 
may have imagined the original display and used attention to select among items 
in this visuo-spatial representation. An alternative account is that subjects stored 
the verbal information in an articulatory loop (Baddeley, 2003), which has a 
natural dimension of time (i.e. position within the rehearsal loop). Using such a 
representation, subjects may have translated the update cues to positional cues 
that targeted different serial positions within rehearsal. In any case, it is clear that 
attentional selection can be deployed to select among memorial representations. 
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Common recruitment of left premotor cortex closely tracked behavioral measures 
of both perceptual and memorial selection. Since responses to selection 
demands were made with the left hand, it is unlikely that these results reflect 
response processes. However, responses to recognition probes performed 
several seconds later were made with the right hand. Therefore, activation in this 
region may have reflected the biasing of stimulus-response pathways to guard 
against interference in preparation for future response production. Alternatively, 
this region may also have been involved in the deployment of attention. Although 
the human FEF is most often localized to the junction of the superior frontal 
sulcus and precentral sulcus, there are demonstrations of oculomotor-associated 
cortex more lateral and inferior near the premotor region we found here (Lobel et 
al., 2001). Hence, this region may also be associated with attentional biasing to 
resolve competition. 
 
7.3.2 Left Ventolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Memorial Selection 
Our results indicated that left VLPFC was unique to memorial selection and that 
activation in this region was closely tied to behavioral manifestations of selection 
difficulty and proactive interference. Lesions in this region, particularly in BA 45, 
cause selective deficits in the ability to resolve proactive interference (Hamilton 
and Martin, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002), but spare other forms of working 
memory performance. Based on these results, some authors have hypothesized 
that this region is involved in selecting among contextual information in order to 
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appropriately categorize the source of highly familiar information (Badre and 
Wagner, 2005; Jonides and Nee, 2006; Nee et al., 2007a). This region is also 
involved in selecting among competing semantic representations (Badre and 
Wagner, 2007; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Nelson, 2005) and hence, this 
region may serve a general memorial selection function (Zhang et al., 2004). Our 
results are consistent with these ideas in that activation in this region was 
associated with memorial selection difficulty, and activation also predicted future 
difficulty in how well subjects resolved proactive interference. 
 
Braver and colleagues (2007) have suggested that selection processes of left 
VLPFC may be engaged in a proactive manner in order to mitigate future effects 
of proactive interference. Engagement of this region during updating had the 
potential to investigate whether greater use of selection processes of left VLPFC 
during updating would lead to reduced proactive interference at the time of the 
probe. We did not find this pattern. Instead, difficulty during memory updating 
was associated with difficulty during recognition decisions, suggesting that the 
same process was elicited in both scenarios. However, our results do not 
preclude other potential proactive strategies such as increased selection during 
the retention interval after updating and before the recognition probe. Although 
our design did not permit a separate assessment of delay period activation, an 
interesting future pursuit would be to examine the interplay between cue-related, 
delay-related, and probe-related activation in left VLPFC to investigate potential 
processes of proactive and reactive control. 
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Preferential involvement of left VLPFC in memorial selection may also have been 
due to the verbal nature of memorial selection. Although perceptual selection 
was also performed on verbal materials, such selection was done in a visuo-
spatial manner that may have attenuated verbal aspects of processing. However, 
previous studies contrasting attention and working memory using objects that are 
difficult to name (Mayer et al., 2007), as well as spatial locations (Nobre et al., 
2004) also found greater memory-related activation in left VLPFC compared to 
attention. Left VLPFC involvement in the resolution of proactive interference has 
also been found for non-verbal material (Postle et al., 2004; Jonides and Nee, 
2006), although these effects have not always been found (Badre and Wagner, 
2005; Leung and Zhang, 2004). Hence, although we cannot rule out a verbal 
involvement for left VLPFC, it remains possible that this region responds 
generally to memorial selection. 
 
7.3.3 Control Operations of the Intraparietal Sulcus 
Previous comparisons of attention and memory have demonstrated largely 
overlapping activation in the IPS (Labar et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et 
al., 2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000). Our results demonstrated very little 
overlap in this region, with the IPS being almost exclusively associated with 
memorial selection. One difference between our attention task and others is that 
for all of our conditions, attention shifting was closely matched, whereas in other 
studies, contrasts of interest included processes involved in shifting attention. 
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The IPS is known to be involved in attentional shifts (Wager et al., 2004) and the 
lack of involvement during perceptual selection here may be because our 
contrasts subtracted out this process. By contrast, there may have been shifting 
operations during memorial selection as subjects shifted from maintenance 
operations to updating, or shifting their attention among different information in 
memory. 
 
Alternative accounts suggest that rather than being associated with shifting, the 
IPS is involved in maintaining attention on target information (Serences et al., 
2004; Yantis and Serences, 2003).  Tonic activation in the IPS is associated with 
maintaining attention both to perceptual (Serences et al., 2004) and memorial 
information (Todd and Marois, 2004; 2005; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004; Vogel et 
al., 2005; Xu and Chun, 2006). Once again, our perceptual selection contrast 
may have subtracted this process out, but alterations in maintenance operations 
likely occurred for memory updating operations. During memory updates, 
maintenance is interrupted and attention is shifted and maintained on updated 
information. Hence, the reason that we found IPS involvement in memory, but 
not attention may be due to the particular contrasts performed here. It is clear 
from other work that the IPS is involved in both attention and memory (Labar et 
al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2007; Nobre et al., 2004; Pollmann and von Cramon, 




7.3.4 Individual Variations in Common Control 
Our analyses suggested that regions of the FEF, premotor cortex, and SPL may 
have been preferentially engaged in perceptual selection, and that subjects 
varied in the degree to which they used these same networks for memorial 
selection. Such variation may be accounted for by differences in representational 
strategy. As alluded to above, subjects may have differed in the degree to which 
they relied on visuo-spatial or timing strategies in working memory. Memorial 
representations that highlighted visuo-spatial or timing aspects of the information 
in working memory may have been more amenable to perceptual selection types 
of processes. Subjects who recruited more perceptual selection regions of the 
SPL and FEF for memorial selection also demonstrated less difficulty for high 
memorial selection demands, compared to subjects who relied more on left 
VLPFC. These results suggest that perceptual selection strategies may be 
beneficial to memory performance. An interesting avenue for future research 
would be to examine whether explicitly giving subjects such perceptual selection 
strategies for memorial selection can improve performance. 
 
Notably, in our tasks, perceptual and memorial selection were performed 
independently. Previous studies that have examined selective attention and 
memory in dual task situations have found that these processes interfere with 
one another when performed concurrently (de Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2005; 
Lavie et al., 2004). This research may predict that those subjects who 
demonstrated less sharing of perceptual and memorial selection may actually 
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demonstrate better performance under dual task situations, since those subjects 
can draw from separate neural resources to perform each function. This is 
another interesting avenue for future investigation. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Top-down control allows the cognitive system to represent only information that 
is relevant to current goals. We have demonstrated that similar forms of top-
down control underlie selecting among competing percepts and memories. 
These processes may be subserved by interactions between goal and template 
information held in the DLPFC that biases the deployment of FEF and SPL 
attentional processes in the face of competing distraction. When selecting among 
competing memories, regions of the left VLPFC are additionally recruited. 
Although not all control processes are shared, there appear to be benefits to a 
cognitive economy of re-using the same processes for perceptual and memorial 
selection, at least when both selections can be performed independently. 
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Table 7.1 - Memorial Selection 
 
Region X Y Z Voxels T-value BA 
Frontal       
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars 
triangularis) -52 20 28 5247 9.27 45/9 
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars 
opercularis) -54 14 22  8.8 44/45 
left middle frontal gyrus -48 26 34  8.06 9/46/10 
left precentral sulcus -56 10 38  7.25 6/9 
left precentral gyrus -50 -4 39  7.21 6 
left supplemental motor area -2 18 50 1719 9.45 6/32 
right anterior cingulate cortex 6 28 32  6.56 32/8 
left supplemental motor area 6 8 68  3.87 6 
right precentral sulcus 50 8 40 1390 6.61 6/9 
right frontal eye field 36 4 56  6.47 6/8 
right middle frontal gyrus 50 36 30  5.66 9/46 
right anterior middle frontal 
gyrus 40 46 28  4.99 10 
right inferior frontal gyrus 60 14 32  4.66 44/9 
right insula 34 26 2 406 5.98 13 
right insula/inferior frontal 
gyrus 48 14 -4  4.63 13/47 
right inferior frontal gyrus 46 28 2  4.18 45 
left superior frontal sulcus -30 8 60 53 4.45 6 
left superior frontal sulcus -28 8 66    
       
Parietal       
left intraparietal sulcus -24 -66 42 4502 9.48 7/40 
left intraparietal sulcus -34 -66 50  8.73 7/40 
left anterior intraparietal 
sulcus -36 -50 42  8.34 7/40 
right intraparietal sulcus 34 -60 42  7.76  
right intraparietal sulcus 32 -62 34  7.34  
right anterior intraparietal 
sulcus 36 -44 44  6.81  
       
Temporal       
left middle temporal gyrus -52 -46 4 71 4.63 22/21 
left middle temporal gyrus -60 -38 0  3.87 22/21 
right middle temporal gyrus 48 -42 2 55 4.54 22/21 
 52 -34 2  4.01 22/21 
Other       
right cerebellum 16 -76 -34 135 5.39  
left global pallidus/putamen -16 -2 4 34 5.27  
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left cerebellum -40 -70 -36 220 5.26  
corpus callosum 4 12 20 39 4.63  
right cerebellum/vermis     4.5  
left cerebellum/vermis -6 -84 -26 38 4.45  
 
Table 7.1. Memorial Selection. Whole-brain results for the memorial selection 
contrast (high selection – low selection).  All regions are significant at a threshold 
of p < 0.001, with 20 or more contiguous voxels.  Peak coordinates are listed in 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.  BA = Brodmann Area 
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Table 7.2 - Common Regions for Perceptual and Memorial Selection 
 
Region X Y Z Voxels BA 
Frontal      
left frontal eye fields/premotor 
cortex -25 5 52 2577 6/8 
left middle frontal gyrus -44 32 30  9/46 
left precentral sulcus/middle frontal 
gyrus -48 0 48  6/9 
right anterior cingulate/medial 
prefrontal cortex 2 18 44  32/8 
right supplemental motor area 2 6 60  6 
right frontal eye fields/precentral 
sulcus 44 6 44 1023 6/9 
right anterior middle frontal gyrus 38 44 26 286 10/9/46 
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars 
opercularis)/superior temporal 
gyrus -56 14 2 180 44/47/22 
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars 
opercularis -36 28 -4 63 47 
left insula/left inferior frontal gyrus 
(pars triangularis) -38 22 16 51 13/46/45 
right inferior frontal gyrus 36 28 -8 27 47 
right anterior cingulate cortex 14 30 20 24 32 
      
Parietal      
left precuneus/superior parietal 
lobule -6 -64 52 2761 7 
left superior parietal lobule/anterior 
intraparietal sulcus -22 -66 52  7/40 
right superior parietal lobule 24 -66 52  7 
left inferior parietal lobule -50 -38 42  40 
      
Temporal      
right suprerior temporal sulcus 52 -40 4 274 22/21 
left middle temporal gyrus/superior 
temporal sulcus -54 -46 2 207 22/21 
right superior temporal gyrus 52 14 -4 26 22/38 
left superior temporal pole -56 16 -14 22 38 
      
Other      
right cerebellum 28 -76 -32 307  
right putamen 20 2 12 84  
right thalamus 8 -6 2 35  
left caudate/putamen -14 0 14 34  
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left cerebellum -34 -60 -32 24  
left thalamus -8 -12 0 22  
left putamen/caudate -18 6 8 21  
 
Table 7.2. Common Regions for Perceptual and Memorial Selection. Results 
from a conjunction analysis comparing for both perceptual and memorial 
selection.  All regions were significant for perceptual and memorial selection 
contrasts (high selection – low selection) at p < 0.01 (conjoint p < 0.0001) with at 
least 20 contiguous voxels.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space and reflect 
center of mass.  BA = Brodmann Area. 
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Table 7.3 - Selection Unique Regions 
 
Perceptual Selection Unique     
Region X Y Z Voxels BA 
Frontal      
right superior frontal gyrus/frontal 
eye fields 16 -2 64 187 6 
right premotor/precentral gyrus 50 -6 54 34 6 
      
Parietal      
right superior parietal lobule 18 -60 64 179 7 
left superior parietal lobule -22 -58 66 121 7 
right temporo-parietal junction 54 -44 22 72 40/13 
left precuneus -10 -50 54 52 7 
      
Occipital      
left occipital pole -20 -98 -10 480 18/17 
right occipital pole 22 -98 -8 228 18/17 
left lateral occipital cortex -32 -84 22 56 19 
      
Other      
Putamen -22 6 0 66  
Brainstem -6 -34 -46 31  
      
Memory Selection Unique     
Region X Y Z Voxels BA 
Frontal      
left lateral prefrontal cortex -48 26 12 3445 
9/46/10/ 
47/45/44 
right lateral prefrontal cortex 46 38 18 1212 
46/10/45/
9 
left medial prefrontal cortex/anterior 
cingulate -2 28 42 1200 8/32/9/6 
right superior frontal gyrus 38 12 56 180 6/8 
right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 34 30 0 149 47 
right anterior cingulate cortex/medial 
prefrontal cortex 10 42 16 62 32/10/9 
      
Parietal      
left intraparietal sulcus -38 -56 44 1383 40/7 
right intraparietal sulcus 44 -52 44 1165 40/7 
precuneus 0 -74 46 233 7 
      
Other      
left cerebellum -42 -68 -38 204  
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right cerebellum 58 -64 -38 24  
right cerebellum 46 -58 -38 46  
right cerebellum 4 -88 -34 98  
right cerebellum 46 -82 -30 71  
midbrain/pontine tegmentum 6 -30 -22 29  
corpus callosum 2 8 20 39  
 
Table 7.3. Selection Unique Regions. Regions unique to perceptual and 
memorial selection.  Unique regions were significantly active for one task (high 
selection – low selection), significantly more active for one task than another task 
(task x selection interaction), and not significantly active for the other task (high 
selection – low selection).  Coordinates are reported in MNI space and reflect 
center of mass.  BA = Brodmann Area. 
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Table 7.4 - Forget versus Remember Cues 
 
Region X Y Z Voxels T-value BA 
Frontal       
left precentral sulcus 58 6 36 1624 5.81 6 
left posterior middle frontal 
gyrus -50 12 50  5.08 8/6 
left inferior frontal gyrus 
(pars triangularis) -36 28 26  4.81 45 
left middle frontal gyrus -44 22 36  4.18 9 
left medial frontal gyrus -8 26 52 744 5.2 6/8 
left superior frontal 
gyrus/frontal eye fields -16 6 70  3.59 6 
left supplemental motor 
area -8 14 66  3.44 6 
left medial frontal gyrus -4 40 36  3.12 9 
left medial frontal 
gyrus/anterior cingulate 
cortex -8 42 28  3.06 9/32 
right inferior frontal gyrus 50 26 26 457 3.41 45 
right posterior middle frontal 
gyrus 46 10 48  3.29 8/6 
right inferior frontal sulcus 50 16 32  2.96 9/46 
right middle frontal gyrus 52 16 42  2.59 9 
right anterior middle frontal 
gyrus 30 56 2 104 2.49 10 
right anterior superior frontal 
gyrus 28 60 10  2.37 10 
right supplemental motor 
area 10 10 68 42 3.1 6 
right insula 32 34 -4 42 2.42 13 
left inferior frontal gyrus 
(pars triangularis) 50 38 8 30 2.48 45 
right anterior cingulate 
cortex 12 16 36 24 2.08 32 
       
Parietal       
left inferior parietal lobule -46 -58 56 550 4.38 40 
left inferior parietal 
lobule/intraparietal sulcus -42 -66 50  3.79 7/40 
left superior parietal lobule -22 -72 50  3.3 7 
left inferior parietal lobule -50 -48 52  3.05 40 
left intraparietal sulcus -36 -52 54  2.1 7/40 
right superior parietal 
lobule/intraparietal sulcus 28 -64 58 158 2.44 7/40 
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right intraparietal sulcus 36 -66 54  2.35 7/40 
right inferior parietal lobule 44 -60 52  2.11 40 
right inferior parietal lobule 54 -36 42 49 2.36 40 
left intraparietal sulcus -24 -60 49 28 2.44 7/40 
 
Table 7.4. Forget versus Remember Cues. Regions significantly more active for 
memory updates to forget cues versus remember cues (p < 0.05), restricted to 
regions active for the memorial selection contrast (high selection – low selection) 
at p < 0.01.  Only regions of 20 or more contiguous voxels are reported.  Peaks 





Across six studies, we examined the psychological and neural processes 
underlying interference control.  Through the combination of meta-analytic 
techniques, cognitive psychology, and brain imaging, we uncovered common and 
unique components to interference control.  Some of the patterns of dissociation 
that we have observed have suggested that interference control may be parceled 
by the stage of processing at which control operates.  I consider each stage in 
turn. 
 
8.1.1 Interference Control Over Percepts – Selective Attention 
Consistent with previous reports, we found that selective attention was related to 
activation in the FEF, premotor cortex, PPC, and DLPFC (Desimone and 
Duncan, 1995; Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Kastner et al., 1999).  We found 
anterior portions of right DLPFC involved both when subjects filtered out 
distracting information (Chapter 7) and when subjects had to revisit ignored 
information (Chapter 5).  In both cases, these activations overlapped with similar 
control-related activation acting upon memories.  In Chapter 7, we also found 
comparable common DLPFC activation for perceptual and memorial selection in 
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the left hemisphere, about 1 cm posterior the right-sided activations.  We 
suggested that common DLPFC recruitment across memory and perception may 
reflect a similar reliance on goal information to bias processing in the face of 
interference (Miller and Cohen, 2001).  Although we did not directly assess 
neural activation to response conflict, our meta-analysis suggested that similar 
DLPFC regions were recruited across an assortment of response conflict tasks 
(Chapter 2).  Consistent with this idea, Rowe and colleagues (2005) 
demonstrated common activation in the DLPFC when subjects selected amongst 
colors (perceptual selection) and responses (response selection).  Interestingly, 
in addition to common activation across both forms of selection, the DLPFC 
produced different patterns of connectivity when subjects selected among color 
or response information.  The DLPFC showed stronger connectivity with extra-
striate cortex during color selection and stronger connectivity with premotor 
cortex during response selection, suggesting that the DLPFC provided a top-
down signal for regions critical for representation in each task.  Hence, the 
DLPFC may act as a common source of control, storing goal information that 
provides a modulatory signal that can act upon multiple representational cortices.  
Such representational cortices can correspond to percepts (visual cortex), 
responses (motor cortex), or memories (temporal cortex). 
 
DLPFC influence on posterior regions of cortex may act through intermediaries 
such as the PPC (Chafee and Goldman-Rakic, 2000).  In Chapter 6, we 
demonstrated a close association between the SPL and visual suppression in 
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early visual cortex, suggesting that the SPL exerted attentional control that 
filtered out distracting inputs.  The SPL, in turn, may have received goal or 
template information from the DLPFC that prescribed what sorts of information to 
filter out.  A future study examining functional connectivity between the DLPFC 
and SPL may find such an interaction.  An alternative account is that the SPL 
may receive signals from the FEF regarding where to direct attention (Yantis and 
Serences, 2003).  These interactions may also be modulated by goal information 
arising from the DLPFC.  Consistent with this idea, Sakai and colleagues (2002) 
demonstrated that sustained activation in the DLPFC predicted stronger 
correlations between the FEF and PPC that in turn led to more accurate 
performance during spatial working memory, suggesting interactions between 
goal-information held in DLPFC and spatial working memory subserved by the 
FEF and PPC.  Since spatial working memory and selective attention are closely 
intertwined (Awh and Jonides, 2001), there is reason to believe that similar 
interactions subserve selective attention. 
 
Our direct comparison of selection functions acting upon perception and memory 
(Chapter 7) suggested that very few regions were unique to perceptual selection.  
Regions that were uniquely elicited by perceptual selection demands were very 
close to regions that overlapped with memorial selection, suggesting that 
variations were quantitative rather than qualitative.  Behavioral work by Friedman 
and Miyake (2004) suggests that selective attention also has close ties to 
response control.  Hence, selective attention may be a common component to 
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several forms of control.  These results give neural support to the controlled 
attention account of interference control (Kane et al., 2001).  That is, control of 
various forms is the act of attending to relevant representations.  Such attentional 
processes can be brought to bear not only on perception, but also memories and 
responses.  Our results in Chapter 7 suggest that some subjects favor more 
diverse strategies for different forms of selection, but subjects that more strongly 
recruited common control for perception and memory demonstrated better 
performance.  Subjects that recruit common control processes may correspond 
to high span subjects studied by Engle and colleagues, who are hypothesized to 
have better controlled attention than low span subjects (Engle et al., 1999; Kane 
et al., 2001).  Using diverse strategies to perform multiple kinds of control may 
actually be a compensatory mechanism to overcome difficulties with controlled 
attention.  Hence, an interesting avenue for future research would be to compare 
high and low spans and the degree to which they recruit common control 
resources. 
 
In contrast to hypotheses of MacLeod and colleagues (2003), we demonstrated 
that selective attention processes can be associated with an inhibitory 
mechanism (Chapters 5 and 6).  In our studies, negative priming was associated 
with the down-regulation of early visual cortex during selective attention, and the 
up-regulation of that same cortex to overcome inhibition during re-encoding.   
However, it is unclear whether inhibition generalizes to other levels of 
processing.  Negative priming can act at levels later than visual processing, such 
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as in semantic memory (Fox, 1995; May et al., 1995; Tipper, 2001).  It remains 
possible that inhibition does not act at these later levels.  Investigations into 
whether inhibition also exists in later stages of processing may proceed by the 
careful identification of relevant representational cortex and the assessment of 
neural down- and up-regulation during selection and re-encoding, respectively. 
 
In summary, selective attention appears to be common to several forms of 
control, and may act to resolve competition from distracting percepts, memories, 
and responses.  When selecting among percepts, control may proceed with the 
activation of goal information subserved by the DLPFC providing a modulatory 
influence on the FEF and PPC.  The PPC may, in turn, select among competing 
inputs, selectively enhancing relevant inputs and de-selecting irrelevant inputs.  
De-selection appears to produce a lasting inhibitory influence that underlies 
visual negative priming. 
 
8.1.2 Interference Control Over Memories – Memorial Selection 
In addition to regions involved in selective attention, we demonstrated that left 
lateral PFC, particularly in the VLPFC, shares close ties to memorial selection 
(Chapters 3, 5, and 7).  Left VLPFC responded to memorial selection demands 
across different tasks, and across different time points of selection, acting during 
both memory updating and retrieval.  Moreover, other work has demonstrated 
that left VLPFC responds to demands in both short- and long-term memory 
(Braver et al., 2001; Cabeza et al., 2002; Ranganath et al., 2003; Nee and 
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Jonides, submitted), as well as demands on selection within semantic memory 
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; 2002).  Hence, left VLPFC plays a broad role in 
memorial selection.   
 
Recently, Badre and Wagner (2007) have hypothesized different functions for 
different regions of left VLPFC.  In particular, they claim that anterior and inferior 
regions of left VLPFC (pars orbitalis, BA 47) may be involved in episodic 
retrieval, whereas more dorsal and posterior regions (pars triangularis, BA 45) 
may act more generally to resolve post-retrieval competition.  Much of our work 
has focused upon BA 45 and has demonstrated that activation in this region 
correlates with interference, consistent with the claims of Badre and Wagner 
(2007).  Moreover, this region was also responsive to the difference between 
forget and remember cues in Chapter 7, a putatively specific contrast of 
memorial selection demands.  We hypothesized that forget cues had a stimulus-
memory incompatibility that lured subjects to the inappropriate information.  
Resolving this conflict required additional activation in BA 45.  Although we have 
not explicitly discussed BA 47, activation during memorial selection (high 
selection versus low selection contrast) did include BA 47.  Interestingly, 
activation in BA 47 to memorial selection (high selection – low selection) also 
correlated with behavioral measures of selection demands (MNI center -52 22 2; 
BA 47, 153 voxels, r = 0.66, p < 0.01).  High selection conditions may have 
placed a more general demand on retrieval operations (in addition to selection 
operations), producing the observed result.  However, this region was not found 
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to differentiate forget and remember cues, suggesting that it did not respond to 
memory conflict.  The combination of these results suggest that this task may 
hold some promise for dissociating mechanisms of episodic retrieval and general 
interference resolution. 
 
We demonstrated that during high conflict situations, the left VLPFC 
demonstrates greater functional connectivity with the medial temporal lobe 
(Chapter 3).  This result has been replicated with a different paradigm that 
manipulated demands on left VLPFC through trace strength, rather than 
interference (Nee and Jonides, submitted).  Hence, in situations of high demand, 
the left VLPFC may work with the medial temporal lobe to perform memorial 
selection.  This network of activation may draw parallels to the selective attention 
network.  We hypothesized that selective attention proceeds via a network of 
goal-related information in DLPFC exerting an influence on attentional regions of 
the FEF and SPL which, in turn, influence visual cortex.  In a similar way, left 
VLPFC may receive goal information from the DLPFC and work with the medial 
temporal lobe to select among memories in regions of storage such as inferior 
temporal cortex.  An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine 
whether the common recruitment of DLPFC that we observed across perceptual 
and memorial selection begins different network cascades during different forms 
of selection (FEF to SPL to visual cortex for perception, left VLPFC to medial 
temporal lobe to inferior temporal lobe for memory).  A richer data set coupled 
with structural equation modeling may provide answers to these questions. 
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Some of our findings provided somewhat mixed evidence for DLPFC involvement 
in memorial selection.  We found robust DLPFC activation for memorial selection 
in Chapter 7, weaker, but still reliable DLPFC activation for resolving proactive 
interference in Chapter 5, but no common DLPFC recruitment for resolving 
proactive interference in Chapter 3.  What might account for these variations?  
One possibility is that reliance on the DLPFC may vary as a function of selection 
demands.  In Chapters 5 and 7, we used color cues to elicit memory updating, 
whereas in Chapter 3 we used a spatial cue.  The phonological rehearsal loop, 
due to its reliance on timing, has a natural spatio-temporal characteristic.  
Therefore, spatial cues may map somewhat naturally to the phonological 
rehearsal loop, providing a means to perform selection.  By contrast, color cues 
do not have such a natural mapping, and may therefore rely heavily on biasing 
by goal information stored in the DLPFC.  A comparison of different selection 
cues may provide a means of testing this claim. 
 
In Chapter 3 and elsewhere (Jonides and Nee, 2006) we have presented a view 
of left VLPFC function that does not involve inhibition.  However, in Chapters 5 
and 6, we posited that inhibitory processes underlied the ability to filter out 
irrelevant perceptual material.  Hence, it is possible that some of our 
dissociations between memorial and perceptual selection may hinge on the fact 
that we have examined different processes (inhibition and recollection) across 
different representational domains (perception and memory).  A putative 
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inhibitory complement to our memorial selection task may be the think/no-think 
paradigm of Anderson and colleagues (Anderson et al., 2001; 2004).  
Interestingly, activation during the no-think (memory inhibition) phase of this task 
relative to the think (recall) phase recruits a similar network of frontal and parietal 
regions that we found for memorial selection, most notably in the left lateral PFC 
(Anderson et al., 2004).  Furthermore, lateral PFC activation is related to better 
memorial inhibition, as well as decreased hippocampal activation when subjects 
attempt to keep inappropriate memories from entering their minds.  By contrast, 
we have demonstrated increased correlations between lateral PFC and the 
medial temporal lobe with increased retrieval demands (Chapter 3 and Nee and 
Jonides, submitted).  These results suggest that the same neural regions are 
recruited for both inhibitory and non-inhibitory settings, but that the use of 
inhibition or the lack thereof alters the patterns of connectivity.  Lateral PFC may 
co-activate with the medial temporal lobe during recollection, but suppress the 
medial temporal lobe when memories need to be kept from entering mind. 
 
8.1.3 Interference Control Over Responses – Response Selection and 
Response Inhibition 
Both the behavioral study described in Chapter 4 and the meta-analysis in 
Chapter 2 suggested that response control may be subdivided into response 
selection and response inhibition.  Response selection reflects control while a 
response is being chosen, and response inhibition reflects control that ceases 
the execution of an already selected response.  The meta-analysis suggested 
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that more dorsal aspects of the frontal lobe (DLPFC) may load heavily on 
response selection whereas more ventral aspects (right VLPFC) may be more 
heavily involved in response inhibition.  Our behavioral data suggested that 
performing two concurrent forms of response inhibition at once was deleterious 
to performance, whereas performing response selection and response inhibition 
at the same time caused no behavioral decrement. 
 
As we suggested earlier, the DLPFC may play a common role across perceptual, 
memorial, and response selection as a region that holds goal information to bias 
processing.  In the meta-analysis, we found a significant cluster in left DLPFC 
when combining all of our conflict tasks together (MNI center -40 26 30) that was 
quite close to the common left DLPFC region found comparing perceptual and 
memorial selection in Chapter 7 (MNI center -44 32 30).  However, several tasks 
included in the meta-analysis also required selective attention (e.g. Stroop and 
Flanker tasks), so the closeness of these clusters may be due to common 
perceptual selection demands.  Mitigating this possibility, the go/no-go task, 
which had no selective attention component, also produced a significant left 
DLPFC cluster in the same vicinity (MNI center -40 32 34).  Therefore, common 
DLPFC recruitment may underlie all forms of selection demands. 
 
Response inhibition has been most closely associated with the right VLPFC, as 
assessed by tasks such as the stop signal task (Aron, 2007; Aron et al., 2003; 
2004).  Interestingly, this region also demonstrates robust activation increases 
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when subjects need to reorient their attention to imperative stimuli at unexpected 
locations (Corbetta et al, 2002; Shulman et al., 2007).  The efficacy of 
appropriately withholding a response to a stop signal depends on the degree to 
which the system can orient to the stop signal and use it to guide performance.  
Moreover, the ability to reorient attention depends critically upon the ability to 
disengage attention from an inappropriate location.  Thus, there may be common 
processes underlying response inhibition and attention reorienting, either at 
inhibiting inappropriate information (responses or locations), or reorienting to 
appropriate information (stop signals or unexpected targets). 
 
What might distinguish response selection and response inhibition at a neural 
level?  One distinction is that response selection can generally be prepared for in 
that responses are selected on the basis of current goals.  By contrast, in tasks 
that involve response inhibition such as the stop signal task, one does not know 
in advance that a stop signal will occur on a given trial, giving less room for 
preparation.  Hence, goal information (represented by the DLPFC), may be 
inherent in response selection tasks, but not response inhibition tasks.  As a 
result, response inhibition tasks may be more bottom-up in nature, by letting a 
salient external stimulus quickly produce a non-response.  By contrast, response 
selection tasks may be more top-down in nature, using goal information to 
prescribe the appropriate response to select.  If response inhibition is truly 
bottom-up, a candidate region involved may be the right temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ).  The right TPJ is known to remain deactivated until a salient target 
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appears, at which point it activates (Shulman et al., 2007).  This activation may 
feed-forward to the right VLPFC, which then inhibits an inappropriate response.  
As far as I know, this network has not been explored.  By contrast, top-down 
processing for response selection may proceed via DLPFC to premotor 
connections as described earlier (Rowe et al., 2005).  Premotor cortex would 
then, in turn, feed to motor cortex to perform the appropriate response. 
 
The meta-analysis suggested that the anterior cingulate is a region robustly 
associated with response control.  Much debate has centered around whether 
this region responds to conflict (Botvinick et al., 2002), errors (Gehring et al., 
1993), or error-likelihood (Brown and Braver, 2005).  Regardless of what the 
anterior cingulate responds to, one pattern that appears to emerge is that 
activation in the anterior cingulate modulates future behavior (Kerns et al., 2004; 
Brown and Braver, 2005).  For example, Kerns and colleagues (2004) 
demonstrated that greater anterior cingulate activation produced greater DLPFC 
activation on the subsequent trial, which was in turn associated with reduced 
conflict.  Hence, the anterior cingulate may enhance goal information stored in 
the DLPFC, which bolsters goal-relevant biasing. 
 
8.1.3 The Unity and Diversity of Interference Control 
Our extant data point to some poignant commonalities, as well as clear 
differences between multiple forms of interference control.  For perceptual, 
memorial, and response selection, I have hypothesized that the DLPFC provides 
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a common goal representation that biases processing in more posterior 
networks.  For each form of selection, the biased network differs.  Visual 
perceptual selection may rely most strongly on the FEF and SPL to select within 
visual cortex.  Memorial selection may proceed from left VLPFC to the medial 
temporal lobe to select within temporal cortex.  Response selection may proceed 
from premotor cortex to select within motor cortex.  In all cases a common 
DLPFC signal may give rise to posterior modulation, but in all cases, a different 
posterior network is involved.  Response inhibition may be a uniquely bottom-up 
system that dissociates from these other varieties of control. 
 
The hypothesis of common and dissociable recruitment may explain the 
checkered landscape of interference control.  Whereas correlations among 
different forms of control have been extremely low (Kramer et al., 1994; Shilling 
et al., 2002), variables such as working memory capacity have explained 
variance across multiple control tasks (Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2001).  
Common variances may be due to common recruitment of the DLPFC, whereas 
differences may be due to tasks that differentially load on different components of 
more posterior networks.  These results highlight the value and need for 
neuroimaging.  Behavioral studies provide correlations, interactions, and their 
absence to posit commonalities and differences.  However, many such 
behavioral measures tap only one level of the cognitive system, whereas all 
cognitive tasks require a complex interplay of multiple levels of processing.  It is 
difficult to measure each individual level of processing with data such as reaction 
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times, but neuroimaging provides a way to picture several component processes 
at once, simultaneously unveiling commonalities and distinctions.  Hence, 
although neuroimaging studies are costly compared to behavioral research, the 
gains that can be obtained by the richness of brain data may far exceed these 
costs. 
 
8.1.4 Open Questions and Areas for Future Work 
Although we have learned a great deal about processes of interference control, 
several open questions remain.  First, we have demonstrated that inhibition 
underlies some interference control processes acting during perception (Chapter 
5 and 6), and others have provided similar demonstrations on output systems 
(Aron, 2007).  However, it is unclear whether inhibition also acts in-between input 
and output.  That is, does inhibition also act upon memories and stimulus-
response associations?  We have yet to find evidence for or against this 
proposition and answering this question would provide important data for models 
of interference control. 
 
Second, I have hypothesized various different networks involved in interference 
control of each sort.  Strong tests of this hypothesis will require large data sets 
suitable for computing cross-correlations among brain regions of interest across 
different conditions.  These data sets will have to be large enough at the 
individual subject level to allow for accurate assessment of dynamic neural 
networks for each form of selection.  Although we have done some functional 
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connectivity analyses with the extant data, the number of data points that 
contribute to each correlation of interest is relatively small and sensitive to 
outliers.  Hence, accurate assessments of connectivity patterns may require 
much larger data sets collected over several sessions.  I argue that the collection 
of these data sets is critical to understand how the brain performs interference 
control. 
 
Our work has only briefly touched upon individual differences in interference 
control.  I have suggested that measures such as working memory span may 
provide interesting individual difference data that would explain some of the 
variations that we have observed.  Moreover, our work has carefully identified 
different component processes of interference control that can be applied to the 
study of patient populations (Jonides and Nee, 2005).  Our work suggests that 
deficits across multiple forms of interference control in patients may reflect 
deficient DLPFC processing, whereas deficits unique to an individual form of 
interference control (e.g. memorial selection), may arise via deficient processing 
in other nodes of our interference control networks (e.g. left VLPFC).  Precise 
identification of the processing pathways that are insulted can prescribe 
appropriate forms of treatment, and may provide a more careful means of 
interrogating deficits than gross neuropsychological tests. 
 
Finally, our work may inform programs targeted at training cognitive functions.  
Our results suggest that the broadest impact on interference control may be 
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achieved by strengthening the processing of the DLPFC.  Such training may take 
the form of requiring subjects to maintain goal information in mind while juggling 
multiple tasks or filtering out various forms of distraction.  Hence, multi-task 
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